

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

Orders From God? The Implications of Ethno-Religious Discourse and Transnational
Networks on Group Mobilization and Violence

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Islamic Studies

by

Heidi Elizabeth Rutz

2003

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
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
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
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
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To my Mom, for urging me forward and leading the way.

And to my family, without whom I could not proceed.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-------|---|
| DFLP | The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine |
| IMI | The Islamic Movement (in Israel) |
| JDL | Jewish Defense League |
| KC | Kahane Chai |
| LIM | The Land of Israel Movement |
| NRP | The National Religious Party (Israel) |
| PFLP | The Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine |
| PIJ | The Palestinian Islamic Jihad |
| WIG | Women in Green |
| YESHA | Yehuda, Shomron, and Aza (Gaza) |
| ZA | Zo Artzeinu |

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TRANSLATIONS OF SELECT HEBREW AND ARABIC TERMS

boged (traitor) [Heb.]

*din moser*¹ [Heb.]

*din rodef*² [Heb.]

Galut (Exile) [Heb.]

Halakhah (Jewish religious law) [Heb.]

Haram al-Sharif (The Noble Sanctuary) [Ar.]

Har ha-Bayt (The Temple Mount³) [Heb.]

kafir (infidel) [Ar.]

Sharia (Islamic religious law) [Ar.]

tikkun 'olam (repairing the world) [Heb.]

toshav ger (alien resident) [Heb.]

'ulama (Muslim religious scholar) [Ar.]

'Umma (Muslim Community) [Ar.]

¹ Halakhic terms identifying Jews who are traitors or dangers to their own community. Both may be put to death, either with or without a trial depending on the circumstances.

² See footnote 1 above.

³ "The Temple Mount" and "the Noble Sanctuary" are two different names for virtually the same geographical location that includes the elevated area around and near the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque. The remains of Judaism's Second Temple are believed to lay beneath the Dome of the Rock.

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I made an important finding during the completion of this research- that is, there seems to be a clear causal relationship between the *number of years* one pursues a PhD and the *number of people and institutions* one wishes to thank. The large-*n* data, at least in my case, suggests a strong correlation.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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Networks on Group Mobilization and Violence

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Professor Leonard Binder, Chair

Violence in the Middle East is frequently attributed to a rapid growth in what has been termed “religious fundamentalism.” At present, academics and policymakers are faced with the difficult questions of why, how and when religion becomes the basis for political mobilization and even violence. Many have argued that as globalization proceeds, ethnic and religious groups will become increasingly transnational. Others view such groups as an increasing threat not only to individual states, but to international security as a whole. Despite the present salience of such arguments, there is limited

evidence that transnational ethnic and religious actors pursue more violence than other types of political opposition. Therefore, the question raised in this research is what effect do transnational networks have on overall group mobilization and political strategy? Are transnational networks significant variables in impeding or encouraging a movement's ability to engage in violence?

My research focuses on what I refer to as ethno-religious nationalism. Ethno-religious nationalism is limited to those groups that 1) articulate national agendas through the lens of a particular religious tradition, 2) identify with "sacred" communal space often in the form of contested territory, and 3) frame political and religious goals within what I have termed "ethno-religious discourse." Although ethno-religious nationalist groups often begin in a "homeland," most nonetheless develop various types of transnational networks such as fundraising offices, recruitment centers, and other transnational structures.

I discuss partial and preliminary evidence concerning the incidence and types of violence undertaken by six ethno-religious groups over a period of ten years. These groups have varying degrees of transnational networks and are mainly located in the Middle East. Each has pursued a range of political strategies, including both violent and non-violent political expression. Finally, I examine whether individual ethno-religious groups reformulate or "reframe" their respective political narratives in the transnational setting and if so, whether there is any corresponding effect on levels of violence over time.

INTRODUCTION

If there were ever a “bull market” for academics, it is in the study of what has come to be known as “fundamentalism.” This is even more true of studies of fundamentalism that focus on the Middle East and Islam, and the range of books and articles on the topic promises to grow exponentially over the next several years. The existing literature on the topic, however, is at best a hodge-podge of different disciplinary approaches whose individual reference points are often at odds. This has resulted in a general and unmistakable dissonance in the literature.

Taken as a whole, the multi-disciplinary literature on fundamentalism can be broken down into roughly three different types of scholarship: attempts to define fundamentalism; efforts to understand its causes; and studies of its effects and future salience. The approaches that are mainly “definitional” focus on identifying the meaning, content, and ideological underpinnings of fundamentalism. Those that pivot on the question of causation often seek to trace historical, political, or economic origins of fundamentalism.¹ The third type looks at the *effects* of fundamentalism on various regions and within a broad

¹ These are mainly found in the field of Middle East history where fundamentalism has often been regarded within the context of civil society literature. See for example, Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Augustus Richard Norton, ed. *Civil Society in the Middle East* (Leiden and New York: Brill Publishers, 1995); and John Esposito and John Voll, especially *Makers of Contemporary Islam* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) and *Islam and Democracy* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.) See also, Esposito, ed. *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?* Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1997) and Norton et al. eds. *The Civil Society Debate in Middle Eastern Studies* (Los Angeles, CA: Center for Near East Studies, 1996 and 1998.)

range of contexts. This third category tends to be a combination of both policy and non-policy approaches. It also considers the potential dangers that fundamentalist movements may pose for the security and longevity of particular states or regional stability.² In some of these studies, there is an implicit assumption that fundamentalism is inherently anti-democratic and/or violent in its aims. Regardless of the approach to the subject, all of the literature on fundamentalism has tended to suffer from a lack of theoretical clarity and has often begun with the premise that religious and ethnic politics is based on static and ascriptive identities.

The literature on fundamentalism has also yielded a number of useful studies.³ These have offered typologies and sub-categories that sharply delineate between fundamentalism(s).⁴ These studies have provided useful distinctions

² Gilles Kepel, *Allah in the West: Islamic movements in America and Europe*. Translated by Susan Milner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); Gilles Kepel, *The revenge of God: the resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the modern world*. Translated by Alan Braley (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Bruce Hoffman, "Holy Terror: The implications of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Volume 18, Number 4 (1995).

³ Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, eds. *The Fundamentalism Project, Volumes 1-5* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press); Mark Tessler and Jodi Nachtwey, "Islam and attitudes toward international conflict: evidence from survey research in the Arab world," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(5) October 1998: 619-637; Mark Tessler and Jodi Nachtwey, "Palestinian Political Attitudes: An Analysis of Survey Data from the West Bank and Gaza," *Israel Studies* 4(1) Spring 1999. In 1976, Leonard Binder edited a volume that featured "state-of-the-art" research applied to the Middle East. See Leonard Binder, ed., *The Study of the Middle East: research and scholarship in the humanities and the social sciences: a project of the Research and Training Committee of the Middle East Studies Association* (New York: Wiley Publishers, 1976). See also a recent study on Middle East studies and approaches to the region in political science in Mark Tessler, ed. (with Jodi Nachtwey and Anne Banda), *Area Studies and Social Science Strategies for Understanding Middle East Politics* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999.)

between groups like Hezbollah on the one hand and the Pennsylvania Amish on the other.⁵ What is evident is that *if* there is something that should collectively be referred to as fundamentalism, it is certainly not a monolith. More importantly, despite little existing consensus as to the definition, scope, origin, and trajectory of fundamentalism, most scholars acknowledge that there has been a dramatic growth in religious and ethnic movements worldwide. It is therefore evident that something *like* fundamentalism has become an important feature of many societies in many different regions over the last half century.

The present study is concerned with fundamentalism as politics. In particular, it focuses on ethno-religious opposition movements in the Middle East who engage in what appear to be mostly nationalist struggles. The literature treating fundamentalism as politics (which makes up the majority of the literature) is neatly divided on the question of whether *religious* or *ethnic* politics may be understood using the same assumptions that under gird the study of other types of mass politics. More to the point, social scientists have long disagreed whether those groups fighting “in the name of God” are mainly *rational* or *irrational* political actors. In the parallel literature on ethnic conflict, the debate has been

⁴ The Fundamentalism Project has done this better than any other set of articles on the topic by devoting each volume to a specific theme and providing an introductory chapter that attempts to lay the foundations for a common dialogue and set of common assumptions about the contents of each article as it relates to fundamentalism. See Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, eds. *The Fundamentalism Project, Volumes 1-5* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.)

⁵ One of the early examples in this sub field is Richard Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985.)

whether ethno-religious actors are best understood using primordialist, constructivist, or instrumentalist templates.⁶ In fact, neither the rational vs. irrational debate nor the “primordial/constructivist/instrumentalist” triad for explaining ethnic conflict or fundamentalism has been completely satisfying. The obvious salience and complexity of ethnic and religious politics, whether involving violent conflict or not, has generated many more questions than answers.

Research Hypotheses

The present research focuses on political groups that are referred to here as ethno-religious nationalists.⁷ It looks at three important questions that are relevant to the study of ethnic conflict and more broadly, to the peripheral literature on social movements and religious fundamentalism. The first question addresses the function of political speech in the overall mobilization process. It attempts to shed some further light on how ethno-religious nationalist groups express their individual political, social, and cultural agendas. Ethno-religious nationalists frequently employ language that is easily perceived as irrational due to heavy doses of religious symbolism and a propensity to describe current politics through scriptural and sacred references. I refer to this political speech as “ethno-

⁶ This is often a departure point for scholars who write about religious actors- that is, the tendency to begin their analysis with an historical background of ethnic or religious grievances “from time immemorial.”

⁷ To my knowledge, Mark Juergensmeyer was among the first to use the term “religious nationalism” to refer to sub-types of fundamentalism. See Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.)

religious discourse.”⁸ The question is whether ethno-religious discourse is dynamic and responsive to concrete political changes in an ever-changing political environment? This discourse contains specific themes and symbols that appear to impart a political message to those for whom it is constructed. It nonetheless remains unclear if, how, and when (if ever) violent words translate into violent actions. I argue that there are crucial insights to be gained from carefully and systematically examining the use of ethno-religious discourse as a powerful political tool. Accordingly, ethno-religious discourse is viewed here as a unique and dynamic component of conflict tailored by political entrepreneurs to resonate in a given religious or cultural environment.

The second question raised is how and when do ethno-religious nationalists engage in violence or militancy? This question has been central to ethnic conflict theory. Here I ask whether there is any relationship between how an ethno-religious nationalist group portrays its own ethnic or religious "story" and how it behaves in the political arena. I offer new empirical information on a variety of cases that are neither frequently written about nor captured in existing

⁸ Rather than examining the official or state level politics that quite obviously impinge on the makeup and decision-making processes of opposition movements, I have concentrated on the group's own perceptions of political processes within their own societies. Alexander George has referred to types of political speech as the "propaganda of war" in George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1993.) Lisa Wedeen has taken a similar approach to understanding official Syrian politics by looking at the political discourse at the level of the state in Wedeen, *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric and Symbols in Contemporary Syria* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999.) By contrast, my research looks at what might be considered one of the political discourses of the opposition.

datasets. I look at the incidence of violence among several of these ethno-religious opposition groups over a period of approximately ten years.

The third question makes the initial assumption that ethno-religious politics has to a lesser or great extent become a transnational politics. That is, like all political actors, particularly those that are non-state actors, there are ways of pursuing political goals that extend beyond the formal borders of the state. This growing phenomenon is explored in the final chapter and focuses on whether increasing transnational networks have the potential to change the expression of politics and the process of mobilization among ethno-religious nationalists. How will ethnic and religious movements behave in an increasingly transnational political world? Does the presence of transnational networks affect a group's use of violence and if so, what types or degree of transnational networks appear most important and how might they influence the willingness to choose violence over accommodation?

It is still unclear whether groups and organizations that choose to engage in some form of political conflict (whether violent or non-violent) over religiously and ethnically charged political issues will ultimately succeed in the transnational arena. It also remains to be seen whether groups such as those discussed here are capable of exporting their respective ideologies without losing the central and most important goals of the movement. I therefore look at the development of specific *types* of transnational networks among several movements in various national contexts. Transnational networks, I argue, likely play crucial, if different roles, in the respective growth and

ideological development of a given ethno-religious group. In particular, I focus on the impact that transnational networks may have on the overall development of a group and on the incidence of violence or militancy. This area of study has recently taken on an increased importance as scholars have begun to consider the ramifications of mass globalization on local politics and the potential changes that this phenomenon imposes on the overall trajectory of a given ethnic or political group or on a given political struggle.⁹ These three questions have led to the following two hypotheses:

Hypothesis #1:

This hypothesis is partly based on the premise that ethno-religious nationalists are both rational and strategic actors. It assumes that ethno-religious nationalists participate in politics through the use of ethno-religious discourse. The ways in which this participation takes place may vary, but it is based on a rational assessment of political conditions by a given group whose program of action is based on a desire to win political goods. It is anticipated that ethno-religious discourse will reflect some observable change as political entrepreneurs attempt to tailor it within a given political environment. When the political environment also includes a transnational dimension, then ethno-religious nationalists must also understand how to mold and reshape the message it sends

⁹ The most interesting attempts at breaking ground in this area was done by Gabriel Sheffer in *Modern Diasporas in International Politics* (New York: St.Martin's Press, 1986.) The more recent literature on transnationalism is an outgrowth of social movement theory. A good example is Guidry, Kennedy and Zald, eds. *Globalizations and Social Movements: Culture, Power, and the Transnational Public Sphere* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000.)

to a non-local audience. These groups disseminate information about their objectives *outside* the homeland through transnational networks. These networks then will likely be tailored to be of maximum utility for the group in the transnational setting. If the political goals of a given group are disseminated via these networks, then it should be possible to detect a “reframing” of the ethno-religious discourse in a way that responds to both the external and internal (state-based) changes in the political arena. This reframing should be observable whether it is produced in a “homeland” context or whether it is constructed outside the home base of the group’s activities.

Hypothesis #2:

If it is assumed that only some types of transnational networks will have an impact on the actions of a group, the question becomes: 'what types of networks seem to have an impact?' Some types of networks may expand the choices available to the group while others may constrain the ability of a movement to mobilize. I argue that *most* types of transnational networks tend to augment the “repertoire of action”¹⁰ that movements may draw from in formulating their political objectives. At the same time, transnational networks may also present the group's leadership with a tradeoff by forcing it to decide between greater numbers of adherents and large-scale popularity or more secretive, clandestine behavior that limits the group’s ability to gain a large popular base.

¹⁰ This term was originally coined by Charles Tilly. See Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1978.)

Case Selection

The individual cases in this study constitute a cross-section of different types of movements within the scope of what is often considered fundamentalism. Some of the groups have engaged in violence while others have not. Moreover, the cases here are of varying sizes.¹¹ What they share in common, however, is a nationalistic orientation through deep attachment to specific territory and use of what I refer to as “ethno-religious discourse.” These groups possess specifically national agendas and articulate those agendas through the lens of particular ethnic or religious traditions that are part and parcel of a larger part of their respective societies.¹² They are inherently political in their focus and subsequent group activities and consider themselves strategic and self-conscious actors in the larger political arena of which they are a part. Nonetheless, the groups also view their importance as being integral to an often indeterminate, but ‘sacred’ territory.

It is therefore especially important to determine what makes ethno-religious discourse different from other types of political expression. I have tried to avoid the

¹¹ Unfortunately, accurate information on the number of adherents in each group is still unavailable. Not surprisingly, the leadership of the groups discussed in this study refused to disclose even rough estimates of the number of supporters.

¹² These are to be distinguished, for example, from organizations that have been called “new religious movements” that are a blend of symbols and societal influences, but do not claim, in most cases, to be representatives of a nationally based religious or ethnic minority. For an excellent review of ‘new religious movements’ in the field of religious studies, see Doniger, ed. *Merriam-Webster’s Encyclopedia of World Religions* (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster Incorporated, 1999.)

pitfalls of the term “fundamentalist” without attempting to argue away the obvious presence and salience of groups of political actors who attempt to “sell” themselves as both religious and ethnic actors. These actors often present a narrative that is detached from “time” and “space” and their political agendas remain quite ambiguous, hidden as they are behind myth, religious and scriptural references, and depictions of the “ethnic other.” These groups have proliferated by carving out a delicate middle ground between more secular nationalist programs and often xenophobic ethno-religious discourses.

The cases chosen for this study are also thought of as part of opposition movements that have actively participated in what is considered here a “cycle of protest” against both the Israeli government and, since 1994, in opposition to the Palestinian Authority. This period of over a decade starts with the beginning of the first *Intifada* or Palestinian uprising in Gaza in December 1987 and continues through the end of 2000. I have included additional material from the period coinciding with the second *Intifada*, also known as the *al-Aqsa Intifada*, which began in late 2000, because of the enormous impact this new period of protest has had on the politics of the region and directly on the cases themselves.

The cases presented in this study include groups that possess the following characteristics: they are 1) ethno- religious nationalist groups; 2) extra-parliamentary in the sense that they are not established political parties in any system; 3) to a greater or lesser degree *transnational*. Three of the groups have engaged in violence while the other three have, until now, embraced non-violent strategies. All of the cases, however,

are distinguishable from their secular counterparts in their use and reliance on ethno-religious discourse as a central component in their political speech. I therefore argue that the prevalence of this ethno-religious discourse is what primarily defines why these and other “like” movements have been deemed examples of “fundamentalism.”

Select cases of ethno-religious nationalism

The groups that are discussed in detail in the following chapters include three Palestinian Islamic groups: *HAMAS*, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Islamic Movement in Israel¹³, and three Israeli Jewish movements: Women In Green, *Zo Artzeinu* (This is Our Land), and *Kahane Chai* (Kahane Lives). Though each of these groups merits a more comprehensive study as an individual group exhibiting different and innovative organizational behaviors, together these groups form the component parts of a social movement within each respective religious community. Indeed, the religious opposition groups in Israeli-Jewish society are often collectively termed “the Israeli Right.” Likewise, Palestinian society has been bifurcated into the ‘Nationalists’ and the ‘Islamists.’ In many ways, these two different ethno-religious movements that emanate from each respective society share more common traits with one another than they share with their own secular counterparts. These two movements, despite the fact that they are directly opposed to one another, share a number of common traits in their political

¹³ This movement is based in the Palestinian-Israeli city of Um al-Fahm in central Israel.

behavior: First, these social movements are built on specific ethnic, religious and national symbols that together function as a distinctive ethno-religious discourse. Second, these movements claim a *religious* right to specific territory. These territorial claims are, according to the discourse of the movement, sanctioned and validated by traditional and scriptural sources from each respective religious tradition. Third, the leaders of these groups view themselves and their respective goals as transcending existing national boundaries for their larger respective ethnic and religious communities. Through ethno-religious discourse, these movements seek sympathetic co-religionists and co-ethnies and segregate themselves from potential opponents by carving the world into diametrically opposite realms of “religious” versus “secular,” “We” vs. “Them” and the “sacred” versus the “profane.”

All six of these groups disseminate an ethno-religious discourse through transnational networks that serves to advertise the main political and religious objectives of these movements. Indeed, all of the six groups mentioned above possess varying degrees and types of transnational networks in states and regions other than their respective homelands. In the case of the Palestinian Islamist groups, these transnational networks exist not only in neighboring Arab or Muslim-majority states such as Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen, but they are also found in western nations like the United States, Germany, and Great Britain where Muslim and Palestinian diaspora communities are but a tiny minority of the overall population. Among Israeli Jewish groups, fundraising offices have been established as external support bases for the groups in

countries such as the US and Canada, as well as in a number of European nations. These networks provide significant amounts of financial support, human resources in the form of volunteerism, and an effective channel for reaching Jewish communities outside Israel.

However, ethno-religious nationalists also face a fundamental contradiction: they seek on the one hand to redress some perceived evil or injustice found within a particular state or territory, yet the basis for their religious worldview is universalist and global. Therefore, movement leaders tend to seek to maximize supporters both with regard to their nationalist concerns, as well as for the purpose of religious identification with co-ethnics.

Given the broad range of things that could be called “transnational,” I have limited my definition to include the following: print, electronic, and broadcast media, fundraising offices, and religious training centers outside the “homeland.” In an era in which globalization has become a general trend, I consider it unlikely that a movement will forego the development of transnational networks. This should be particularly so if the development of transnational networks come at a low (especially monetary) cost to the group. To a large extent, the types of networks I have tried to measure here are indeed low cost and require no more than a working computer system in order to reach a large global community. In some ways, becoming global is the natural trajectory for political movements with a “universalist” set of goals such as religion provides. Because of the general trend of globalization, even groups that have a small number of supporters or have been deemed illegal by governments, find it increasingly possible to develop

even the most skeletal system of transnational networks within a transnational setting. These networks are often developed at very little or no cost to the movement because of willing supporters who work for very little compensation or receive none at all for their role in promoting the movement outside the homeland. Becoming global and transnational is also ideologically appealing for movements whose primary public identity as religiously motivated organizations provide the movement with an automatic “universalist” platform. Ethno-religious nationalists, therefore, seem to be successful in amplifying nationalist concerns, yet are still able to maintain strong bonds with co-religionists and co-ethnies on many religiously salient issues within their own communities. Hence, the role of transnational networks as effective channels for this diffusion of movement goals across various national boundaries is a question that grows in importance as all nations are swept up in an ever-deepening trend towards globalization.

Sources of ethno-religious discourse

Each of the groups included in this research produce and disseminate their ethno-religious nationalism through a number of different channels. Sometimes this dissemination takes place through specific publications that become the mouthpieces of a particular group. At other times, dissemination takes place through sympathetic co-ethnies either in the group’s territorial homeland or in the transnational setting. In still

other cases, group leaders conduct speaking tours in which they travel from one country to another advancing the group's political and religious platform.

Overall, the ways in which a particular ethno-religious nationalism is disseminated is no different from the ways any nationalism (or for that matter, political idea) is disseminated. That is, the "tools" of ethno-religious nationalism are the common tools of all modern social movements. For the most part, these tools include newspapers, magazines, newsletters, internet sites, radio and television programs. Both the Israeli Jewish groups and the Palestinian Islamist groups utilize all of these sources to promote their individual messages.

Methodology

The parts of this research that are based on how these ethno-religious groups express their political aims in ethno-religious speech is, in my opinion, a crucial factor in understanding both how they have evolved over time and whether fundamentalism has characteristics that make it different from other "-isms." Moreover, as noted earlier, few scholars have considered whether ethno-religious discourse is linked directly to political action. It has been implicit, at least in much of the literature on fundamentalism, that speech is predictive of action. I look for better evidence of when and where this is the case and then, draw a few preliminary conclusions about how ethno-religious discourse is used as a political tool and form of conflict. To do so, I have surveyed each group's public proclamations, manifestos, leaflets, and other primary sources. These sources are

mainly published in Arabic and Hebrew. I have also included English language materials published by some of these groups. The English publications, not surprisingly, are increasingly becoming a medium used by all these groups and generally are directed at ethnic audiences in the United States and other English-speaking countries such as Great Britain and Canada. In my opinion, these sources remain indispensable for understanding the micro-processes at work within each group and they tell us a great deal about the aims of group leaders even in the absence of a specific political program. Moreover, careful analysis of ethno-religious discourse has the potential to contribute insights that would be easily missed in studies using large-*n* statistical data.

Case material, nonetheless, has limitations. The public speech of a handful of cases says very little about the universe of cases that exist or could also be considered cases of ethno-religious nationalism. Therefore, additional work on this subject will aim to incorporate the relevant findings from cross-sectional data generated by the Minorities At Risk (MAR)-Polity IV project in order to draw broader comparisons with other like-cases.¹⁴ Other datasets that contain useful information on the incidence and targets of violence and acts of terrorism are also noted for inclusion in later versions of this research.¹⁵

¹⁴ Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk (MAR) - Polity IV* (1999). This cannot be undertaken at this time mainly because the MAR Data is specific to ethnic groups and not to political groupings within ethnic groups. In addition, although the dataset includes 275 different ethnic minorities, it does so only when the minority group is considered "at risk." Therefore, the data does not address political divisions within one ethnic or religious community.

Overall, I have sought to partially “bridge” the methodological divide between qualitative and quantitative research that has contributed to the distance between the disciplinary “state-of-the-art” and Middle East area-specialists.¹⁶ My research aims to contribute to general knowledge about violence and the influence of transnational networks on political opposition movements, as well as to area-specific knowledge of ethno-religious nationalism in the Middle East movement structure and organization in the “national” or “homeland” environment. Special emphasis is placed on groups that “frame” the conflict and their political goals in ethno-religious discourse in order to determine whether there is evidence that a movement responds to political changes either in the way it tells its “primordial” story or in its concrete actions. I focus in particular on the collective action frames used by each movement in both local and transnational contexts and attempt to identify observable change over time. The content and function of ethno-religious discourse within individual cases and try to assess their impact on the larger social movement of which they are an integral part, both at the level of what has been termed “civil society” and at the level of the state through an examination of how such movements have become institutionalized. I also examine how the same groups

¹⁵ For example, Jon Pevehouse, *Middle East Political Events Data, 1979-1995* [Computer File], (Lawrence, KS: Dept. of Political Science, University of Kansas [producer], 1996); Edward Mickolus, *International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, 1968-1977* [Computer File] (ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [producer and distributor], 1982).

¹⁶ Robert Bates et al, *Controversy in the Discipline: Area Studies and Comparative Politics*. (Symposium) *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 30(2) 1997: 166-175; Sidney Tarrow, “Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science” *American Political Science Review*, 89(2) 1995: 471-474; Sidney Tarrow, “Globalization and Area-Studies: When is too broad too narrow?” *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, January 23, 1998.

choose to express themselves in a transnational setting or for a transnational audience and to what extent ethno-religious discourse is strategic in this sense? It is my contention that “fundamentalist” discourse means something that has not yet been understood by scholars and that it is a complex political tool rather than a conglomeration of irrational religious beliefs and symbolic rhetoric that set it apart from the realm of realist politics.

Layout Of Chapters

The first and second chapters provide a historical context for the individual case studies on which most of this research is based. These two chapters place each of the cases within the framework of their post-colonial environments and within particular competing forms of nationalism and mass politics that have been formative in shaping societies in the Middle East since the end of WWII. These competing ethno-religious nationalisms are rooted in their secular antecedents, Zionism and Arab nationalism. These two chapters focus, in particular, on the emergence of ethno-religious nationalist groups in the Israeli and Palestinian populaces within these larger social movements.

Chapter One examines the emergence of Gush Emunim and the religiously inspired segment of the Israeli settlement movement since 1967. I provide a brief background discussion of each of the cases within that context. The rapid institutionalization of Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) in the early 1970s is

considered the one of the main impetus for current expressions of ultra-religious nationalism in Israeli society.¹⁷

Chapter Two addresses the emergence of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in its earliest years of development in post-1948 Palestine. The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood is known to have been a model for many Islamic movements like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad from the 1980s onward. An overview of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood is followed by brief discussions of three different Palestinian Islamist groups: Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Islamic Movement in Israel (IMI).¹⁸ While the existing literature on Hamas is sizeable, there is little on either of the other two groups presently published in English.

Chapter Three places the case studies within the context of social movement theory. It discusses the relevance of each of these literatures as they apply to ethno-religious nationalism and transnational networks among these movements. It also refers to the literature on apocalyptic movements. The ethno-religious discourse that emerges over the period examined here is dynamic in many respects and static in others. The literature of each group is discussed as a function of “framing” within a master frame. The discussion of ethno-religious discourse as a political tool is at the center of this analysis. It pinpoints how a group’s ethno-religious discourse uses apocalyptic elements

¹⁷ See Ehud Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.)

¹⁸ I am using the acronym IMI to refer to the Islamic Movement to distinguish it from other usages of Islamic Movement, but the group itself does not use this shortening of its name.

as central political concepts.¹⁹ The chapter also focuses on the discourse of opposition through an analysis of an ethno-religious narrative used by these groups in different publications during a period that is just over a decade in length. I examine the extent to which the political platforms of each movement were expressed through ethno-religious discourse during this period. I also examine how ethno-religious discourse seems to function within each movement and how it has been used accordingly for movement mobilization in the transnational context. The chapter breaks down the discourse into its constituent parts and looks at the evolution of this discourse through movement publications and public speech both in the national and transnational contexts. In particular, I develop a sub-category of the discourse called “strategies of threat”²⁰ that appears to be part and parcel of the discourse of these movements and how these function as part of a collective action frame within the greater movement. In the case of ethno-religious nationalism such symbolism forms the core of such “collective action frames” and sets these movements apart from other more secular rivals. Strategies of threat, I argue, constitute a unique *type* of conflict. This chapter also looks at whether a movement reformulates or “reframes” its strategies in a transnational setting and how this shapes the movement as a whole, particularly as it relates to advocacy of and implementation of violence to achieve political gains.

¹⁹ See Stephen O’Leary, *Arguing the Apocalypse: A Theory of Millennial Rhetoric* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.)

²⁰ “Strategies of threat” include references in ethno-religious literature that a) name specific enemy/ies; b) prescribe action against these enemies; c) justify militancy using scriptural references.

Chapter Four focuses on why some ethno-religious groups have chosen violence. Three of these groups (Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Kahane Chai) have chosen violence while the other three (The Islamic Movement in Israel (IMI), Women in Green, and Zo Artzeinu) have not. The incidence of violence among these groups may be considered within a single “cycle of protest” from 1987-2000.²¹ Within this period, I measure the number of incidents and type of violence undertaken by each movement. I also examine the importance of other variables such as ideological and institutional flexibility, a range of strategies from violent extralegal opposition to non-violent means of political expression, and whether ethno-religious discourse is strengthened, modified, or even weakened in its transition from local to transnational. Incidences of violence are discussed with reference to other factors such as government incentives, financial resources, and larger structural and political changes (such as an international agreements.)²²

Chapter Five covers new ground by considering the extent to which these groups are transnational and how effectively their transnational networks seem to function in the

²¹ See a discussion of “cycles of protest” in Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and Tarrow, “Mentalities, Political Cultures, and Collective Action Frames: Constructing Meanings through Action,” in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds. *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992.)

²² I approach these questions using both case-study research and findings of the *Minorities at Risk* -Phase III (MAR III). Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993). Jonathan Fox has also compiled a supplementary dataset to be used with MAR III. He includes variables that measure religious elements of ethnic conflict. His preliminary findings are discussed in Fox, “Towards a dynamic theory of ethno-religious conflict,” *Nations and Nationalism*, Volume 5, Number 4(1999).

overall development of the group. It addresses the structural limitations or lack of political opportunities present for each group that may have affected their ability to mobilize through transnational networks. It also questions whether this lack of political opportunity has actually impeded group efforts to mobilize. Of all the chapters, it remains the most speculative in its conclusions. This is both its strength and its weakness. Although I am certain that transnational networks matter, a complete picture detailing *how* they matter in each and every instance of group mobilization remains a question that can be better resolved by subsequent research.

Conclusion

Whether transnational networks have any observable impact on ethno-religious nationalism and especially on ethnic or religious violence remains a question of central importance in the discussion of ethnic conflict and fundamentalism in Middle East politics. The literature on fundamentalism in particular, has offered many predictions about the negative implications of ethnic and religious politics on state sovereignty. The presence of sectarian conflicts in much of the Middle East has furthered this perception and sometimes colored the ability of scholars to apply their findings to regions outside the Middle East. This research seeks improved and additional evidence about how movements develop both a political discourse and a program of action based on this discourse. In particular, I ask whether transnational networks have any effects on the ethno-religious discourse of ethno-religious nationalist movements and if so, what are

these effects? The questions raised here are equally relevant to ethnic conflict studies within the subfield of comparative politics and to the emerging transnationalism literature in international relations. There is no single discipline that directly addresses the questions posed above. This research therefore draws mainly on social movement literature and ethnic conflict theory. To a lesser extent, it also touches on some of the recent research addressing apocalyptic and new religious movements.²³ By carefully examining whether there is a link between what ethno-religious nationalist movements say, types of transnational networks, and the presence or absence of violence over time, much can be learned about the variables that shape the process of ethnic and religious mobilization. In general, this research seeks to contribute to empirical, as well as qualitative knowledge about the organizational dynamics of specific ethno-religious groups in the Middle East.

Finally, if what groups *say* and what they *do* are positively correlated at all, this research will make some inroads into understanding how and when this is the case. If there is to be something called “fundamentalism” that warrants so much scholarly attention, it seems necessary to further explore how it differs from other types of political activism. Indeed, the answers to such questions are critical if we are to make further headway in understanding when, where and especially “why men [people] rebel.”²⁴ This

²³ These two subjects have been most fully developed within the innovative field of religious studies.

²⁴ The brackets are my own. See Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970.)

research attempts to partially answer this question, but it also attempts to better understand the rational and strategic actions of political actors who, through the use of ethno-religious discourse, instead maintain that they engage in conflict and violence on direct “orders from God.”

Part I

Ethno-religious nationalism

...The question is not whether we will be extremist, but what kind of extremist we will be.

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.,
Letter from the Birmingham Jail, 1963

Like fundamentalism, the term “ethno-religious nationalism,” has not been satisfactorily defined within strict parameters. The ethno-religious nationalist movements discussed in the following pages embody characteristics that make them, in both the broad and particular sense, comparable cases. First, they possess *national* agendas and articulate those agendas through the lens of a particular religious tradition. Second, they identify the goals of the movement with *sacred* communal space, often in the form of contested territory. Third, they employ a unique ethno-religious discourse as a means of gaining adherents and promoting their cause.¹ In other words, ethno-religious discourse is an important component in the process of mobilization. Most importantly, despite each movement’s autonomous existence, each is also part of broader and deeper political trends existing in the Israeli and Palestinian societies, respectively. Each is one part of the collective narrative of the modern post-colonial history of the region and the social and economic forces that have emerged to fill the power vacuum following WWII. Both Israelis and Palestinians were shaped by the political, economic, and social turmoil

¹ More often than not, it is the last of these attributes that gains the movement the label of being fundamentalist.

that characterized the end of the British Mandate and the subsequent founding of the Israeli state in 1948. Moreover, prolonged periods of immigration and emigration of both peoples over the half a century since 1948 makes the political expressions of both Israeli and Palestinian movements important to the process of early state-building.

The following two chapters discuss specific ideological trends among both Israelis and Palestinians since WWII. Both polities underwent rapid development which culminated in many competing institutions. This was perhaps more evident after the 1967 Six Day War (or June War) when the boundaries of the State of Israel were redrawn and solidified along both new territorial and ideological lines. The new boundaries of each community have in large part been the source of tension between the two religious and ethnic communities. Most significant are the issues that surround the claims of each people to specific religious sites such as those within the Old City of Jerusalem.

In Chapter One, I trace the historical background of one of the most distinctive social movements in Israel known collectively as “Gush Emunim” or “Bloc of the Faithful.” I then turn to the individual narratives of three groups of ethno-religious nationalists that I believe each have an important function in the overall movement trajectory of Gush Emunim mobilization. These are: Kahane Chai, Zo Artzeinu, and Women in Green.

In Chapter Two, I trace the origins of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood as it developed in the post-WWII period. I discuss the ideological roots of the movement and its persistence and growth in the subsequent and rapid evolution of its more militant

successor groups, The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad since the early 1980s. This discussion is followed by a separate treatment of the recent evolution of a lesser-known group called the Islamic Movement in Israel (IMI) which by contrast to the other two Palestinian groups, is located and directed from inside the internationally recognized borders of Israel and is made up of Palestinians who are citizens of Israel. Each of these groups, like their Jewish counterparts, plays a distinctive and formative role in shaping the trajectory of “political Islam” as it is expressed in Palestinian Islamist politics.

Chapter Three places the case studies within the context of social movement theory. It discusses the relevance of each of these literatures as they apply to ethno-religious nationalism. It also refers to the literature on apocalyptic movements. The ethno-religious discourse that emerges over the period examined here is dynamic in many respects and static in others. The literature of each group is discussed as a function of “framing” within a master frame. The discussion of ethno-religious discourse as a political tool is at the center of this analysis. It pinpoints how a group’s ethno-religious discourse uses apocalyptic elements as central political concepts.² The chapter also focuses on the discourse of opposition through an analysis of an ethno-religious narrative used by these groups in different publications during a period that is just over a decade in length. I examine the extent to which the political platforms of each movement were

² See Stephen O’Leary, *Arguing the Apocalypse: A Theory of Millennial Rhetoric* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.)

expressed through ethno-religious discourse during this period. I also examine how ethno-religious discourse seems to function within each movement and how it has been used accordingly for movement mobilization in the transnational context. The chapter breaks down the discourse into its constituent parts and looks at the evolution of this discourse through movement publications and public speech.

CHAPTER ONE

Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful)

During the summer of 2000, as the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority were negotiating the terms of a potential territorial settlement set forth by Camp David II, the streets of every major Israeli city erupted in protests against the Oslo Peace Process. These protests were led by the well-organized Israeli settlement movement collectively known as the “Gush Emunim.”¹ The protesters, who were estimated to have numbered in the thousands,² successfully organized daily rallies in major city centers in Israel. Some marched in front of the homes of then Prime Minister Ehud Barak and camped out in front of the homes of left-leaning Israeli parliamentary members. Still other protesters positioned themselves along major highways holding up massive placards that bore slogans such as “*Achim lo Mifchadim!* (Brothers do not Abandon Brothers)”³ The political message that the protesters were attempting to send to the Israeli government was a very specific one directed at the Israeli and American negotiators who had come to meet at Camp David II in late July 2000. Their message

¹ The actual numerical difference between those who support the settlement process and those who are simply against any peace process is unknown and not adequately polled. It is estimated that there are between 180,000 – 220,000 settlers in the regions of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This does not include the significant population of settlers in the Golan Heights and is often presumed to make up a large percentage of what is thought of as the “Israeli Right.”

² Joel Greenberg, “Talks raising temperature of politics in Jerusalem.” *The New York Times*. July 12, 2000: A14; Margot Dudkevitch, “Settlers to begin hunger strike.” *The Jerusalem Post*. July 11, 2000: p. 3.

³ This slogan is an allusion to the Biblical story of Joseph in which Joseph’s brothers sell him into slavery.

was that *Eretz Yisrael* (The Land of Israel) belongs to the Jewish People. These protests, however, were intended for a broader audience than simply the Israeli government officials who engaged in the Camp David II negotiation process. The protests were also directed at undermining the final-status negotiations that were to take place between Israel, the United States, and the Palestinian Authority. The expression of protest messages that were displayed on placards and banners identified the “enemy” both within the larger Jewish and Israeli communities as well as the Palestinian and Arab populaces. Among the targets of the placards and banners were the Israeli media, leftist and secular parties and groups within Israel, and the United States government led by President Clinton and his special envoy, Ambassador Dennis Ross.⁴

Since the early 1970s, Gush Emunim has been more successful than any other single sector of Israeli society at mobilizing protests. The movement has galvanized support among Israelis, as well as in other Jewish communities worldwide. The most salient issue that lies at the center of Gush Emunim mobilization is that of *Eretz Yisrael*.

Gush Emunim activists have also been extremely successful in producing and sustaining collective action on these issues. They have cultivated government support and sought elite allies within specific political parties that have in turn advocated

⁴ The protests also were aimed at inciting Palestinians. The placards were placed outside Palestinian villages in both Israel and in the West Bank and in places where Palestinian laborers were waiting for transport back and forth to work inside Israel.

expansionist policies over the past three decades. In 2002, the number of settlers in the West Bank and Gaza is estimated at approximately 180,000-200,000.⁵

Origins of Gush Emunim

Gush Emunim is a collective term for the Israeli religious nationalist movement that, since the early 1970s, has dedicated itself to resettling areas of the West Bank and Gaza. Thus, the movement gained momentum and motivation following Israel's conquest of these areas in the 1967 War. It was initially begun by a handful of individuals whose ideological underpinnings were the product of two earlier religious Zionist organizations: *Gahelet* and The Greater Land of Israel Movement or LIM. *Gahelet* (Embers) began as early as 1952 as a small and secretive Torah study group for religious youth.⁶

The Greater Land of Israel Movement (LIM) was founded in August 1967 in the exuberant mood created by Israel's victory and territorial acquisitions in the Six Day War. The LIM, for its part, began as a single-issue movement dedicated to returning of all of Eretz Israel to Jewish sovereignty.⁷ Its affiliates sought direct political influence by asserting pressure on sympathetic parties within the Israeli Parliament and also by having

⁵ *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories* (The Foundation for Middle East Peace.)

⁶ See Gideon Aran, "From Religious Zionism to Zionist Religion: The Roots of the Gush Emunim," in Peter Medding, ed. *Studies in Contemporary Jewry II* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1986), p.117. See also Ehud Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right* (London: Oxford University Press, 1991) Chap 3, p. 49.

⁷ Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right*, p. 40.

members of the movement in key positions in the party.⁸ It had initial support both within Labor Party circles as well as within right-leaning parties such as the National Religious Party.⁹ LIM also began publication of a movement journal called *Zot Ha-Aretz*, which was in publication from 1968-1981.¹⁰ This publication served as the official mouthpiece for the formative years of the movement. By 1974, both Gahal and the LIM merged into what has come to be known as Gush Emunim.

In its thirty-year history as an active extra-parliamentary movement, Gush Emunim has made inroads through both official and unofficial channels. Its indirect and direct political actions have been undertaken in order to achieve its main goal of creating Jewish municipalities in the occupied territories that are deemed part of *Eretz Yisrael*.¹¹ Initially, Gush Emunim activists sanctioned only legal Jewish settlements, but within a few months of the 1967 victory, some supporters pursued the establishment of illegal settlements in open defiance of official Israeli policy. The first well-known Gush Emunim activist to establish an illegal settlement was Rabbi Moshe Levinger. As early as 1968, Levinger and seventy-nine of his followers moved into the area of Hebron in the West

⁸ For example, Isar Harel, a former Mossad chief, was elected to Ben Gurion's State List in 1969. The LIM had some representative presence in Knesset through the 9th Knesset elected in 1977. See "Land of Israel Movement" in Susan Hattis Rotef, ed. *Political Dictionary of the State of Israel* (Second Edition) (New York: MacMillan, 1993), p. 187-88.

⁹ "Land of Israel Movement" in Susan Hattis Rotef, ed. *Political Dictionary of the State of Israel* (Second Edition) (New York: MacMillan, 1993), p. 187-88.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Rick Hasen, "The Strength of the Gush Emunim Infrastructure." *Jusur 4* (University of California, Los Angeles, 1988) p. 46.

Bank, set up living quarters and refused to leave.¹² The resulting settlement, Kiryat Arba (the Biblical name for Hebron) is today one of the largest settlement communities.¹³ Levinger's actions set an important precedent for what has come to be known as a well-entrenched tradition of illegal settlement by Gush Emunim activists.

From the very inception of the movement, Gush Emunim activists have also made significant gains through their lobbying efforts with Israeli parliamentarians. Moreover, Gush Emunim has developed its own regional answer to political representation in the form of a parallel semi-independent institutional structure that has since grown into the movement's main representative body. This appointed group of regional settlement heads is called the Yesha Council.¹⁴ By 1974, Gush Emunim courted political allies in several Israeli parties. In recent years, some Gush Emunim activists have run on a Yesha platform and won parliamentary seats.¹⁵ Gush Emunim maintains strong supporters within right-leaning Knesset parties such as the NRP, and formerly within Tehiya¹⁶, Moledet¹⁷, and Tzomet, among others.

¹²Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right*, p. 47.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Yesha is an acronym for Yehuda, Shomron, and Aza (Gaza). It is also sometimes written as "Yosh".

¹⁵ See *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, No. 43 (Jerusalem, Israel: The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2002)

¹⁶ Tehiya was founded in 1979 by one of the early ultranationalists, Rabbi Moshe Ha-Levin Segal who was himself, a former Etzel and Brit Ha-Birionim activist. See Sprinzak, p. 32.

¹⁷ Moledet was founded by Rehavam Ze'evi and became a party in 1988. Its initial platform during this first campaign was a single-issue campaign calling for the transfer of Arabs out of Israel. Though it has

The formation of Gush Emunim discourse

Since the movement's inception, Gush Emunim activists have formed many of their religious and political views as students in the well-known Talmudic academy called *Merkaz Ha-Rav Yeshivah*.¹⁸ This academy was founded by two avid supporters of religious Zionism: Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Ha-Cohen Kook¹⁹ (d. 1935) and his son Zvi Yehudah Kook (d. 1982).²⁰ Both father and son have had an enormous impact on the formation of the core beliefs in Gush Emunim ideology. Their messianic form of Zionism was imbued with the view that if the Jews were to resettle *Eretz Yisrael*, that God would see fit to bring about the long-awaited Redemption. Many students of *Merkaz Ha-Rav*, for example, viewed the 1967 Israeli military victory as a miracle sent by God.

distanced itself from Rabbi Meir Kahane's forcible transfer, it is nonetheless considered by many as a racist party and attempts were made during the elections for the 13th Knesset to disqualify the party on these grounds. See "Moledet" in Susan Hattis Rotef, ed. *Political Dictionary of the State of Israel* (Second Edition) (New York: MacMillan, 1993), p. 394.

¹⁸The Mercaz Ha-Rav Yeshivah presently has over 500 Talmudic students and claims to have graduated many of the leading figures of the Gush Emunim movement. For their website, see <http://www.mercazharav.org/MercazEng/Netscape-eng/index.htm>. For an historical overview, see Sprinzak, "The Iceberg Model of Extremism," in David Newman, ed., *The Impact of Gush Emunim* (London: Croom Helm, 1985) pp. 27-45.

¹⁹ The elder Kook was also the first Chief Ashkenazi Rabbi of the Jews of Palestine in 1921. See discussion in Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right*, p. 31.

²⁰ Ian S. Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988) pp. 92-93.

Moreover, many viewed the Jewish return to the territories of Biblical Israel as a sign from God.²¹ Both rabbis Avraham Kook and Zvi Yehuda Kook wrote extensively about the spiritual and metaphysical necessity for the Jewish people to once again govern *Eretz Yisrael*. The elder Kook is credited with having merged concepts of Zionism with the belief in Redemption. He argued that Jews did not violate any religious belief by settling in the Land of Israel. To the contrary, he argued that the act of settling the Land of Israel was a necessary precondition for the Redemption. This argument, though theoretically at odds with the apolitical stance of Orthodox Jewry which strongly forbade any deliberate attempt to “trigger” Redemption, came to be a central ideological tenet of Gush Emunim.²² This messianic form of Zionism first espoused by the Kooks and the leaders of *Merkaz Ha-Rav* is a central component of present-day Gush Emunim ethno-religious discourse.²³ The *Merkaz Ha-Rav* academy remains a center for training rabbinical students sympathetic and a part of elite Gush Emunim circles.²⁴ Among its graduates and subsequent leaders are Ya‘akov Ariel, Shlomo Aviner, Haim Druckman, Moshe Levinger, Dov Lior, Zalman Melamed, Avraham Shapira, and Eliezer Waldman.²⁵

²¹ Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right*, p. 44.

²² Ibid, pp. 45-46. In the eyes of much of the Orthodox Jewry in Europe prior to WWII, Kook was considered a heretic for the views he espoused regarding the settlement of Palestine.

²³ Gideon Aran, “The Father, the Son, and the Holy Land,” in Scott Appleby, ed., *Spokesman for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1997):

²⁴ Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right*, p. 109.

The significance of *Eretz Yisrael*

Eretz Yisrael (The Land of Israel) is a term heavily weighted with political and religious connotations. It is used in particular by Gush Emunim to refer to an imprecise territorial entity that includes both the areas under Israeli control since 1967, as well as regions believed to be sacred to Jews since Biblical times. Some Gush Emunim members have actively pursued the resettlement of such areas. Many consider the retention of these territories to be a fundamental prerequisite for facilitating the Redemption. Intellectual debates about the exact characteristics of *Eretz Yisrael* are well grounded in Zionist thought as a whole. Issues regarding whether Jews were permitted to actively seek to bring about Redemption through a return to Zion were heavily debated during the early days of the Zionist movement. These debates have somewhat subsided since the establishment of the modern state of Israel in 1948 and more so since the 1967 war as the reality of Israeli territorial gains were increasingly justified by Israeli security concerns and the de-facto control of holy cities like Jerusalem. Nonetheless, among Gush activists, there continues to be debate about precise geographical boundaries of Eretz Israel and the religious role of Jews to participate in the return of biblical Jewish lands. Some Gush activists have gone so far as to argue that Eretz Israel includes territory now controlled by Jordan, Syria, and even Iraq.²⁶ Others define Eretz Israel as the area in

²⁵ Samuel C. Heilman, "Guides of the Faithful: Contemporary Religious Zionist Rabbis," in *Spokesman for the Despised*, p. 329.

which the Israelite tribes of Reuven, Gad, and Manasheh lived. Still other voices have invoked scripturally based claims to portions of southern Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and even Kuwait.²⁷ The Gush Emunim has portrayed the goal of resettlement as the most primary of its religious and political objectives.

Gush Emunim activists justify their territorial activism by citing historical instances of Jewish resistance to non-Jewish rule. One of the most commonly cited is the Jewish Revolt against the Romans from 66-73 CE and the subsequent catastrophic destruction of the Second Jewish Temple in Jerusalem. The Gush Emunim discourse considers this period one of inspiration since it was a period when individual Jewish movements fought the Romans in an effort to retain their territory and to bring about the Redemption.²⁸ Such messianic attitudes are repeated frequently in many Gush publications.²⁹

The “Jew” in Gush Emunim ideology

Historically speaking, Gush Emunim ideology has evolved out of religious versus political strains of Zionism and is conditioned by the belief that the Jews are the ‘chosen people’ and have faced ongoing persecution and threats to their existence. The way to

²⁶ Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right*, p. 46.

²⁷ Ibid, pp. 107-108.

²⁸ Ibid, pp. 20-21.

²⁹ Specific references to apocalyptic and millenarian symbolism is discussed in more length in Chapter 3.

alleviate this condition is to resettle all of *Eretz Israel* and rule it according to Jewish law.³⁰ Equally important to Gush Emunim discourse is the belief that since 1948 and the establishment of modern Israel, the Jews have lived in the Age of Redemption which will manifest itself when all the land is resettled. The Jewish People, therefore, are doing their part to assist God in repairing the world (*tikkun 'olam*).³¹

Despite its religious overtones, the primary Gush Emunim objective of resettling Eretz Israel has been periodically redefined by rational assessments of both Israeli military power and potential economic incentives. Hence, Gush Emunim activists have often been quick to promote an expanded formula of territorial maximalism when government policy seems out of step with Israeli public opinion. In the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, for example, some Gush Emunim activists revised their claims to include parts of Lebanon in these Biblical lands. In recent years, Gush Emunim leaders have discussed the possibility of setting up a separate court system based on *Halakhic* law.³² Perhaps one of the most notable examples of this was the pronouncement made by a group of rabbis prior to Rabin's assassination. A document circulated within Gush Emunim circles condemning the Israeli government's actions in

³⁰ Lustick, pp. 72-90.

³¹ Ibid. This is not neither a universally held belief by all those who support Gush Emunim political aims nor by those who choose to settle the areas under Yesha control. Nonetheless, Gush Emunim ideological foundations rest on this basic concept.

³² See Ehud Sprinzak's article in Lawrence Silberstein, ed., *Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective* (New York: New York University, 1993).

the peace process with Palestinians. The document called for a negation of all non-religiously sanctioned actions.³³

Gush Emunim discourse also incorporates the secular Jew and makes him a tool for the reestablishment of *Eretz Yisrael*. This inclusion of non-religious members of society somewhat alleviates an otherwise obvious fault line between communities of Israelis. To some degree, the fact that secular Jews have an important role to play in Gush Emunim discourse in itself discourages outright conflict between the two communities and enlarges the potential group membership to the benefit of Gush Emunim. Indeed, Gush Emunim members have rarely resorted to outright hostility towards proponents of secular Zionism, though some have argued that Kahanism had introduced an entirely new volatile potential into secular-religious relations since the mid-1980s.³⁴ Tacit tolerance of the members of secular Jewish society has also facilitated the growth of the group enabling it to attract new members from the non-religious camps. This trend was perhaps most visible in campaigns to entice Israelis to purchase homes in areas of Yesha.³⁵ Unlike that of other religious sectors of Israeli society such as the Haredim, Gush Emunim has succeeded in attracting supporters by marketing its political standing as one that offers both spiritual and political benefits and

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Hasen, p. 56.

³⁵ *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories* (Washington, DC: The Foundation for Middle East Peace.)

a strong sense of national belonging steeped in Jewish values. It has readily adopted or modified classical Zionist slogans such as that of the “wall and tower” which were used during the British Mandate period to entice secular Israelis to join in resettling the Land of Israel.³⁶ These slogans have been carefully reframed by Gush Emunim activists and have been at the center of mobilization efforts.

Beginning in the 1990s and coinciding with the increased contact between Israeli and Palestinian members of the “peace camp,” Gush Emunim discourse has undergone a visible shift towards exclusivism. Gush Emunim publications such as *Nekudah* (Point of View) have increasingly resorted to negative portrayals of those leftist and secular forces in Israel who seek to inhibit or impede the settlement process. The groups of specific concern to Gush Emunim include *Shalom ‘Achshav* (Peace Now),³⁷ *Nashim be-Shachor* (Women in Black) and leftist Knesset members such as former Knesset member Shulamit Aloni. These groups and individuals have been frequently portrayed as posing imminent threats to the Jewish state and the Jewish people.³⁸ Furthermore, those Jews who fail to return or resettle historically Jewish areas are not looked upon favorably by Gush activists.

³⁶See, for example, Hasen p. 45. The use of expanding collective action frames will be further discussed in Chapter 3.

³⁷For an interesting comparison of Gush Emunim and Peace Now, see David Newman and Tamar Hermann, “A Comparative Study of Gush Emunim and Peace Now,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 3(1992) pp. 509-530.

³⁸ The group known as “Women in Green,” for example, is known for its attendance and disruption of Knesset sessions. Women In Green appears to have adopted its name from its leftist counterpart, “Women In Black.”

In fact, this position vis-à-vis where the Jewish community resides is at odds with the traditional stance of early Gush Emunim. According to the Kookist interpretation of the Diaspora Jew, the Jew in Exile (*Galut*) was the antithesis to true Judaism and inferior to the Jew who settles the Land of Israel. Gush Emunim, Don-Yehiya notes “attack democratic liberal concepts such as tolerance, pluralism, and the respect for minority rights as symptoms of ‘Western influences’ that are both alien to the spirit of Judaism and born of a Galutic inclination to ‘imitate the gentiles.’”³⁹

Moreover, during the tumultuous period prior to the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, debates among Gush Emunim activists outlined the grounds for action in the face of actions deemed to undermine the safety of the Jewish people. In these discussions among Gush Emunim rabbis, religious terms like *din rodef* and *din moser* were frequently used to justify grassroots resistance to the Israeli government’s negotiations with the Palestinians and Arabs.⁴⁰

Since the evacuation of the Israeli settlement of Yamit in the Sinai peninsula as a result of the peace treaty with Egypt, some members of the Gush Emunim have resorted to a confrontational political discourse that is often openly hostile towards Israeli military forces that are often stationed in settlements in order to protect Gush Emunim from

³⁹ Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “The Negation of Galut in Religious Zionism,” *Modern Judaism*, Vol. 12 (1992) p. 151.

⁴⁰ Sprinzak, “The Israeli Right and the Peace Process, 1992-1996,” Davis Occasional Papers: The Leonard Davis Institute, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, c. 1996, p. 20.

neighboring Palestinian villages.⁴¹ In their mind, the State of Israel has not fulfilled its obligation to the Jewish people and that the IDF is the official arm of a “profane” state. While there have been few recorded instances of violence by Gush Emunim against IDF soldiers, the Temporary International Peacekeeping Forces (TIPH) who were stationed in Hebron encountered such severe resistance from the settlers that the commission removed its peacekeepers from parts of the city that are inhabited by Jewish settlers.⁴² In recent years, there has been a concerted effort on the part of Yesha to seek to host IDF units whose religious and political views are in step with Gush Emunim ideology.

The “Arab” in Gush Emunim ideology

While the definition of who within Jewish society is an enemy of Gush Emunim objectives, there is a second category of “Otherness” that is less dynamic. The most extreme elements of this discourse are a portrayal of Palestinians and Arabs that is highly xenophobic and racist. Muslims, Arabs, and Palestinians in this discourse are relegated to a semi-mythical “catch-all” category which emphasizes ethnic and racial features rather than those of national belonging. During times of acute political stress within Israel, Gush Emunim portrayal of the Arab enemy appears to be less nuanced and more

⁴¹ The Gush Emunim leaders in Hebron have recently alluded to the fact that they will do what is necessary to preserve their position in Hebron. They have openly stated that they will consider any Palestinian Authority as obsolete and that they will, if necessary, resort to defending themselves against forced evacuation by IDF forces.

⁴² “TIPH curtails patrols in Jewish section of Hebron,” *The Jerusalem Post*, August 21, 2001: p. 4.

xenophobic. For instance, Yesha Council rabbis Dov Lior, Eliezer Melamed, and Daniel Shiloh sent a letter of grievances to the Knesset which outlined the religious understanding of who could be understood as a traitor to the Jewish state. In the letter, the word used as a synonym for Arabs and Palestinians was “terrorists.”⁴³ Gush Emunim media organs such as *Nekudah* and on the radio broadcasts of Arutz-7 commonly refer to Arabs rather than Palestinians, thus stripping them of national identity and belonging.

There have been many scholars who have argued that Gush Emunim attitudes towards Palestinians have evolved since 1974 from largely paternalistic to increasingly militaristic. One author points out that Arabs were initially considered by Gush Emunim activists as *toshave gerim* or ‘alien residents.’ Under this definition, their civil rights were guarded by Jewish law. The wording of the 1974 Gush Emunim manifesto reflects this interpretation:

The Arabs of *Eretz Israel* and other alien minorities living there ought to be given the complete private and legal rights every person deserves. These include the right to emigrate, to own property, to free trial and all the other individual civil liberties.⁴⁴

This position was later restated in more blatantly hostile terms which were the result of the apparent realization on the part of many Gush Emunim members that the Arab residents would not accept their position, but would continue to strive for their own self-

⁴³ Ehud Sprinzak, “The Israeli Right and the Peace Process, 1992-1996,” Davis Occasional Papers: The Leonard Davis Institute, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, c. 1996, p. 18.

⁴⁴ “Gush Emunim: A Movement for the Rejuvenation of Zionist Fulfillment”(early Gush Emunim pamphlet, circa. 1974 in Hebrew).

determination. Sprinzak has noted the existence of three different interpretations of *toshav ger* within Gush Emunim circles. They are: “limited rights, no rights, and total war and extermination. While the positions are usually stated as reactions to particular events, each is anchored in an authoritative interpretation of Scripture.”⁴⁵

Xenophobic attitudes within Gush Emunim have often been attributed to the growth of “Kahanist trends” within Israeli society as a whole since the early 1980s. Rabbi Meir Kahane, a now deceased militant activist who advocated the physical removal of all Arabs from Greater Israel, published openly racist tracts on the Arab threat. As the founder of the US-based Jewish Defense League (JDL), Kahane’s views on Israeli politics and his attitudes towards the Palestinians were a direct outgrowth of his earlier religio-political ideology within the JDL.⁴⁶ Kahane’s views were unmatched in their extreme hatred and racism towards non-Jews. Kahane argued that God required all Jews to do what was necessary to eliminate the Arab threat and he considered inaction on the part of Jews to be equal to heresy.⁴⁷ In the mid-1980s, Kahane and his followers successfully pushed the margins of Israeli political discourse to new extremes with such slogans that referred to Israeli government officials as *bogedim* or traitors.⁴⁸ Even after

⁴⁵Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right*, p. 122.

⁴⁶Ibid, pp. 51-56.

⁴⁷ Aviezer Ravitzky, “Roots of Kahanism: Consciousness and Political Reality,” *The Jerusalem Quarterly* 39 (1986), p. 105.

⁴⁸ This term was again used by Kahanist and other right-wing groups during the period between 1994-1995 when the Declaration of Principles was signed by Israelis and Palestinians. It was used specifically to refer

his party Kach was banned from participation, he continued to speak out publicly and lobby Knesset members.

Nonetheless, Kahane is not solely responsible for this trend. Ian Lustick has noted the viewpoint of other individuals whose publications are rife with Kahanist themes. In particular, Lustick notes the prominent Gush Emunim author, Harry Fisch, whose books and articles remain popular in Gush Emunim circles.

Fisch dismisses the Palestinians as the exact opposite of the Jewish people. The Jews are authorized by the living God and creator of the universe as a legitimate, eternal people with unalienable rights to the entire Land of Israel. The Palestinians have absolutely no legitimate claim to nationhood or to any part of the country. They have experienced no real suffering, and have drawn together as an entity only out of opposition to the Jews. Theirs is a “suicidal” struggle for the elimination of the state and the people of Israel.⁴⁹

In fact, Kahane differed slightly from Gush Emunim on the subject of Redemption.

Kahane preferred to await divine intervention and Gush Emunim wishes to hasten it.

The Shift Towards Militancy

Gush Emunim was from the outset, an essentially non-violent movement. In recent years, however, it has evolved in several conflicting directions. Among the directions the movement has taken, there is an increasingly vocal element which includes violence as a legitimate way of pursuing politics “by other means.”⁵⁰ There were three

to Yitzhak Rabin prior to his assassination. It was also used to refer to Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak during the Camp David II negotiations in July 2000.

⁴⁹Lustick, p. 77.

initial periods of crisis for the movement between the years 1973 and 1981 that are believed to have caused significant ideological rifts within Gush Emunim circles and led some members to advocate settlement even by militant means.⁵¹ The first of these crises was the psychological defeat suffered by Israelis in the wake of the 1973 war. These events moved Gush Emunim to galvanize support for further settlement activities. Gush activism revealed a deep and growing mistrust of the Israeli government felt by many ultranationalists. Many Israelis during this period began to believe that Israel's physical and spiritual character faced a growing threat from secular and non-Jewish influences. Accordingly, they believed that the way to regain this existential and real security was to resettle areas of the West Bank and Gaza that had religious significance for Judaism. In the same year, led by the charismatic Moshe Levinger, Gush Emunim activists were successful in establishing Elon Moreh near the city of Shechem.⁵²

Further damaging to the movement's sense of security was the Israeli government's warmer relations with Egypt's Anwar Sadat during the mid-1970s. By 1978, Gush Emunim had been successful in laying the initial groundwork for further settlements within areas occupied by Israel after 1967. The Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, however, were viewed by Gush Emunim activists as a real

⁵⁰ Karl von Clausewitz is known for saying that "war is the continuation of politics by other means."

⁵¹ Sprinzak argues that this extralegal activism has continued to steadily increase among Gush members since 1978. Sprinzak, *Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right*, pp. 18-19.

⁵² Samuel C. Heilman, "Guides of the Faithful: Contemporary Religious Zionist Rabbis," in *Spokesman for the Despised*, p. 338. The city of Shechem is the Hebrew name for this city. It is known to Palestinians by its Arabic name, Nablus.

threat to further expansion of the settlements. In 1981, the crisis was further exacerbated by the evacuation and subsequent dismantling of Yamit. Gush Emunim feared that Yamit's demise set a dangerous precedent for other settlement evacuations by the Israeli government. Sprinzak argues that Gush Emunim ideology took a radical turn during this time and has since moved towards an increasingly radical and oppositional stance toward Israeli government policies regarding the return of occupied territories.⁵³ Sprinzak also contends that there has been a growing trend in Gush Emunim to legitimize violence as a defensive, rather than offensive, imperative.⁵⁴ This defensive posture is considered a natural response to what the Gush Emunim considers its vulnerable position in the West Bank and Gaza. It is also directly related to the growing realization that the Palestinian population is not likely to sit passively and allow the Israeli settlement process to expand. Sprinzak attributes this to an increasingly militant attitude towards the Palestinian population on the part of Gush Emunim and notes that

this early moderate attitude toward the Palestinians of the West Bank began to deteriorate in the 1970's. The change had to do with the post-1974 appearance of the Arab threat to Israel and the growing friction between Jewish settlers and Arabs in the West Bank.⁵⁵

⁵³ Sprinzak, "The Israeli Right and the Peace Process, 1992-1996," p. 23-24.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ehud Sprinzak, "Three Models of Religious Violence: The Case of Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel" in Martin Marty, and Scott Appleby, eds, *Fundamentalisms and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 473.

He also distinguishes between two different motivations for the use of violence: *vigilante violence* and *messianic violence*.⁵⁶ Vigilante violence, Sprinzak argues, is characterized by the notion that the Israeli government is a legitimate governing institution within Israel, but fails to protect its citizens outside of Israel's 1967 borders. In this sense, Gush Emunim discourse is able to justify defensive actions against aggressors as a means of protecting the settlements. Messianic violence, Sprinzak notes, is pursued in order to "trigger a catastrophe of large magnitude in the hope of facilitating the coming of the Messiah."⁵⁷ Perhaps the most notable example was the 1981 Temple Mount Plot by a wing of the settlement movement called "the Jewish underground." The plan, which was uncovered shortly before it was implemented, was intended to blow up the Muslim shrine known as the Dome of the Rock. After the plot was uncovered by Israeli authorities, it was revealed that its perpetrators had believed that the destruction of the Dome of the Rock would bring about the messianic age.⁵⁸ Sprinzak cautions that there was also a very plausible political motive expressed by those who attempted to carry out the 1981 plot. They believed it would ruin the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and stop the final evacuation of the Sinai.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Sprinzak, "Three Models of Religious Violence," pp. 475-476.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ For a good account of this plan, see Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right*, pp. 251-59.

⁵⁹ Sprinzak, "Three Models of Religious Violence", p. 476. Also by the same author, see "From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush Emunim Underground," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 10, no. 4 (Dec. 1987).

Dynamism within Gush Emunim

It can be argued that Gush Emunim's strength as a social and political force has been steadily growing since its beginnings in 1973-74. It is not however, accurate to view the movement as cohesive in all dimensions and like many Islamic movements, Gush Emunim has experienced splits and defections from its ranks. In many regards, it is a loose conglomeration of small and semi-autonomous organizations often with independent leaderships and political platforms. These smaller individual organizations often emerge as individual actors, while at other times they remain indistinguishable from the larger Gush Emunim ethno-religious discourse.⁶⁰ How these smaller movements come together to form the Gush Emunim remains an unexamined, but important question. These smaller organizations share Gush Emunim political and religious attitudes, have independent leaderships, fundraising bodies, and "pet" issues for which they lobby or protest.⁶¹ These component parts of the larger movement of Gush Emunim run the political gamut from those movements which advocate violence to those that limit their

⁶⁰ To the extent that Gush Emunim has a central representative body, it is the Yesha Council. See *The Yesha Report*, which is a monthly English publication of the Yesha Council and the Council's official mouthpiece.

⁶¹ They also appear to be aware that their individuality as separate groups is threatened by conformity with other groups and therefore, they often try and distinguish themselves in a particular arena. For example, Women In Green has regularized its protest activities by setting specific times and locations for its protests. Most often, members set up demonstrations on Sunday mornings in the Rose Garden area near the Israeli Knesset.

activities to legal and non-combative means. Examples include The Temple Mount Faithful, Ateret Cohanim,⁶² Gamla, Women In Green, Zo Artzeinu, and Kahane Chai.⁶³

The latter three, though part of Gush Emunim in an ideological sense, are officially extraparliamentary protest organizations. Zo Artzeinu and Women In Green are closely allied and share many ideological and structural affinities, as well as some resources. Both movements have attempted to carve out independent ground between themselves and the larger Gush Emunim leadership on the grounds that the latter's tunnel vision regarding the settlements has prevented it from seeing the overall problems of maintaining a Jewish state in other parts of Israel. Women In Green and Zo Artzeinu also consider themselves grassroots organizations. Among their many activities, they often lobby for Israeli parliamentary parties considered sympathetic to Gush Emunim objectives such as *Yisrael Beiteinu* (Israel is Our Home) and the NRP.⁶⁴ In doing so, both have acquired important allies in government circles and have been active in gaining financial support in the US and Canada, in particular. In this regard, Women In Green and Zo Artzeinu are indistinguishable from the larger movement of Gush Emunim.⁶⁵

⁶² Ateret Cohanim has its main offices in the Old City of Jerusalem near to the Muslim quarter where it seeks to acquire properties for Jewish settlement from Palestinian owners. The group maintains a close relationship with Gush activist Rabbi Shlomo Aviner. It also publishes its own periodical pamphlets written by Aviner and other religious figures.

⁶³ The latter three are discussed in detail in the following pages.

⁶⁴ Zo Artzeinu has recently shown some desire to elect its leader, Moshe Feiglin, to the Likud party.

⁶⁵ Notably, however, they appear to be separate from the Yesha Council, which has a number of influential Gush members in its ranks as either political or religious heads of the affiliated settlements.

Kahane Chai, by contrast, has been less successful in its ability to court official government circles because of its origins as a replacement or offshoot of the militant Kach movement. Membership in Kahane Chai, like Kach, is presently barred by an Israeli court decision from within Israel.⁶⁶ Kahane Chai has also been curtailed in its ability to hold official gatherings and publish its materials within Israel since the 1994 Hebron massacre and the 1995 assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.⁶⁷ Nonetheless, Kahane Chai's political platform and ideology has found supporters within both Gush Emunim and even within some Knesset circles.

Politically, however, Gush Emunim supporters espouse views about Arabs and the territorial borders of Israel that were in no small part the legacy of both religious nationalist and non-religious circles active in the pre-state era. These supporters included secular and socialist leaning Israelis who during the last few years prior to statehood, were active in underground movements either directed against the British presence in Palestine or were directly involved in anti-Arab operations.⁶⁸

Gush Emunim activists have also assumed important political roles as local or parliamentary officials. For example, Rabbi Shlomo Aviner is the leader of the Beth El settlement, as well as an important functionary for Ateret Cohanim. Other Gush activists

⁶⁶ "Banning Kahanists," *The Jerusalem Post*, March 14, 1994: p. 6.

⁶⁷ Many opposition groups reported that they were under government surveillance during and following this period. "Police to close down Kach, Kahane Chai offices today," *The Jerusalem Post*, March 15, 1994: p. 1.

⁶⁸ Sprinzak, pp. 27-32. There are also a growing number of revisionist historians who have dealt with this topic such as Benny Morris, Ilan Pappé, Tom Segev, and others.

include Benny Katzover, Rabbi Hanan Porat, and Rabbi Moshe Levinger. Hanan Porat was one of the elite paratroopers to reach Israeli-liberated Jerusalem in 1967 and was a Knesset member from 1981-1999 in both Mafdal and Tehiya parties. He is considered one of the early architects of Gush Emunim and is himself a Merkaz Ha-Rav graduate.⁶⁹

Kahane Chai (Kahane Lives)

Kahane Chai is best understood as it relates to its predecessor KACH. First, is a brief discussion of KACH, its rise to power in the Israeli parliament in the mid-80s and its subsequent decline on the official Israeli political scene. Second is a discussion of Kahane Chai, its leadership, and its stated goals as expressed in its ethno-religious discourse. Kahane Chai was literally created after the death of Meir Kahane whose assassination in 1991 was carried out in New York City by an Egyptian immigrant who was subsequently linked with a radical Muslim group connected to the World Trade Center Bombing in 1993. During its institutionalized heyday, the tone and extreme rhetoric used by KACH was a central concern to many within Israeli society. Kahane Chai has supplanted KACH and continues to publish its agendas, participate in the political process through various private channels and carry on its founder's legacy.

⁶⁹ This is from biographical information on Hanan Porat (b.1943) who appears on the Beit Orot Yeshiva homepage at <http://www.beitorot.org/orot7.htm>. The yeshiva was established in 1990 by Porat and other Gush affiliated activists such as MK Rabbi Benny Elon who headed the NRP-Israel Beitenu Party and was Tourism Minister in the Sharon government during early 2002. Elon resigned from the Sharon government in March 2002 over disputes between his party and Sharon over Israeli strategies towards quelling the second Palestinian intifada.

Although the younger Kahane was killed at a time when it could be argued that his movement was undergoing a renaissance, the group continues to operate and has reportedly grown since the outbreak of the second intifada.⁷⁰ Until his death, Kahane Chai was led by Meir Kahane's son Binyamin Zeev Kahane. In both its ideology and goals, Kahane Chai is merely an extension of KACH, though there appear to be some former KACH members who departed from within KC ranks and continued with the KACH name.

Kahane Chai expresses its views by using sympathetic settlement media circles, as well as a limited number of both Hebrew and English publications. The most well developed of these is Kahane Chai's official website. The website sells speeches and books by both the elder and younger Kahane and reprints of religious and political essays written by both Meir and Binyamin Kahane. Unlike either *Zo Artzeinu* or *Women In Green*, Kahane Chai rarely comments on the activities of other segments of the settlement movement. In this way, the group avoids having to assess the various activities of other groups with whom it competes for political support, but it also allows Kahane Chai to emphasize a narrow, yet explicit set of political and religious beliefs. Indeed, the ethno-religious discourse of KC is perhaps the least dynamic of all the groups discussed in subsequent chapters. Likewise, Kahane Chai's activities are rarely discussed in the publications of the other groups within Gush Emunim circles. It does, however, gain a

⁷⁰ "In the footsteps of his father, to the very end," *The Jerusalem Post*, January 1, 2001, p. 3.

certain amount of notoriety and popularity during periods of tension between Palestinians and Israelis. For example, during the first few months of the second intifada, Zo Artzeinu leader Moshe Feiglin has republished several Kahane essays in his newsletter, *Manhigut Yehudit*.⁷¹ This fact places KC and its KACH affiliates in a more marginalized political sphere than that of the less extreme groups. This does not, however, mean that the group does not have significant leverage within the larger movement of Gush Emunim. Rather Kahane Chai appears to be content to exist primarily on the periphery of the political scene as a reserve resource that can be called into service when the situation warrants direct and extralegal action.

Kahane Chai is said to have been the inspiration for and sometimes the organizer of several anti-Arab vigilante groups over the past two decades. *Eyal*, the underground group that participated in the assassination of the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin was said to be inspired and led by former Kach and Kahane Chai members.⁷² Other KC covert affiliations include “Dov”, “The Sword of David”, and “Lechi” (or “Warriors for the State of Israel”). More recently, the “Organization for the Protection of the Roads” targeted and killed three members of a Palestinian family by shooting at their vehicle as it traveled on a West Bank road.⁷³ Many experts, especially in Israel, estimate that there are many more underground cells dedicated to carrying out violent acts against

⁷¹ “Dear World,” *Manhigut Yehudit* electronic newsletter, April 12, 2002.

⁷² “Assassination of Rabin Raises Alarm Over Role of Kahane's Violent Followers in U.S.,” *The New York Times*, November 13, 1995: p. 10.

⁷³ “Road Rage and the Intifada,” *Newsweek* (Atlantic Edition), July 30, 2001: p. 20.

Palestinians both in the West Bank and within Israel itself. KACH and Kahane Chai have long been viewed as the most right-wing elements in Israel and according to one scholar, they have been either directly or indirectly responsible for a dramatic increase in vigilante attacks on Palestinian villages after the signing of Oslo.⁷⁴

Like KACH which was outlawed by Israel in 1988 for its anti-democratic tendencies, KC is viewed as representative of the right-wing fringe in Israel. The movement was explicitly mentioned in the formulation of anti-incitement legislation which was also used against other religious and rightist organizations after the Rabin assassination including Zo Artzeinu.⁷⁵ In addition, it is listed as a terrorist organization on the US Department of State list.⁷⁶ Almagor argues that because of the heightened alert following the assassination of Rabin, many movement activities and individuals within KC and other groups have encountered growing limitations on their civil liberties. Almagor notes that since February 1994, nine men have been placed under administrative detention under newly invoked anti-incitement laws. The individuals were Baruch Marzel, Noam Federman, Ben-Zion Coopstein, Baruch Ben-Yoseph, Eyal Noked, Shmuel Ben Yishai, Shmuel Ben Yaakov, Avraham Schaar, and Michael Ben-Horin.

⁷⁴ Rafael Cohen Almagor, "Combating Right-Wing Political Extremism in Israel: A Critical Appraisal." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9(4) 1997: p. 83. Almagor does not provide actual statistics to support this allegation, but it is one echoed by other terrorism observers.

⁷⁵ "The Proposed Incitement Law, Act III," *Ha'aretz*, July 17, 2001.

⁷⁶ "US bans 30 terror groups from fund-raising," *The Jerusalem Post*, October 9, 1997: p. 2.

They were held for period of 6-9 months and were not apprised of the allegations against them.⁷⁷

Most controversially, he argues that the “Law of Return” should not extend to non-Israeli members of these movements, thus effectively barring them from citizenship.⁷⁸ According to social movement theory, such actions on the part of a government (in particular, a period of detention without trial and the general way in which the Israeli system treated KACH) may be viewed as lack of political opportunity. Such actions reflect a state’s tendency towards repression.”⁷⁹ Sprinzak asserts that Kahane’s organizational activities were, until his death, a one-man operation and that all the movement’s activities were centralized under him.⁸⁰

Zo Artzeinu (This is Our Land)

Moshe Feiglin and Shmuel Sackett are the founders and current leaders of Zo Artzeinu. The former is the most visible and frequently seeks out opportunities to engage the media and Israeli political circles on the issues that concern the movement. Sackett,

⁷⁷ Almagor, p. 87. He argues in this article that this type of government response is contrary to democratic norms because Israel was not in a “real” state emergency during this period. He further notes that while the outlawing of an organization in Israel was acceptable, that the high level of “administrative detention” used by the state against the activists was undemocratic. He distinguishes between periods of “real” emergency and those he terms periods of “latent emergency”.

⁷⁸ Almagor, p. 85.

⁷⁹ See prerequisites for political opportunity structures as cited in McAdam et al. (1996), p. 10. See also David Rapoport and Leonard Weinberg, eds, *The Democratic Experience and Political Violence* (London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001.)

⁸⁰ Ehud Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991: pp. 211-214.

by contrast, appears to be in charge of the movement's publication *L'Chathilah* which the leaders claim has a distribution in Israel alone of over 70,000 copies.⁸¹ Sackett is allegedly himself a former member of Kahane Chai.⁸² Both men have authored many articles and even books outlining the agenda of both their movement and the religious nationalist circles in general and often appear in print or are referred to in other publications such as *Arutz-7* or in *Nekudah*. Likewise, *Zo Artzeinu* publishes the opinions and articles of both Women In Green leaders as well as figures such as Yehuda Etzion.⁸³ Interestingly, though the basic content of *Zo Artzeinu's* publications and activities are religious in nature, neither Feiglin nor Sackett are trained as religious authorities. In fact, of the Jewish movements discussed here, the only individuals with religious credentials were the late Kahane father and son.⁸⁴

⁸¹ *Manhigut Yehudit* (Jewish Leadership) Internet Newsletter, May 6, 2003.

⁸² Larry Derfner, "Right Wingers view themselves as conspiracy victims," *The Jewish Bulletin* (San Francisco, CA) December 1, 1995 (vol.144, no. 47), p. 25.

⁸³ Yehuda Etzion is a well-known activist in Israel. He is known most notably for his participation and subsequent conviction in court for his role in a 1981 plan to blow up the Dome of the Rock which is located adjacent to the Western Wall and presumably partially built on the site of the now demolished Second Temple.

⁸⁴ Books and articles dealing with religious fundamentalism have often stressed the importance of the religious credentials of the group leaders as a window into the overall ideology of the group.

The Women in Green

The Women In Green was established in late 1993 and considers itself an authentic extraparliamentary grassroots movement.⁸⁵ Unlike the other cases in this study, it is the only movement run almost exclusively by two women. It does not, however, consider itself a strictly women's movement. To the contrary, the Women in Green members are from a variety of backgrounds both with regard to gender and ethnic and national origin.⁸⁶ Nadia Matar, who is generally the more visible of the two leading figures, is in charge of all Hebrew media broadcasts while Co-Chair Ruth Matar⁸⁷ handles the English broadcasts. Decision-making within Women In Green is done by Nadia and Ruth Matar. Other members of the movement are voluntary participants and take on activities such as distributing posters and in maintaining the website for the movement.

The Women In Green do not publish any newspaper or journal that is explicitly their own, but frequently appear in both the publications of *Zo Artzeinu* and those of *Arutz-7* and the larger movement of YESHA. The official Women In Green website, however, is well developed and is the main link between the leadership and any of the group's members. The website offers up-to-date information on when and where protests

⁸⁵ *Taped Interview with Ruth Matar*, Jerusalem, June 29, 2000.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Ruth Matar is in fact, Nadia Matar's mother-in-law.

will take place, as well as offering commentary on various aspects of the political process within Israel.

Though Women In Green is an independent opposition group, it maintains close affiliations with other groups through its participation in larger protest events such as those sponsored by YESHA or Zo Artzeinu. . It would appear that this is primarily a function of size and is reflective of Women In Green's need to seek public legitimacy through formal or informal association with larger and better know movements such as YESHA.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ YESHA councils have been influential in the day-to-day politics of the settlements. YESHA, however, should not be considered as synonymous with the social movement of Gush Emunim.

CHAPTER TWO

The Palestinian Islamist Movement

In this chapter, I discuss three Islamist groups within the Palestinian communities that reside in the West Bank, Gaza, and in Israel. These groups may be referred to as examples of “political Islam” or as parts of the larger phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism or the Islamic resurgence that has become a dominant form of political protest in the Arab and Muslim world. Though, the subject of political Islam is discussed here only in its Palestinian context, many other “like” Islamist groups have originated in other areas of the Islamic world including those in countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Sudan. In some ways, though these groups are often autonomous organizations and sufficiently different from one another, most derive the basic elements of their religious and political platforms from the greater trend towards religious revivalism which has been on the rise in the Arab and Islamic world since the 1970s.¹ Many of these Islamic movements have concentrated on reforming the Muslim communities of which they are a part while others seek rapid political change through armed struggle and the overthrow of existing regimes.

The Islamic movements have been influenced by many factors, based on both ideological and political change. Among these influences are two that should be noted:

¹ For an excellent overview of Islamic fundamentalism, see Zohair Mir Husain, *Global Islamic Politics* (1995.) Beverley Milton Edwards provides an excellent background on the Palestinian movements. See Milton Edwards, *Islamic Politics in Palestine* (London and New York: Tauris Academic Publishers, 1996.)

First, most Islamic movements have structured their organizations and institutions either formally or informally, on the model of the Muslim Brotherhood first formed in Egypt in 1928. Second, the success of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 as a model for the Islamic state has been a source of inspiration for most Islamic movements and has inspired their leaders, whether Sunni or Shi'i.

This chapter first briefly summarizes the main developments within the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood since the 1940s. It draws a distinction between the developmental dissonance between the West Bank and Gaza which has affected movement size, leadership and ideological scope particularly since 1967. Most of the historical development of Palestinian Islamism, however, has been well-covered elsewhere² and therefore, is noted here only as a context for discussing the individual cases of Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Islamic Movement.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine

From an ideological standpoint, it may be argued that religious and political tracts written by a handful of prominent figures within the Muslim Brotherhood largely laid the groundwork for what is now a distinct genre of Islamist literature. This Islamist literary genre forms much of the ideological backbone of today's Islamic movements, whether in Palestine or elsewhere and is merely indicative of a type of discourse rather than a program for political action.

² In particular, see Ziad Abu Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.)

The Muslim Brotherhood's early activities in Palestine are of more immediate interest to this study, but the organization's general development in the region also greatly influenced the development of both Palestinian Islamic movements and other Islamic movements in the immediate surrounding regions of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. In Palestinian society, the Muslim Brotherhood has been the main Islamic association since the 1930s.³ It is widely respected and has historically been engaged in a wide array of political and social activities. More recently, Islamist movements have sought inspiration and a model in the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. The Iranian Islamic Revolution provided a direct and visible application of Islamist ideology. It came to be viewed not only as a successful model for many Islamic movements by replacing a "westoxified" monarchy, but because it also succeeded in forming what is perhaps the first truly Islamic state since the early period of Islam.

In an article about the evolution of Palestinian Islamism, Legrain suggests that Palestinian Islamic movements have exhibited two tendencies: The first tendency is revolutionary and seeks political change "from above" through a direct overthrow of the government or existing political authority. This model is one based on that of the Iranian Revolution. The second tendency seeks the re-Islamization of society "from below."⁴

³ The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, by contrast, was formed in 1945 and according to one author, never threatened the Jordanian monarchy with violence, but maintained a largely formalized structure as a social movement organization (SMO.) See Quintan Wiktorowicz's discussion in *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan* (Albany, NY: State University of New York (SUNY) Press, 2001), p. 4.

This categorization is useful as a basis for discussing all religiously motivated movements, not only Islamic movements. But it is especially useful for looking at the small and almost imperceptible shifts that have occurred towards the more revolutionary model throughout the decade between 1990-2000. Hamas was formed in 1988 and at the outset, was clearly and strongly committed to political change from below (in the style of its predecessor movement, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian Mujamma‘. However, the outbreak of the first intifada and the competition Hamas encountered from other Islamic groups within the Palestinian political arena forced it to adopt the revolutionary method almost immediately. By 1989, nearly two years into its existence, Hamas began to engage in attacks on Israel, thus adopting a direct method of confrontation and struggle with its enemies that Legrain describes as “Islamization from above.”⁵ The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, by contrast, was formed in 1945 and according to one author, never threatened the Jordanian monarchy with violence and maintained a largely formalized structure as a social movement organization (SMO).⁶

⁴ Jean-Francois Legrain, “Palestinian Islamisms: Patriotism as a Condition of their Expansion,” in Marty and Appleby, eds. *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements* (Volume 4) (The University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 414.

⁵ Hammami argues that prior to 1989, Hamas’ most visible participatory function in the intifada was that it tacitly supported a smear campaign against unveiled women in the occupied territories. See Hammami, “From Immodesty to Collaboration: Hamas, the Women’s Movement, and National Identity in the Intifada,” in Beinun and Stork, eds. *Political Islam* (Los Angeles and Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1997).

⁶ Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan* (NY: State University of New York Press (SUNY), 2001), p. 4.

The Islamic Resistance Movement- *Hamas*

The Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, known as Hamas, evolved directly out of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza in the early months of the first Palestinian *intifada* of December 1987. Before the outbreak of the Intifada, Hamas was not known as a separate organization. The newly independent Hamas made its initial entry into the public sphere in early 1988 with a communique (*bayan*) that proclaimed the emergence of a new Islamic movement devoted to taking a leadership role in the *intifada*. Since 1987, Hamas has grown into one of the most well known militant Islamic movements.⁷ It has gained public acceptance and support through a variety of organizational activities ranging from active and militant resistance to Israel. Though Hamas continues to view itself as a branch of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, it represents a physical and ideological break with Muslim Brotherhood ideology in many respects. Hamas, unlike the Muslim Brotherhood of the 1980s, views the struggle against Israeli occupation of what it considers to be Palestinian lands to be the issue of foremost importance for Palestinians. By contrast, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood's long commitment to the process of spiritual and political reform of Muslim society is a secondary goal for Hamas.⁸

⁷ I have made the argument that it is really more appropriate to consider the Muslim Brotherhood as loosely representative of more nationally based organizations such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, and the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood.

A number of leading Hamas figures, including the current Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, were previously active members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza. Ziad Abu Amr (1993) has argued that Hamas' sudden disassociation from the core of veteran members of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood may have been intended to protect the latter from Israeli reprisals during the *intifada*.⁹ Another view of Hamas' origins which is more often repeated in articles about the establishment of the group is that it began as an effort by Brotherhood leaders to repair the image of the Muslim Brotherhood in the eyes of the Palestinian populace at a time when the Muslim Brotherhood's appeal had been severely diminished and other movements, both in the secular nationalist camp and other Islamic movements had grown in popularity.¹⁰ The Palestinian Brotherhood, it is argued, favored non-violent confrontation with the Israelis during some of the most difficult periods of Israeli occupation and thus was increasingly seen within Palestinian society as a largely passive organization that had lost important support to other factions such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.¹¹ The Palestinian Brotherhood is also alleged to have expended considerable resources on heavily

⁸ One author has traced the origins of Hamas to the Palestinian *Mujamma'* and argued that the role of the latter increased steadily in Palestinian politics throughout the 1970s and 80s. See Chapter One in Mishal and Sela for the details on the *Mujamma'*'s evolution.

⁹ Abu Amr also posits that *Hamas* may have been a response to the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU.) See Ziad Abu Amr, "Hamas: A Background." *Journal of Palestine Studies*, XXII (Summer 1993) p.11.

¹⁰ See discussion by Mishal and Sela, pp. 13-26.

¹¹ Khaled Hroub, *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000), p. 33.

criticizing other Palestinian groups and thus, was also viewed by many in the Palestinian public as divisive and counterproductive to overall Palestinian resistance.¹² Shadid (1988) argues that during the early 1980s, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood pursued a slander campaign against Fatah and the PLO that was meant to curb the influence of “non-Islamic” nationalist forces.¹³

Overall, it is evident that the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic reform organizations at this time, as well as many in the nationalist camp, seem to have been eclipsed by more visibly active Palestinian Islamic groups like Hamas during the period just prior to and during the first intifada in 1987.¹⁴ Several prominent Muslim Brotherhood members are believed to have left the Brotherhood at this time as a result of the Brotherhood’s smear campaign against the nationalists.¹⁵ Most significantly, Palestinian public opinion at this time appears to have been unsupportive of the Brotherhood. According to Shadid, between 1984 and 1986, less than 10% of the Palestinian populace in the West Bank and Gaza favored the Muslim Brotherhood’s “transitional concept of *jihad*” and the sacrifice of one’s self to overcome personal

¹² Milton Edwards, p.

¹³ Muhammad Shadid, “The Muslim Brotherhood movement in the West Bank and Gaza,” *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 10, no. 2 (1988) p. 682. The author’s notes indicate that his research was conducted during the mid-1980s and therefore, was probably completed before Hamas was established.

¹⁴ Hroub, p. 32.

¹⁵ Muhammad Shadid, “The Muslim Brotherhood movement in the West Bank and Gaza,” p. 658.

desires....’¹⁶ The emergence of Hamas, therefore, filled this political vacuum and spared the Brotherhood an even greater decrease in popularity. Moreover, Hamas also quickly gained the confidence of many Palestinians through its swift and active program for liberating Palestine from Israeli rule during and after the intifada.

Alternative theories surrounding the emergence of Hamas include those that suggest that Hamas was formed in order to reclaim political support for Sunni Islamist movements. One often cited theory is that the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (which had been formed in the early 1980s, had experienced its own increase in popularity during the latter part of the decade. Like Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad had distinguished itself from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood from its inception the early 1980s.¹⁷ The PIJ gained recognition among the Palestinian public by staging daring attacks on Israeli targets since the late 1980s.¹⁸ The success of these violent strategies gained the PIJ a base of popular support. This support for the PIJ is thought to have posed an unwelcome challenge to the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood whose historically strong public support in Palestinian areas had swiftly declined.¹⁹ Unlike the more secular PLO, the PIJ was

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 682.

¹⁷ Ziad Abu Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994) p. 93.

¹⁸ The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel maintains a database of all attacks committed by groups that have been labeled as terrorist groups. According to the ICT database, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad is credited with more than 50 attacks on various targets since 1989. Other violence attributed to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad took place against other Palestinian groups in the early 1980s, especially in Gaza.

¹⁹ Ziad Abu Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*, p. 21.

successfully emerging with a growing reputation as the most promising Islamic voice in Palestine. Its founder and leader, Fathi Shikaki, openly praised the success of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and held it up as a potential model for the Palestinians. More significantly, the PIJ became the only Palestinian Muslim movement at that time to openly espouse ecumenism by making frequent references to Shi'is doctrines.²⁰ While the actual number of Palestinian Shi'is was insignificant for the movement, the possibility that it might gain further public recognition from movements like Hezbollah may have been a matter of concern for the strictly Sunni-oriented Brotherhood.²¹

The extent to which the creation of Hamas was a clean break with the traditional Muslim Brotherhood remains a matter of debate. More important is the fact that Sheikh Ahmad Yasin and the other primary "inside" leaders of Hamas have taken on a leading role in Palestinian politics since their beginnings in the first intifada. Since 1987, their popularity has gone from a minimal. Nonetheless, in just over a decade, Hamas has carved out a stable political base within the West Bank and Gaza that is of significant importance. Hamas leaders have been less interested in first pursuing the Islamic transformation of society as is advocated by the Brotherhood. Instead, they have made it

²⁰ Thomas Mayer, "Pro-Iranian Fundamentalism in Gaza," in Emmanuel Sivan and Menachem Friedman, eds., *Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East* (New York: SUNY Press, 1990) pp. 143-156.

²¹ While this assertion has not been proven, it is often discussed by authors and I subscribe to this theory. See Musa K Budeiri, "The Nationalist Dimension of Islamic Movements in Palestinian Politics," (Review Essay) *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (Spring 1995) p. 91.

their primary goal to procure the liberation of Palestine before the re-Islamicization of society can begin.²²

The veteran leaders of Hamas, nearly all of whom were Brotherhood members, may have well understood the urgent need to repair the image of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian populace at the outbreak of the first intifada. Their ability to invigorate a more active and confrontational “wing” of the Muslim Brotherhood which would be able to compete with the growing popularity of both the PLO and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad was largely the brainchild of a small group of individuals.

Some of the most prominent leaders of Hamas besides Sheikh Ahmad Yasin include Dr. Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, Mahmoud al-Zahhar²³, and Sheikh Tamimi, a religious leader and teacher from al-Aqsa in Jerusalem who established the West Bank branch of Hamas.²⁴

²² Abu Amr, “Hamas,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, p. 9. It is not clear that Hamas intended to become what is now a separate movement, though ironically, the practical effect of its programs has accorded it more support than the Brotherhood or any other resistance group other than Fatah within Palestinian society at the present time. According to one recent poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, 18% of Palestinians polled replied that they would support Hamas if municipal or village council elections were held. The support for Fatah was 30% in the same poll. See poll conducted between November 11-16, 2002 by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO), prepared by Dr. Nabil Kukali, President.

²³ Mahmoud al-Zahhar was born in 1945 and is a surgeon and lecturer at the Islamic University in Gaza. He has occupied the position of senior spokesperson for Hamas and a leader of Hamas’ political wing. He was also one of the principal negotiators with the Palestinian National Authority during the period when Hamas was engaged in discussions with the PNA regarding their participation in PNC elections and the Oslo Peace process. See “al-Zahhar, Mahmoud,” in Nafez Y. Nazzal and Laila A. Nazzal, *Historical Dictionary of Palestine* (London: The Scarecrow Press, 1997), p. 209.

²⁴ Al -Tamimi is reported to have been one of several Hamas leaders to distance themselves from Hamas attacks in February and March 1996.

Within its publications and media organs, Hamas emphasizes the importance of several historical figures. These include Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi (Saladin), Hasan al-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and ‘Iz al-Din al-Qassam. ‘Iz al-Din al-Qassam, an early Palestinian member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Haifa, is known for his martyrdom at the hands of British forces in 1935.²⁵ The most well-known militant cell of Hamas presently bears the name “The ‘Iz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.”

In its founding charter, Hamas regards Palestine as part of the Islamic *waqf* lands conquered under the leadership of the second of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, ‘Umar. The Hamas Charter states that Palestine belongs to all Muslims until the Day of Judgment.²⁶ In general, Hamas regards Israel and its allies in the West as part of an imperialist entity designed to prevent the existence of Palestine and ultimately to undermine and destroy Islam. Consequently, *jihad* is deemed obligatory or *wajib* for all Muslims in order to liberate the land of Palestine. The Charter mentions the importance of three circles that will be used to assist in the liberation of Palestine. These spheres or concentric circles place the Palestinian people in the innermost circle, surrounded by the Arabs, with Islam forming the outermost circle.²⁷

²⁵ See, for example, Abu Amr, “Hamas,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, pp. 6-7.

²⁶ *Mithaq Hamas* (The Hamas Charter), January, 18, 1988, Article 11.

²⁷ *Mithaq Hamas* (The Hamas Charter), Article 14.

The primary Hamas objective as stated in its 1988 manifesto²⁸ is to pursue active struggle to liberate Palestine from Zionist occupying forces. Hamas advocates the use of violence against its enemies which include imperialism, secularism, and Zionism. It refers to Jews and Zionists interchangeably often in conjunction with “Western imperialists.”²⁹ Hamas states in its charter that the PLO and Fatah are its potential allies and makes clear attempts to avoid alienating sectors of Palestinian society which support nationalist forces such as Fatah and the PLO in general. Furthermore, in conjunction with the Palestinian and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas provides an extensive network of social and religious programs for Palestinians whose objectives are to reeducate Muslims to avoid the growing threat to Islamic tradition, culture, and religious belief.

Aside from the Charter, which has not been amended since the establishment of the movement and therefore, does not adequately reflect the evolution, splits, and changing agendas of the movement, Hamas also publishes frequent leaflets (*bayanat*) that offer the official position on events that occur in Palestinian political circles. These leaflets were used with frequency during the first intifada and were since roughly 1995, have been posted regularly on the movement’s official website on the internet.³⁰

²⁸ The Palestinian Islamic Jihad identifies the same objective as its main reason for existence.

²⁹ *Mithaq Hamas* (The Hamas Charter), Article 14.

³⁰ This website does not operate without interruption and has been increasingly difficult to access since September 2001.

According to Hroub, the leaflets were the single most important means the movement possessed to disseminate information for the first two years. Hroub argues that after the Palestinian Authority was established, Hamas was allowed more participation in Palestinian society without fearing the direct impact of Israeli intervention.³¹ The contents of the leaflets dealt with day-to-day political events within the local arena and were, due to the more local nature of the medium, not often concerned with events that took place outside the occupied territories.

Hamas also is associated with several newspapers including *Filastin al-Muslima* (Muslim Palestine) and *al-Watan* (The Homeland). These publications are considered Hamas mouthpieces and often run interviews with Hamas leadership and other Islamists.³²

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ):³³

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) was founded by Dr. Fathi Shikaki in the early 1980s.³⁴ Shikaki has remained the group's most influential leader both because of his

³¹ Hroub, p. 7.

³² Mishal and Sela, p. 134.

³³ Leadership in PIJ: Mohammed Abdel A'ael, 28, senior level PIJ leader killed by IDF in raid on April 2, 2001. Ahmed Khalil Assad, 35, senior level PIJ leader killed by gunmen in May, 2001. The PIJ condemned the massacre of tourists in Egypt in 1997, saying that there was no justification for killing civilians. See biographical information on PIJ leaders on the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website.

enormous influence on the group's doctrine and early activities and also because of his subsequent death in Malta in 1995. Shikaki was known for his general disdain for the mainstream Islamist movement in Palestine and by 1974, had departed to Egypt to study in an environment that he considered less influenced by the secular Palestinian groups than the main centers of learning such as Bir Zeit University.³⁵ During his time in Egypt, he published articles under a pseudonym for an Egyptian Islamist newspaper called *al-Mukhtar al-Islami*.³⁶

The first significant faction was based in the Gaza Strip and additional factions were established in other locations during the first intifada.³⁷ Hatina (2001) argues that the PIJ evolved in three stages: The first was from 1981-83, the second from 1984-87, and the third from 1988 onwards.³⁸ Hatina notes that PIJ's armed struggle against Israel became a militant one in the second of these phases.³⁹

During the first intifada, the PIJ established its now prominent position among Palestinian Islamic groups through its acts of armed struggle against the Israelis.

Between 1987 and 1992 when the first Intifada was at its height, PIJ operations were

³⁴ Meir Hatina, *Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement* (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Dayan Center Papers 127, 2001), p. 21. Shikaki was born in 1951 in the village of Zarnuqa in the Ramleh District.

³⁵ Hatina, p. 24.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 25. Hatina says Shikaki's pen name was Izz al-Din al-Faris.

³⁷ Ibid, p. 21. Hatina says that the first PIJ members were disillusioned members of the Mujamma'.

³⁸ Ibid, p. 28.

³⁹ Ibid.

mainly bombings and shootings of IDF soldiers and less frequently, assaults on Israeli civilian populations. According to Milton Edwards, the aggressive behavior of the PIJ in the Palestinian arena prompted Hamas to increase its own militant operations.⁴⁰

The Islamic Movement in Israel (IMI)

For the nearly one million Palestinians who hold Israeli citizenship, participation in the Israeli electoral system has been a valuable part of the community's collective political voice. Among the political parties and organizations that have gained the support of Palestinian citizens in Israel have been secular parties such as Rakah⁴¹ and in recent years, leftist Israeli parties such as Meretz.⁴² As a less politically empowered minority within the Israeli state, the political and religious attitudes of Palestinian Israelis have been shaped by competing Israeli and Palestinian nationalisms. On the one hand, their relative political security as Israeli citizens has often been better than their counterparts in the occupied areas of the West Bank and Gaza. On the other, Palestinian Israelis are underrepresented in the Israeli parliament and tend to suffer from many of the sociological problems of a less-empowered minority.⁴³ It is not surprising, therefore, that the growth in the popularity and prevalence of religious nationalism in the form of

⁴⁰ Milton Edwards, p. 35.

⁴¹ Milton Edwards, p. 65.

⁴² Hroub mentions Rakah as the most prominent Palestinian Israeli party with a communist platform. Hroub, p. 140.

⁴³ The classic work on this subject is Sammy Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989.)

political Islam has also gained adherents among the Muslim members of this community in recent years.

The Islamic Movement is currently the most well known of the Islamist organizations within Israel.

Hroub (2000) argues that the Islamic Movement in Israel and Hamas share a few basic similarities: First, both movements emerged as individual movements in the late 1980s.⁴⁴ Second, but equally important is the fact that both movements have, at some point in their evolution, advocated armed struggle against Israel.

The most important difference between agendas of the two movements is that the Islamic Movement in Israel began as a more militant organization and proceeded to grow into a more moderate one.⁴⁵ As early as 1985, the Islamic Movement devoted itself to a more moderate platform by staging peaceful protests during Israeli political campaigns or by funding educational activities within the Muslim community.⁴⁶ After the release of the Islamic Movement's spiritual leader, Sheikh Abdullah Nimr Darwish, the movement restructured its agenda and devoted itself to building an Arab-Islamic identity, defending the rights of Palestinian Israelis as a minority community within Israel, and to running candidates for the Israeli parliament.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Hroub, p. 140.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Hroub, p. 140. Hroub implies that the fundamental shift in emphasis occurred when the spiritual leader of the movement, Sheikh Abdullah Nimr Darwish was released from prison after a sentence of four years for incitement against Israel. See also, Raphael Israeli, *Muslim Fundamentalism in Israel*.

Though both Hamas and the Islamic Movement are independent organizations with their own hierarchies and specific local agendas, there appears to be limited support among Islamic Movement leaders for the militant activities of Hamas. This support has been both moral and financial: In recent years, Islamic Movement funds have been dispersed to pay the families of victims of the Intifada and demonstrations have been organized on behalf of Hamas members detained or exiled by the Israeli authorities.⁴⁸ More often, however, the Islamic Movement has opted to pursue political issues through legal and widely accepted methods of protest. In 1992, for example, when Hamas and PIJ activists were deported by Israel to Lebanon, the Islamic Movement chose to protest the move by staging a demonstration outside the Israeli parliament.⁴⁹

Like many Islamic organizations, the Islamic Movement in Israel operates numerous charitable organizations. Hroub argues that these charitable organizations have been a constant security concern for the Israeli government which has since 1994, frequently raided and confiscated documents and other materials from the movement in an effort to reveal connections with Hamas.⁵⁰

Until 1995, the Islamic Movement was unified under the leadership of Sheikh Darwish. In mid-1995, a dispute erupted within the movement over whether to

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 141

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 141.

⁵⁰ Hroub, p. 142. Hroub says the most intense surveillance was between 1994-1996 when the movement was accused of paying the families of suicide bombers.

participate in Israeli elections. The dispute led to a split in the movement with one part of the movement, led by Darwish, supporting participation in the Israeli election while the other faction, led by Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, who opposed participation.⁵¹ The rift between those who believe in participation and those who wish to boycott official parliamentary politics was again a primary issue of concern during the Israeli parliamentary elections in 2003. The United Arab List, which gains the majority of the Palestinian votes, was criticized for the performance of the list in the election. The United Arab List lost three of its five seats and its total number of votes fell from 114,000 in 1999 to only 55,000.⁵² Knesset member Abdelmalik Dehamshe, who is the chairman of the United Arab List, announced his willingness to step down from his elected post if the *Shura* Council if he were asked to do so.⁵³

The main publications of the Islamic Movement are the newspaper, *Sawt al-Haq wa al-Hurriya* (The Voice of Truth⁵⁴ and Freedom) and *al-Mithaq* (The Covenant.) Hroub says that the Israeli government prevented publication of *Sawt al-Haq* because of what was perceived as inflammatory rhetoric and support for Hamas.⁵⁵ Indeed, Darwish had been jailed for sedition and had served a sentence of nearly five years.

⁵¹ Hroub, pp. 142-43. Hroub notes that two Islamic Movement candidates participated in the election and were part of the United Arab List.

⁵² Yair Ettinger, "Report set to spark reform in Southern Islamic Movement." *Ha'Aretz*, March 3, 2003.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ *al-Haq* might also be translated as "justice."

⁵⁵ Hroub, Hamas, p. 142.

CHAPTER THREE

Ethno-Religious Discourse as Practical Politics

Whoever controls language, the images, controls the race.

Allen Ginsberg

This chapter examines the content and function of ethno-religious discourse as it relates to the process of collective action and conflict. It focuses on individual groups within the broader context of ethno-religious nationalism in Israeli and Palestinian societies. It looks specifically at various types of political speech expressed by such groups over a period of roughly a decade. The complex political speech produced by such groups is viewed as having a role in the process of collective action and conflict. At one level, these different groups within Israeli and Palestinian societies compete for dominance and a political voice, not only against or with respect to the state, but also against and with one another.

Group vs. state and group vs. group competition are increasingly shaped by the emergence of transnational networks. Such networks have provided groups with the possibility of extending their influence outside the traditional confines of the state or territory in which they are based. Transnational networks are of many types and degrees, but here the focus will be on those that relate to the extension of ethno-religious discourse

into the transnational realm. This includes group leaflets, newsletters, speeches and published interviews that are directed at or produced in a transnational setting.

The chapter therefore proceeds in three parts: The first part summarizes the existing social movement theory on the subject of collective action and the process of “framing.” In particular, it focuses on the role of “master frames” in the Israeli Gush Emunim and Palestinian Islamist movements, respectively. The ethno-political discourse that is articulated by each of the groups is one of the main vehicles through which these groups can create what have been called “networks of shared meaning.”¹

The second part of the chapter focuses on individual groups and what can be thought of as group-specific themes and symbols within the larger ethno-religious discourse of the movement. I introduce the concept of “embedded collective action frames” to explain how individual groups seem to compete within a given social movement. The core of the concept of “embedded frames” is that within the master frame of each larger social movement there are a number of smaller competing groups. Within the Palestinian Islamist movement as a whole, for example, there exist individual groups such as Hamas that must distinguish themselves from other “like” groups in the larger social movement that is “political Islam.” The creation of an embedded frame

¹ Wiktorowicz uses this terminology with particular reference to newer social movements. Wiktorowicz, p. 8. The terminology, “networks of shared meaning” is used by Alberto Melucci in John Keane and Paul Mier, eds. *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society* (Temple University Press, 1989.)

allows each group to maintain a distinct identity from rival groups. It does not, however, sever the group from the ethno-religious discourse of the larger social movement.²

The third part of this chapter examines how individual groups articulate or “frame” their political agendas through transnational networks. I argue that the expression of ethno-religious discourse through certain types of transnational networks provides both opportunities and constraints for individual groups, but that in general, such opportunities outweigh constraints.³ Transnational networks provide a different platform for the dissemination of ethno-religious discourse that extends beyond national borders on the internet and through transnational publications aimed at ethnic audiences in other countries. These transnational networks are explored for their potential to augment and/or alter the process of mobilization and collective action.⁴ In order to understand the possible importance of growing transnational linkages of all types, it is necessary to better understand how ethno-religious nationalists have attempted to “sell”

² Laitin and Fearon, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” *American Political Science Review*, 90(4) 1996.

³ This may not be true as legal restrictions on group activity in some countries are on the rise. For example, since 9/11, several pro-Islamist fundraising groups in the US have been closed or restricted in their activities. The Holyland Foundation is one such example. Moreover, there have been a number of instances in which individual transnational group leaders have been targeted by anti-terrorism policies that are intended to limit potentially anti-state or extremist organizations. Most recently, Great Britain revoked the citizenship of a Muslim cleric and Islamist who had openly espoused his admiration for the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The cleric, Abu Hamza al-Masri, has been stripped of his British passport according to new anti-terrorism policies that seek to prevent activities and statements that threaten state interests through “word” or “deed.” See *The Los Angeles Times*, “Radical Loses Citizenship,” Sunday, April 6, 2003: p. A26.

⁴ Examples include networks maintained by Hamas in Yemen, Syria, Great Britain and the US, by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Lebanon and Syria and formerly, in the US; Kahane Chai in the US and Germany; Zo Artzeinu in the US and Canada; and Women In Green (WIG) in the US, Canada, and Great Britain.

themselves to a transnational public. This question is particularly relevant for better understanding those groups that seek outside support from co-ethnies who remain geographically separated from the main arena of conflict.

The Importance of Master Frames in Collective Action

Ethnic conflict theorists have largely sidestepped the question of how ethnic identities are mobilized. The most useful scholarly literature for addressing this question is found in social movement theory and the sub-literature on collective action frames and framing processes.

According to social movement theorists, the collective action frame functions as a type of conceptual vehicle through which political entrepreneurs shape or motivate collective action. Collective action frames have been defined as “the conscious strategic efforts of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.”⁵ If ideas are “framed” in a way that resonates with society, it is argued, there will be an increased potential for collective action. Therefore, the ability of a movement to “sell” its cause to potential supporters has an important implications for whether the movement is likely to succeed. Thus, collective action frames ideally provide one of the necessary conditions needed to set collective action in motion. Moreover, social movements are created, sustained, and reproduced through the construction of “collective action frames” in a reciprocal process. Although

⁵ This definition is attributed by McAdam et al. to David Snow. See McAdam et al., p. 6.

collective action frames are seen as essential components in the process of collective action, they are not viewed as sufficient in and of themselves for producing collective action.⁶

Benford and Snow view collective action frames as possessing three important functions: First, frames must magnify certain elements of perceived societal injustice by reconstructing concepts or conditions that have previously been perceived as “moral” and recasting them as “immoral.” That is, successful framing can shape and even change the accepted meaning of a given symbol or group of symbols. Second, a successful collective action frame identifies a societal problem and poses a solution to that problem.⁷ Third, collective action frames are dynamic rather than static and respond to events and conditions within a particular society.⁸ Zald (1996) writes that the framing process includes a “contemporary framing of injustice and of political goals that almost always draw upon the larger societal definitions of relationships, of rights, of responsibilities to

⁶ Collective action frames must go hand in hand with mobilizing structures and political opportunities. There is also no clear consensus on whether a collective action frame is created by the social movement or if the social movement is created by the collective action frame. This discussion is beyond the scope and interest of the present work.

⁷ Snow and Benford, p. 138 in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. This is the basis for discussing the religio-political discourse of religious nationalist movements as examples of collective action frames.

⁸ William Gamson argues that successful collective action frames incorporate three components: 1) injustice, 2) agency, and 3) identity. William Gamson, *Talking Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) Each of Gamson’s components will be dealt with in subsequent sections of this chapter.

highlight what is wrong with the current social order, and to suggest directions for change.”⁹

If the construction of collective action frames provides one of the requisite conditions for mobilization and collective action, two important questions arise: First, how do we know which of the myriad of symbols and ideas within a frame are most important? Second, if specific symbols can be identified, how do they work to produce collective action? The complex process of identifying the presence of effective causal mechanisms within collective action frames is by no means simple. It remains one of the main weaknesses of social movement literature. As McAdam correctly notes, “studying political systems and various kinds of organization is inherently easier than trying to observe the social construction and dissemination of new ideas.”¹⁰ The study of ideas and symbols in the process of collective action has been recently reintegrated into social movement literature.¹¹ Nonetheless, the relative immaturity of framing theories within social movement literature has made framing a nearly autonomous field within the larger literature.¹²

One of the more important facets of the literature on social movement framing considers how *timing* affects the overall outcome and choices made by social movement

⁹ Mayer Zald in McAdam et al., p. 267.

¹⁰ McAdam et al., p. 6.

¹¹ See discussions in introductions to Mueller and McClurg (1992) and McAdam et al.(1996).

¹² McAdam et al. acknowledge that the literature on framing processes is the least developed part of social movement theory. See McAdam et al., p. 19.

leaders. It is argued that each episode of collective action within a given society is carried out within a “cycle of protest.”¹³ Since collective action frames are viewed as self-conscious social constructions, the individuals who make up the movement contribute their interpretation of events to the overall framing process during a given cycle of protest. McAdam et al. (1996), for example, argue that in the construction of frames, the initial framing process is likely to be less “consciously strategic” than later framing processes. They argue that this is because the initial evolution of a social movement is undirected in its earliest stages. Therefore, they assert that the range of information about the greater political arena possessed by a given social movement in its early stages may be incomplete, thereby placing the movement at a disadvantage.¹⁴ Each of the competing groups within a social movement must carve out an identifiable space for itself that allows it to be unique and recognizable.¹⁵ If a given social movement’s initial framing efforts prove successful, “later framing efforts can be expected to devolve into intense ‘framing contests’ between actors representing the movement, the state, and any counter movements that may have developed.”¹⁶ In sum, intra-movement

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ McAdam et al., p. 16

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 17

¹⁶ Ibid. At this time, I believe that issues are transferred within the frame from one group to another, filtered through media. This might help explain why certain frames disappear or emerge in slightly new forms over time.

competition (as well as inter-movement) will ultimately determine the content and effectiveness of collective action frames.

Of course, not all collective action frames survive this competitive process nor do all find a receptive audience. There are those frames that possess the elements that allow them to mature as master frames and are, therefore, successful in producing collective action. There are also framing efforts that fail to inspire. This fact makes it inevitable that those frames that seem to result in the “outbreak” of *observable* collective action will also be those that are deemed as successful collective action frames.¹⁷ The inherent problem in this approach is that it creates selection-bias and neglects consideration of those framing efforts that do not result in observable collective action. If social movement theory is to uncover the causal mechanisms that make up collective action frames as a whole, it seems necessary to consider *all* forms of collective action frames. This should include frames that are clearly linked to different forms of violent and non-violent action and protest, as well as those that do not seem to have worked to produce collective action. Indeed, important lessons about causation can be learned from collective action frames that do not appear to result in identifiable forms of collective action. I argue that there are also some types of speech that may in and of themselves be

¹⁷ Herein exists another problematic aspect of the literature on framing. It is not clear when a collective action frame is complete, when it is most effective, or when it ceases to exist. In my treatment of the case material, I consider the master frame to have more longevity than individual collective action frames. In the same way, the master frame need not produce collective action to remain in existence, but may instead maintain its relevance even in a dormant period. It may well be that what may be considered successful framing (that is, framing that is thought to lead to action) is rare and that most framing efforts are ineffective and go largely unnoticed, but they do not disappear.

considered a form of low-intensity conflict and may, in some cases, drive forward the mobilizing potential of the master frame.

Master frames in ethno-religious discourse

This brings us to a discussion of “master frames.” Master frames are viewed here as the macro-components of ethno-religious discourse. These master frames are the coming together of shared symbols and recurring themes used by different ethno-religious groups within social movements like the Gush Emunim and the Islamist movement in Palestine. Most scholarly treatments of these groups and movements have referred to them as part and parcel of the even larger phenomenon of religious fundamentalism.

The master frame, according to social movement theorists, is a necessary condition for large-scale collective action. Likewise, in discussions of ethnic conflict, the eruption of protracted communal violence presupposes the presence of a shared “sense” of identity that is communicated through a master frame. The problem with such assumptions is that when compared to the vast number of ethnic and religious groups in the world, there is a relatively infrequent occurrence of large-scale collective action. This is true even in ethnically and religiously divided societies and therefore, raises the question of whether the mere presence of a master frame is predictive of imminent large-scale collective action. The obvious challenge for social movement theorists is to predict when and how such master frames will become salient.

Master frames are broader than just one or another group in society. They are generally less responsive to changes in environment and in time than the individual frames constructed by groups. Just as a social movement is a conglomeration of groups that have *more* or *less* similar attitudes on certain issues, a master frame is a loose representation of these attitudes.

Some social movement theorists have argued that effective master frames augment the size of a group that shares “like” symbols and themes. McAdam (1982) for example, found that the American civil rights movement adopted a very flexible and broad set of symbols and thus, was able to appeal to a general and wide audience outside the confines of the African-American community.¹⁸ Likewise, the master frame of political Islam (in its generic form) absorbs all of the competing elements within the individual frames of individual movements. For example, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood may have a different local agenda from its Egyptian counterpart that would constitute an embedded frame, the general symbols of political Islam that are common to both groups are represented in the master frame.

Moreover, the master frame incorporates symbols and ideas that have survived intra-movement competition. Thus, though master frames are less clearly articulated programs of action than the embedded frames of individual groups, they are by the same token, more resilient than embedded frames. Finally, master frames also seem to be less

¹⁸ Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency* (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1982): pp. 24-35.

frequently contested by the groups that make up the movement precisely because the ideas embodied within them are vague representations of issues that can be tailored within each group, but have symbolic relevance to the whole of the movement.

Ethno-religious discourse as master frame

Within the ethno-religious discourse of both Israeli and Palestinian ethno-religious movements, one finds specific symbols and ideas that describe the collective identity of these movements.¹⁹ These master frames tell a general story of conflict between groups that is based on a particular historical experience which is viewed as the basis for the present. Within each master frame, depictions of the enemy and the ethnic or religious *Other* lay the foundation for the story of conflict. This conscious elevation of ethnic and religious symbols by political entrepreneurs (in contrast to secular or other types of symbols) has become the main hallmark of what has is known as “religious fundamentalism.”

It is possible to argue that all societies possess some type of master frame that may, at times, result in collective action on a broad level. In both the Israeli and Palestinian societies there are ethno-religious social movements whose master frames incorporate an ethno-religious discourse. These master-frames provide a set of symbols and themes that separate between political attitudes that are founded on religious issues

¹⁹ This research does not attempt to trace the emergence of these master frames, but only to identify some of these ideas and make a distinction between those that are reflected by the movements as a whole and the individual collective action frames of individual movements.

and political attitudes that are grounded in secular or nationalistic attitudes. There is, therefore, a master frame that is specific to Gush Emunim and one that is specific to the Palestinian Islamist movement, respectively.²⁰ Each master frame is the larger pool of ideas and attitudes within which each movement's respective ethno-religious discourse is constructed and reshaped by both internal and external political competition.

Framing the Problem: Themes of Injustice and Conspiracy

Though Islamist movements have emerged in many different countries, the master frame of political Islam is surprisingly similar across regions. Most Islamist movements have incorporated a number of common themes in their ethno-religious discourse. One of the most common of these themes found in much of the populist Islamist discourse is one that warns of the existence of a global conspiracy by western or non-Muslim nations against Islam and Muslims.

There are many variations on this injustice and conspiracy theme. Most frequently, Islamist literature depicts the presence of a global conspiracy targeting the people, religion, culture and history of Islam. This conspiracy is described as being initiated by the United States and Israel. Its targets are not only the Islamic Umma, but the Arab world in general. In some renditions of this conspiracy theme, the non-Western, non-Christian world is viewed as an imminent threat to all Islam. Within this conspiracy

²⁰ The master frame of the Palestinian Islamist movement is not distinct from the master frame of Islamist discourse in general.

theme is often a general condemnation of globalization and its negative effects on Islam or the Arab world. In other renditions, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is depicted as the primary evidence of this conspiracy. In general, “the Zionist Entity” or *al-Kiyan al-Sahyuni* is blamed for the general deterioration of society and culture and is often a metaphor for imperialism or colonialism as a whole.

Such conspiracy themes are ubiquitous in the ethno-religious discourse of the Palestinian Islamic movement and are voiced in different versions by the individual groups. This master frame is common to Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Islamic Movement in Israel (IMI). For example, in a 1990 issue of *al-Mujahid*, a common version of this global conspiracy theme is expressed in the following way:

Oh Muslims, Oh Arabs, you may have figured out [that] the “Greater Israel” project of [Yitzhak] Shamir is not his alone, but the project of the West, all the West-America, Russia, Great Britain, and France that deceive us with “friendly” meetings in Tunis or in [some] apartment that they call an embassy near the north pole or on a red carpet in Paris [through] which beloved Palestine is slipping through our fingers.²¹

Though this particular passage is the editorial commentary of *al-Mujahid* (The Jihad Fighter,) a newspaper devoted to the organizational activities of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, there is nothing particularly unique about its contents. It could have well been written by any one of the groups within the Palestinian Islamist movement. The passage also contains an embedded frame in which there is specific reference to the Israeli-

²¹ Editorial in *al-Mujahid*, January 1990, p. 7. Technically, this is considered in this chapter as a transnational publication since it is published in Beirut. *Al-Mujahid* is one of the main mouthpieces of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Palestinian peace process. This embedded frame places this passage in a historical and chronological context so that the reader understands that the reference is to the period of the peace process that took place in Europe away from the people of Palestine and in the heartland of former imperial powers such as Great Britain. In another sense, this passage also reflects a “framing of injustice” that is detached from the specific events that were taking place in the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations during 1990. As such, this passage reflects both the theme of injustice and conspiracy both at the level of a master frame and at the level of an embedded frame. Both of these contribute to the overall function of ethno-religious discourse within a social movement.

Since ethno-religious discourse is something that relies on being disseminated, it is instructive to look at where such framing generally takes place. On the one hand, a group may choose to publish a daily newsletter about its activities, but it is not necessarily useful to restate general themes in this type of publication since each group must compete with other similar groups for popular support. One of the places that many groups are able, however, to negotiate this ground between the themes of a master frame and specific embedded frames is in a group constitution or manifesto. The best existing example of such a manifesto is that published by *Hamas* in 1988. Hamas’ charter was first distributed in 1988 in the West Bank and Gaza at the outset of the intifada. Though the group has undergone internal and external changes since this time, as well as changes in its leadership structure, the charter remains one of the most revealing of Hamas strategy and fundamental political platform.

The *Hamas* charter or manifesto provides many examples of the injustice-conspiracy theme. It makes specific references to the many injustices done to Muslims since the time of the Christian Crusades. The central and reoccurring injustice and conspiracy theme is that Islam is engaged in an ongoing historical struggle with the Jews. The charter lays out the logical progression of this primordial struggle which it predicts will culminate in an apocalyptic battle between Palestinians and Zionists over the Land of Palestine. The charter embodies a unique style that interweaves religious scriptural history and fictional metaphor. It borrows selectively from historical events and offers them as conclusive proof that the spiritual and political rejuvenation of the *Umma* (Muslim Community) is contingent on its willingness to confront the Jewish enemy through jihad. The liberation of all of Palestine is therefore the key to this process of rejuvenation. The charter states:

It is necessary to gather all forces and abilities to face the Tartarian Nazi invasion, otherwise loss of the homeland, exile of the population, and a prompting of the evil in the earth and the destruction of all religious values [will take place].²²

Such references in ethno-religious discourse need not be detached from some version of the accepted historical record. Indeed, certain events in history are elevated to a position that gives them a mythical dimension. Indeed, the salience of a master frame in ethno-religious discourse is heavily dependent on the use of a particular “retelling” of actual historical events. This is certainly true of the Hamas charter. It makes clear

²² Article 32, *Mithaq Hamas* (The Hamas Charter.)

references to specific historical events, but embellishes them with fictional flourish. For example, one article of the charter reads: "We shouldn't lose the opportunity to remind every Muslim that when the Jews occupied immaculate Jerusalem in 1967 they stood on the stairs of the blessed *Masjid al-Aqsa* (al-Aqsa Mosque) loudly chanting: 'Muhammad has died and left the girls behind.'"²³

The ethno-religious discourse that is produced by the Gush Emunim also possesses an "injustice" theme, though the theme of conspiracy is not as prominent as it is within the Palestinian Islamist movement. In the literature produced by groups within Gush Emunim, the world is inherently antagonistic towards Jews and the Jewish state. Similar to the same theme within Islamist discourse, this worldwide antagonism against one ethnic and religious community emanates from the primordial and unchanging anti-semitism that persists throughout history in the non-Jewish world.²⁴ In the case of the Israeli Jewish movements, there is a reversion to symbols and context that position Jews as victims, in particular of the Holocaust. The struggle is often portrayed as one that is eternal (perhaps originating from some distant historical past) and ongoing in perpetuity. The culmination of this primordial pattern of anti-semitism is the Holocaust and the subsequent annihilation of six million Jews in Europe. The historical validity (and

²³See Article 28 in *Mithaq Hamas* (The Hamas Charter.) This quote also appears as a footnote in Sayyid Qutb's short book, *Ma'rakatuna ma' al-Yahud* (Our Battle with the Jews.) According to Nettler, this quotation is a reference to the fact that Muhammad fathered only girls. Nettler, p. 82.

²⁴ It should be noted that the theme of persecution within the discourse of minority communities such as the Jewish community is an important identity marker. The main difference in Gush Emunim discourse is its retelling of history that places the modern history of Israel both at the beginning and end of this struggle with the outside world.

therefore, salience) of the Holocaust as a symbol for the basis of this particular theme is not in question. Rather it is the way in which such a theme is the basis for “injustice” within the master frame of the movement. That is, the conditions of injustice that become central to the framing of a particular story are but *one* important component of the discourse which then theoretically functions as a basis for mobilization and ultimately, collective action. This tendency to portray the group as victimized by some greater outside force allows for the justification of struggle against this force in order to defeat it. The following selection from an essay written by the late Rabbi Meir Kahane in 1988 illustrates the theme of injustice that is prevalent in Gush Emunim discourse.

It is because we became so upset over upsetting you, dear world, that we decided to leave you - in a manner of speaking - and establish a Jewish State. The reasoning was that living in close contact with you, as resident-strangers in the various countries that comprise you, we upset you, irritate you, disturb you. What better notion, then, than to leave you and thus love you - and have you love us? And so we decided to come home - to the same homeland from which we were driven out 1,900 years earlier by a Roman world that, apparently, we also upset. Alas, dear world, it appears that you are hard to please. Having left you and your Pogroms and Inquisitions and Crusades and Holocausts, having taken our leave of the general world to live alone in our own little state - we continue to upset you.²⁵

It is notable that in this particular passage, Kahane does not find it sufficient to mention only the Holocaust as the embodiment and culmination of this historical trend of injustice, but rather feels the need to embellish it with other historical events that he

²⁵ Excerpt from Meir Kahane’s (1988) essay titled “Dear World.” (This essay was reprinted in Zo Artzeinu’s *Manhigut Yehudit* electronic newsletter, April 12, 2002.) Kahane’s acerbic irony in this essay culminates in his perception of what steps should be taken by Jews to prevent their further displacement at the hands of the Arab states.

views as unique to the Jewish experience. This injustice theme as used in the master frame of Gush Emunim discourse becomes a synonym for the perpetual (real and apocalyptic) threat to Israel and the Jewish people.

In another passage reprinted in the English- language *Voice of Judea*, a mouthpiece of Kahane Chai, the following is found:

Jealousy is an irrational demon that drives people to the depths of hate...and that is what the Jew faces today in an America that is addicted to materialism in a way that no crack addict can match. Material had controlled the very soul of America and what was once sheer luxuries today have become necessities that one cannot do without... the beast that is within material man will explode in a horror of jealousy and viciousness against the object of his jealousy- the Jew.²⁶

Framing the “Enemy Other” and the “Enemy Within”

If the master frame includes a theme of injustice or conspiracy, there must necessarily be agents who carry out this injustice and conspiracy. In the master frames of ethno-religious discourse, then, the enemy is framed in two main ways: the enemy that resides outside the ethnic or religious community or ethnic “Other” and the enemy that is “within” the ethnic or religious community. First the “Enemy Other” is most often depicted as having a superior strength against which there is an ongoing struggle. I have referred to this element as “overestimating the enemy.” That is, in order to establish the enormity and magnitude of the injustice or conspiracy, the “Enemy Other” must be especially evil and menacing and must be perceived as the most important and immediate

²⁶ Edited selection from Rabbi Meir Kahane’s speeches reprinted in *The Voice of Judea* under the headline “Attack on America- A Jewish View.” *The Voice of Judea* (October 2002), pp. 14-15.

threat to the existence of an ethnic or religious group. The most effective way of framing the enemy then, is to overstate the viciousness of the threat posed by this “Enemy Other.”

The various groups within the Islamist movement accord a great deal of attention to this depiction of the “Enemy Other.” Hamas, for example, focuses on the enemy as one of its central themes. The Hamas charter identifies the “Enemy Other” as *Dar al-Harb* (Realm of War.) This includes a generic “West,” Orientalists, Imperialists, and those who aid and are controlled by Zionists.²⁷ Both WWI and WWII as well as the establishment of the United Nations are attributed to the “devious” behavior of Jews and Zionists, thus attributing to the enemy responsibility for all world events that have been viewed as negatively affecting Islam. As noted earlier, these general themes that incorporate elements of world conspiracy are a common theme in Islamist discourse in general, but the themes are “reframed” in Hamas’ charter in a way that places Palestine at the center of the narrative. Most interesting is the analogy of the Jews as Nazis. The Hamas charter, for example, reads:

...Our Nazi enemy uses the method of collective punishment...They purposely break bones, fire ammunition at women, children, and elders with a reason and without any reason, create concentration camps to place thousands of people in inhuman conditions, not to mention the demolition of homes, orphaning of children, and issuance of tyrannical laws on thousands of youth so they spend their best years in the obscurity of prisons.²⁸

²⁷ In particular, see Articles 15 and 22 of *Mithaq Hamas* (The Hamas Charter.)

²⁸ *Mithaq Hamas*, Article 20.

Hamas also identifies enemies who it views as being within *Dar al-Islam* (Abode of Islam.) The “Enemy Within” includes corrupt Arab regimes as well as Arabs and Muslims who are depicted as collaborators with the enemy. The main targets are generally proponents of secular nationalist groups, sufis, or other non-Islamic political factions. Indeed, the way in which each group portrays its internal and external enemies is crucial to understanding the solutions proposed by each group. In the case of Hamas the solution is the pursuit of various levels of *jihad*.

Sayyid Qutb’s writings may also be considered the source for the view of the enemy that resides within and pollutes the purity of the *Umma* (Muslim Community.) In Qutb’s thought, from which many Islamist groups draw heavily, some elements within the community are only disguised as “believers” but are in reality, Jewish agents.²⁹ Hamas has adopted this view in its later publications, but it is not included in the charter as a main theme. This theme of the “enemy within” is used by Hamas to depict Palestinians who belong to the nationalist camp and have “collaborated” with the “Zionist enemy” in the Oslo Peace Process.

The groups that make up the movement of Gush Emunim also contain a depiction of the “Enemy Other” as well as the enemy “Within.” The main mouthpiece of *Zo Artzeinu, L’Chathilah* is replete with accusations against the Israeli government. The most common allegation made on the part of *Zo Artzeinu*’s leaders, Moshe Feiglin and

²⁹ If one is to seek a “real” context for such statements, it is possible that Qutb is referring to an incident that took place in the 1950s during prime ministership of Moshe Sharett when a number of Israeli Jews of Arab descent were dispatched to Egypt to spy on the Egyptian government.

Shmuel Sackett, is that the Jewish character of the state has been consistently undermined by Israeli government policy. For example, between September 1999-August 2000, *L'Chathilah* editorials were overwhelmingly devoted to a discussion of the missteps made by the Israeli government in the Oslo Process. In many of these editorials, one of the terms used to describe the Israeli government and any Israelis who agreed with its policies were “destroyers” (*machrivim*).³⁰ Another excellent example of the depiction of the “Enemy Within” is found in one publication in the form of a quiz published in the *Voice of Judea*. The quiz reads “Take this quiz to find out what kind of Jew you are!” At the end of the quiz, there are four possible outcomes for the person taking the quiz that determines where he/she fits within the Jewish community. The first category (based on what are the “correct” answers places the reader in the category of “Tzaddik” or “righteous” category. The subsequent three categories are “self-hater or “establishment [Jew],” “Ghetto-Daydream Believer,” and “Apathist-Kowtowers.”³¹ The questions in the quiz also distinguish the “authentic” Jew from the Jew who places the rest of the community at risk by being fooled or collaborating with the external enemy. For example, Question Six reads as follows:

If you were the Israeli Prime Minister, what statement would most closely resemble your national goals?

³⁰“A Joke of a State: By the law of the Destroyers of settlements and Jewish places in the Land of Israel, the treatment is like that of the laws of the ‘White Paper,’” (editorial) in *L'Chathilah*, Issue 58 (20th day of Heshvan, 5760 [1999]).

³¹ *The Voice of Judea* (October 2002), pp. 38-39.

Possible Answers:

- a) Blow up the Dome of the Rock,³² kick out any Arabs refusing to bow to Jewish sovereignty, establish a Torah State.
- b) Remove any trace of the Torah and make it a Hebrew speaking Portugal.
- c) Give it back to the Arabs because Moshiach [the Messiah] isn't here yet.
- d) Do whatever America says.

In yet another example taken from Gush Emunim discourse, Shmuel Sackett, co-founder and director of Zo Artzeinu writes the following:

We all know that 'Palestinians' don't exist. There are no such people, they have no history, culture or even language of their own. They are Arabs and it is incumbent upon each and every one of us to call them that and reveal their lie.³³

³² The Dome of the Rock is the Muslim shrine built to commemorate Muhammad's ascent to Heaven during his "night journey" or *Mi'raj*. It is also thought to be built on top of the ruins of the Second Jewish Temple which, in messianic Judaism, must be rebuilt in order to bring about the return of the Messiah.

³³ From an essay titled "'Palestinians' don't exist, but neither do 'Israelis.'" from *Zo Artzeinu* publication, *Manhigut Yehudit* (Jewish Leadership) March 18, 2002. The rest of this essay discusses the divine basis for the Jewish, rather than Israeli, claim to the Land of Israel. The author makes the argument that the biblical history of the Jews and not the modern history of Israel are what constitute national belonging.

Framing the Solution

Snow and Benford (1992) argue that a successful collective action frame must also pose a solution to the problem that has been identified.³⁴ Master frames, as well as embedded frames within ethno-religious discourse function to identify such a solution. The solutions that are found for rectifying injustice within collective action frames are varied. In some frames, these solutions are vague while in many embedded frames, clear political programs and specific steps to implement these programs are presented. In much of the literature of *Zo Artzeinu*, for example, there is an effort made to outline specific steps towards resolving specific problems. For example, in one *L'Chathilah* editorial, authored by Feiglin, the title reads “The First Stone”³⁵ and the editorial itself proceeds to first identify the problem, discuss its ramifications, and then, propose a solution that is, according to Feiglin, attained by collective action.

The following example of a complete embedded frame from the *Voice of Judea Commentary* includes a depiction of the injustice, identifies the enemy and proposes a solution.

Would you really like to know what happened to the militant Jewish defenders? They have been outlawed and crushed by the American State Department³⁶ that declared these legal groups to be “terrorist organizations.” Yes, the last ones who could offer any line of defense to the vulnerable Jewish communities in North America have been destroyed and

³⁴ Snow and Benford, *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, p. 138. This is the basis for discussing the religio-political discourse of religious nationalist movements as examples of collective action frames.

³⁵ “The First Stone,” (editorial) in *L'Chathilah*, Issue 64 (7th day of Shevet, 5760 [2000])

³⁶ An excellent example of the “Enemy Other”

rendered impotent thanks to the lobbying of none other than the ADL, Bnai Brith, the Israeli government and other lame Jewish Establishment Groups.³⁷ The last ones who could effectively fight back have been silenced, disarmed, and shut down.

This is nothing new. Before WWII, Jewish leaders such as Zev Jabotinsky who warned of the impending Holocaust and who tried to organize Jewish Defense and emergency aliya were maligned and silenced. Today, once again, Jewish leaders blindly march the Jewish masses down the road of self-destruction, effectively smashing the last and only pockets of Jewish resistance to those who seek to destroy us.

What can be done?

1. Demand that they rescind their efforts to silence Kahane.
2. Petition to legalize the Kahane groups. Send a check to the Kahane.org which is purely an educational and charitable group so that they can more effectively spread their message of Jewish survival.
3. Send them a check in the name of Free Speech and in the name of Jewish survival. But don't stand by idly! Jews are in danger in Israel and around the world.
4. If you are young and want to start a Kahane chapter on campus, call them and ask them how to get started.
5. Come to Israel to live and to help defend your people.

Next time "Palestinian" and neo-Nazi trash attempt to prevent a Jewish leader from speaking, let them taste more than just police pepper spray but rather a sufficient dose of Jewish power on their heads- so that they think 6 million times before lifting a finger on a Jew ever again! Never Again!³⁸

However, the variety of solutions that may be presented within the general and generic confines of a master frame discourse must differ from those proposed by specific groups in their embedded frame discourse. Those that are *group* specific are the basis for competition between groups within a movement-that is, which group makes a better argument for solving the problem that it identifies as a threat to the group and to society.

³⁷ I would call this reference an example of the "Enemy Within."

³⁸ *The Voice of Judea: The Voice of the Authentic Jewish Idea*, Tishrei-Heshvan (October 2002) p.11.

Those that can be considered master frame solutions are general, but are not effective mechanisms in and of themselves for increasing the process of mobilization or producing collective action. Instead, master frame solutions change little over time and in effect, cannot respond to constant changes within a given political environment. Herein is one of the possible differences that allow some groups to be better-known voices within a given social movement.

Benford and Snow (1992) also argue that to be successful, collective action frames must be dynamic rather than static and must respond to events and conditions within a particular society.³⁹ This conceptualization of collective action frames as a homogenous variable seems to ignore the function of a master frame. Since social movement theorists argue that the construction of a master frame is a delicate and often lengthy process, it does not seem logical that the same master frame can respond to changing societal conditions. On the other hand, if the concept of embedded frames within ethno-religious discourse is accepted as part and parcel of the master frame, the embedded frames (as the voices of individual groups) respond more quickly to change and thus, preserve the more constant symbols and themes that comprise the master frame.⁴⁰ For example, the master frame of ethno-religious discourse identifies injustice, the agents of injustice, and the solution to this injustice in a general, often achronological

³⁹ William Gamson argues that successful collective action frames incorporate three components: 1) injustice, 2) agency, and 3) identity. William Gamson, *Talking Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)

⁴⁰ In effect, I do not find social movement theory convincing on this point.

way. By contrast, the embedded frames of ethno-religious discourse include references that can be placed in specific time and place and that have more specific content that allows the individual group (such as Hamas) to make claims that are in part meant to counter the embedded frames of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In other words, without including the possibility of competition between groups taking place through embedded framing, the master frame exists only as a counter-discourse and not as a group of “like” discourses. The best evidence that a master frame does not in itself fuel the basis for specific actions is found in the fact that ethno-religious discourse often is transnational.

The Function of “embedded frames”

Unlike master frames, embedded frames are more specific and dynamic political platforms that tend to present the political activities of a given group in a manner that highlights the group’s distinctiveness from other “like” groups within the movement. Moreover, embedded frames articulate particular movement issues in distinctive ways that are dynamic and responsive to the political environment. For example, while the movement of Gush Emunim generally upholds the importance of Jewish settlement of Judea and Samaria, individual groups within the movement like Women In Green and *Zo Artzeinu* often choose particular Israeli settlements as the focus of their activities. I argue that the occurrence of embedded framing using ethno-religious discourse is an important strategy that allows a particular group to carve out an identifiable place within a larger social movement. The discourse itself may or may *not* be indicative of how a

group will actually behave in practice, but the embedded frames of ethno-religious discourse as a whole define where the group belongs within the spectrum of the larger social movement. The framing process therefore becomes the primary site of group competition and contestation within a movement.

Competing for a political voice within a master frame

Within the master frame of a movement are many different competing voices. For example, the views of Kahane Chai are different from those of the YESHA Council which are in turn different from the views of Women in Green. In this sense, though these three separate organizations all share some views, they nonetheless compete for political space within the rest of society. Zald (1996) has identified this as a competitive framing process.⁴¹ The way the groups within a movement compete with one another is the link between master frame of a movement and individual embedded frames. Embedded framing takes place in each of the individual and independent movements discussed in this research. Within the movement of Gush Emunim, Zo Artzeinu, Women in Green, and Kahane Chai compete for political dominance. In the Palestinian Islamist movement, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Islamic Movement all compete for political support within the Palestinian community.

[See Figure 1-“Master Frames and Embedded Frames”]

⁴¹ Mayer Zald in McAdam et al., p. 261.

Framing ethno-religious discourse through transnational networks

Ethno-religious discourse is often much more public than one would think. In many cases, the leaders of specific movements find outlets in publications and media that are mainstream publications in an ethnic community. Ethno-religious discourse appears in many different types of formats. Accordingly, the content of the discourse is also geared towards specific audiences and may vary from interpretation of scriptural passages to practical assessments of a political situation. For example, Zo Artzeinu leaders publish in multiple locations to maximize the organization's overall exposure. In their own publication, *L'Chathilah*, Moshe Feiglin and Shmuel Sackett provide general recommendations for remedying political problems in Israeli society. In addition, they also air radio commentary on the main settler news service, *Arutz-7* as well as publishing in the semi-official Hebrew language magazine of the settler movement, *Nekudah*.

Outside of Israel, Feiglin frequently publishes his editorials in non-Israeli newspapers such as *The Jewish Press* based in Brooklyn. The same newspaper continues to publish religious commentary by both the late Rabbi Meir Kahane and his now deceased son, Zeev Binyamin Kahane who was the founder and former leader of the movement Kahane Chai.

Orders from God in Ethno-religious discourse

Because each of the social movement organizations in both the Palestinian and Israeli communities share symbols and themes that are part of a larger national discourse, it is impossible to accurately identify where or with which of the groups a certain theme originates. It is even more difficult to trace the trajectory of a given theme as it becomes a fixed component of ethno-religious discourse. Nonetheless, there are certain themes and symbols that are associated with one or another ethno-religious movement. These are fixed themes in ethno-religious discourse that function at the level of the master frame. Moreover, many of these themes are scriptural and originate from the Qur'an, Hadith, Torah, Mishnah and other sources of the scriptural corpus within both Islam and Judaism.

In the ethno-religious discourse of the Palestinian Islamist movement, Jews are consistently depicted as the mortal enemies of Islam. This depiction is not necessarily linked to specific historical events in the modern history of these groups, but to the more scripturally significant bodies of *Hadith* that pertain to Muhammad's experiences in Medina after 622 CE. This theme of the conflict with the Jews in Medina was popularized by the Egyptian Islamist thinker, Sayyid Qutb. In one of Qutb's well-known essays, *Ma'rakatuna ma'a al-Yahud* (Our Battle with the Jews) the threat posed by Jews is at once a political, religious and cultural assault on Islam that has been ongoing since

the time of the Prophet.⁴² Qutb makes much of this argument about the deception of the Jewish tribes of *Nadir* and *Qaynuqa'* against Muhammad. Nonetheless, though many of the Palestinian and other Islamist groups include the above references in their publications, the Hamas charter barely mentions this particular theme of the Jews in Medina.⁴³

The wholesale borrowing of thought from Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) is prevalent in many publications of Islamist groups. Qutb was an Egyptian who was imprisoned by Gamal Abd al-Nasser for his involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb elaborated on Mawdudi's ideas on *jahiliyya* and *hakimiyya*.⁴⁴ That is, he considered some Muslims to be inauthentic Muslims who were *jahili* Muslims. Qutb's writings are considered inspirational for many Islamist groups and he is often given the status of being the "theoretician" of political Islam. Moreover, he holds a special place in the legacy of the Muslim Brotherhood for his adherence and loyalty to reform of the Islamic society. Perhaps most notably, he is one of several Muslim Brotherhood members who have become popular martyrs as a result of their writings, political actions, and subsequent deaths.

⁴² Sayyid Qutb, *Ma'rakatuna ma'a al-Yahud*, 12th edition (Beirut: Dar al-Sharq, 1993.)

⁴³ One Hadith that might refer to this period is cited in the charter, but overt references to the Jews in Medina are excluded.

⁴⁴ This is a good example of the use of ethno-religious discourse to define the "enemy" as a lost or deviant part of the religious or ethnic group.

Sayyid Qutb wrote extensively on the subject of *jihad* including such works as *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq, Islam wa la-Islam* and others.⁴⁵ For example, in Sayyid Qutb's discussion of "*jihad fi sabil Allah*" in *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Signposts Along the Way) and excerpted in other compilations as well,⁴⁶ Qutb elaborates on the concepts of defensive or offensive *jihad*. He maintains that this distinction is promoted only by apologists of Islam and Orientalists who falsely portray Islam and that there, in fact, exists no such difference in the meaning of the word.⁴⁷ In a manner that is similar to Mawdudi's thoughts on this subject,⁴⁸ Qutb is mainly concerned with elucidating the different circumstances under which *jihad* is enacted and the basis for this understanding in Islamic history. He discusses these in the context of the political and religious disputes with "the People of the Book" and the obligation of all Muslims to combine preaching with "movement."⁴⁹

Such references within ethno-religious discourse tying the past injustices to the present is a common feature of many ethnic and religious actors. But this type of theme

⁴⁵For an annotated bibliography of Qutb's works, see Ahmad S. Mousalli, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992) pp.44-55.

⁴⁶(anonymous) *Jihad fi Sabil Allah, al-Banna, Qutb, and Mawdudi*, Sawt al-Haq Series, No. 8, (Cairo: Dar al-Jihad, 1977.) (in Arabic)

⁴⁷Qutb, *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* [Signposts Along the Way] (Beirut: Dar al-Sharq, n.d.) p. 59.

⁴⁸ Sayyid Abul 'Ala al-Mawdudi(1903-1979) was a well-known Islamic thinker who during his lifetime fought for the implementation of an Islamic state in Pakistan and profoundly influenced Arab Muslim thinkers like Sayyid Qutb. Mawdudi, like other Muslim thinkers of his day, was staunchly opposed to Western influence within Islamic society and Western views of Muslims, which he considered bigoted and racist.

⁴⁹ Qutb, *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq*, pp. 57-61.

that is both historical in origin and yet, impinging on the present, is one that therefore is portrayed as irresolvable. Ronald Nettler, who has written about Qutb's usage of these themes, calls Qutb's style "a treatment of metaphor."

Metaphor and (allegedly)⁵⁰ real threat coalesced in Qutb's thought. The Jews as symbol of all great dangers to Islam were a metaphor for the challenges of Western domination and immortality; while as concrete threat the Jews were identified as a continuing historical danger whose dimensions were revealed to Muslims in Islamic sacred sources and historical writings. The line between metaphor and reality was sometimes even effaced altogether.⁵¹

The Hamas Charter also gleans a great deal of this type of scriptural theme from Qutb's writings. While Qutb's style is manifest in many ways in the charter's discussion of the enemy, there are also aspects of his writings which are clearly and curiously absent. This is true of the remarks made within the charter which appear to be in reference to the *Intifada*, which at the time of the document's publication, was entering its second and most influential year.

The Call to *Jihad*

For the Islamist groups considered here, the theme that receives the most attention in most publications is the "call to jihad." This is true of almost all types of literature produced by these groups whether in leaflets (*bayanat*) or in more official documents.

⁵⁰The parentheses are Nettler's.

⁵¹ Ronald L. Nettler, *Past Trials and Present Tribulations: A Muslim Fundamentalist's View of the Jews*, Studies in Anti-Semitism (London: Pergamon Press, 1987), p. 29.

Jihad, for example, is one of the central concerns of the Hamas charter. In fact, in the thirty-six articles, it is mentioned in one form or another in fifteen different articles or in 41.66% of the total number of articles in the charter. The occasions in which *jihad* is mentioned in the charter can be analyzed into a number of categories.

The first category includes references to solidarity and cooperation with other *mujahidin* and a sense of connection with the first Muslims who took Palestine.⁵² These references to *jihad* all refer to unified and worldwide effort on the part of all Muslims to liberate Palestine from its enemies, whether Zionists or the West, at the behest of Hamas.⁵³

A second category of references are read like requests or appeals to the Muslim and Palestinian public. They are equally directed towards the nationalist movements (*al-harakat al-wataniya*) in Palestine⁵⁴ as well as towards Arab and Muslim governments outside Palestine.⁵⁵

The third category deals with women's role in *jihad*⁵⁶ and stresses the partnership of males and females in the struggle. A fourth may be termed as "non-violent" *jihad*,⁵⁷

⁵² See mention in Introduction, p. 3 and Article 33 in *Mithaq Hamas* (The Hamas Charter.)

⁵³ Article 7, *Mithaq Hamas* (The Hamas Charter.)

⁵⁴ See discussion of *jihad* in Article 25, *Mithaq Hamas* (The Hamas Charter.)

⁵⁵ Article 28, *Mithaq Hamas* (The Hamas Charter.)

⁵⁶ Articles 12 and 18, *Mithaq Hamas* (The Hamas Charter.)

including *jihad* through “the good word, excellent article, beneficial book...(*al-kalima al-tayiba wa al-maqala al-jayida wa al-kitab al-mufid...*)”⁵⁸ In this context, the charter also makes two mentions of Hamas’ moral or noble intentions and discusses the individual responsibility of Muslims. First, in one of several references to its stance on the Palestinian nationalist groups, Hamas states that it is, by contrast, a movement and “does not go after fame, nor reward of people (*wa la tatamana illa al-khayr lil nas afradan wa jama’atan*).”⁵⁹ Hamas also reiterates that it “does not want fame for itself, nor a materialistic gain, nor a social status....”⁶⁰

The fifth category places *jihad* in a historical context. These references laud the victory and struggles of Islamic figures such as Salah al-Din al-Ayubi who is revered in Islamic history for his conquest of Jerusalem from the Crusaders and ‘Iz al-Din al-Qassam who led a religiously-inspired revolt against the British forces in Palestine in 1935, and even the role of the Muslim Brothers in 1948 and 1967.⁶¹ Other references portray *jihad* as the primary goal of the Muslim Community (*Umma*) or nation (*watan*) which Hamas says will be conducted with and alongside other liberating forces.⁶²

⁵⁷ Articles 15 and 16 deal with training the *mujahid* intellectually; See also Articles 19 and 30, *Mithaq Hamas* (The Hamas Charter.)

⁵⁸ Article 30, *Mithaq Hamas* (The Hamas Charter.)

⁵⁹ Article 25, *Mithaq Hamas*.

⁶⁰ Article 36, *Mithaq Hamas*.

⁶¹ See Article 7 in particular as well as Articles 15 and 34 for a discussion of Allenby’s actions in Jerusalem, *Mithaq Hamas*.

Finally, *jihad* is referred to as obligatory (*fard 'ain*)⁶³ or a duty (*wajib*) upon all Muslims who care for the fate of Palestine.⁶⁴

Although the strategy of using “martyrdom” operations is now one of the main hallmarks of Palestinian Islamist groups, Hamas has only included this subject in its ethno-religious discourse since the mid-1990s when such acts were first launched by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.⁶⁵ In fact, aside from the references made to the martyr ‘Iz al-Din al-Qassam and his role in inspiring a specifically Islamic- Palestinian resistance and a quote by the martyred Imam Hasan al-Banna, there are few textual references which would suggest that this concept is accorded high priority by the Hamas leadership. Only in one article, where the slogan of Hamas is quoted, is there a mention of martyrdom as “*mawt fi sabil Allah*”.⁶⁶ In fact, Sayyid Qutb himself viewed *jihad* as “neither a suicide mission nor a campaign of atrocities...”⁶⁷ Qutb’s views on martyrdom are better explained as follows:

The ontic element in Qutb’s theory...is given expression in the term *al-kinuna al-insaniyya* (the human existent). Qutb’s ontological Islam is thus linked to the “ownmost being” of the believing Muslim, in a manner that urges him to act out, to realize, to practice that faith as an expression of his being, and not with regard to practical political or social consequences of that act. When we consider once again that the absolute

⁶² Articles 12 and 13, *Mithaq Hamas*.

⁶³ Articles 12 and 15, *Mithaq Hamas*.

⁶⁴ Articles 3 and 33, *Mithaq Hamas*.

⁶⁵ See appendix for graph showing “Suicide Bombings 1993-2002.”

⁶⁶ *Mithaq Hamas*, Article 8.

⁶⁷ Mousalli, p. 205.

foundation of Islam, and of the freedom of the individual Muslim to act, is the *hakimiyya* of God, then the characteristic Islamic act becomes defiance of *jahili* activity. Thus is the groundwork laid for acts of martyrdom which appear to be suicidal and/or hopeless acts of political terrorism.⁶⁸

While these views are consistent with the *lack* of deliberate principle in the charter, the behavior of Hamas since the publication of the charter has been to pursue *jihād* through dozens of suicide missions. This tactic has become so prevalent among some Palestinian Islamist groups that the militant wing Hamas bears the name of ‘Iz al-Din al-Qassam.⁶⁹

Conclusion

In the literature on framing, there is no agreed upon criteria for assessing the viability of a collective action frame, when it becomes a “master frame” or even whether the distinction of calling something a collective action frame is even warranted before the *event* or outbreak of collective action. It seems reasonable then to consider a sort of inert or dormant collective action frame. That is, ethno-religious discourse can have an identifiable frame yet be unsuccessful in a given moment at sparking collective action. Its meaningful concoction of symbols may still be the decisive factor in determining

⁶⁸ Leonard Binder, *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies* (Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 201.

⁶⁹ For a discussion of al-Qassam as a Palestinian symbol, see Nels Johnson, *Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism* (London: KPI, 1982); See also Article 7, *Mithaq Hamas*.

whether a given movement survives in an intensely competitive political environment. An ethno-religious discourse may, therefore, exist as an identifiable set of beliefs that do bring about collective action. In fact, since the viability of collective action frames remain an unmeasured quantity, it is probable that most framing does not result in collective action of any kind. Of those that do generate collective action, they are probably limited in scope and/or in duration.⁷⁰

If ethno-religious discourse does not always produce collective action, it does, I argue, often have the potential to sustain a movement during times of crisis when a movement is unable or unwilling to utilize or engage in more direct forms of political action.⁷¹ Therefore, ethno-religious discourse is one of the main vehicles through which these groups can create what have been called “networks of shared meaning.”⁷² These networks of shared meaning provide the glue that holds “like” groups together in a movement even in the absence of a cycle of protest.

Ethno-religious discourse must also constantly compete for political space and possess the flexibility to adapt to changing political circumstances over time, to shrink in its scope or melt into the larger political spectrum. If it does not possess adequate flexibility, it may cease to be able to properly and convincingly frame the most important

⁷⁰ Hence the extensive discussion in political science literature about the collective action problem.

⁷¹ This is to say that even if a particular ethno-religious discourse is viable as a frame for collective action, it does not necessarily mean that individuals will act regardless of potential cost to themselves. For example, during times when government repression is high, the ethno-religious discourse remains intact and is perhaps even strengthened regardless of whether there is a collective action that takes place.

⁷² Wiktorowicz, p. 8.

ideas of the movement. Accordingly, it must possess enough similarity to other “like” movements in order to avoid being perceived as falling too far from societal norms. Likewise, it must be sufficiently unique or distinctive from other discourses in a given society. In this sense, ethno-political discourses, perhaps like *all* types of discourse, must be carefully fashioned from both “old” and “new” concepts, societal norms, and political goals.

Ethno-religious discourse is multi-faceted and self-conscious and at many levels, dynamic. It contains not only symbols that are religiously or ethnically specific, but it utilizes themes that are universal. Moreover, it also includes both symbols that cannot be considered necessarily religious in origin. Yet, there is something interesting and perplexing about the manner in which ethno-religious discourse is constructed by movement leaders. Some examples of this discourse contain explicit references to events within an ethnic or religious history, scriptural references, or actual scripture while other forms are stark assessments of political rivals, military options, or even analyses of election returns. Some of these are virtually identical to mainstream or state-controlled media and neither indicate a radical program on the part of a movement nor a clear religious or nationalist position. What is clear, however, is that the need of such groups to produce their own literature must be understood as a political maneuver to distinguish themselves within the confines of the movement or redirect its course.

The specific study of this type of discourse as it relates to the political behavior of these movements has been largely neglected in the field of political science in recent

years. There have been few, if any, studies of the nuances in this discourse as they are expressed in different types of publications, presumably for different audiences.

What is different in the discourse of ethno-religious groups is that the “we” vs. “them” references take on adjectives that place them squarely in the camp of the “ethnic” or religious Other. This very sharp degree of distinction between one side and the other is one of the hallmarks of what might be considered radicalization of a discourse. In an effective collective action frame, there also, according to Gamson, should be an element of agency- that is, a discussion of some course of action that alleviates the dangers that enemy poses for society.⁷³ Gamson’s third criterion, identity, refers to the “we” vs. “them” elements of a collective action frame. This is an element of collective action frames that is necessary and, according to most social movement theorists, is found in all types of collective action frames.

Some studies of social movement and collective action have traced the emergence of specific types of protest as a means of identifying how collective action frames function. Gamson and Meyer, for their part, have asked how new ideas can be shaped through the process of collective action?⁷⁴ McAdam also argues that new ideas are a prerequisite for mobilization and provide what has been called “cognitive liberation.”⁷⁵ Of course, both “new” and “old” ideas can have important roles in the complex process

⁷³ William Gamson, *Talking Politics*, p. 5.

⁷⁴ Gamson and Meyer, “Framing Political Opportunity,” in McAdam et al., pp. 275-290.

⁷⁵ McAdam et al., p. 5.

of framing. This is perhaps even more true of ethno-religious discourses that rely to a great extent on invoking the old in a new garb. Such “old” symbols are infused with new and vital meanings within many collective action frames. In effect, ethno-religious movements may be said to rarely introduce new ideas at all, but rather repackage “old” ideas in a way that infuses them with new meaning within a given societal struggle.

In recent years, ethnic conflict theorists have embraced the view that ethnic identity is constructed by political entrepreneurs through a social process. The majority of this growing literature has also increasingly rejected the “ancient ethnic hatred” or primordialist approach, as well as the instrumentalist approach to explaining ethnic conflict of all types and levels. Nonetheless, few studies have provided satisfactory evidence to show how ethnic identity is first constructed and then, mobilized in ethnic conflict. Gurr and Harff (1994) argue that the existence of an ethnic identity does not in itself tell us where and when ethnic conflict will arise nor does it tell us what degree of ethnic conflict may be expected.⁷⁶ By contrast, they assert that ethnic identity is an insufficient condition unless it is asserted in a specific way through a complex process of ethno-political mobilization. The relative success of such political mobilization, they argue, is shaped by other conditions such as “regime type” and “degrees of political and economic discrimination” to mention only a few.⁷⁷ That is, ethnic identity may lay

⁷⁶ Gurr and Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) p. 84.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

dormant and never be asserted if the political environment that the group resides has certain attributes such as a democratic tradition.

Collective actions are shaped by the political context in which an ethnic group is situated. The type and extent of political conflict are determined by such factors as the cohesion of the group, the strategies and tactics of its leaders, the nature of the political system that governs it, and outside encouragement.⁷⁸

Gurr and Harff view these above causal variables as the most important in a process that may “ignite” conflict. Of course, there are hundreds of causal variables that may contribute to the reasons that a given ethnic group will suddenly assert a claim of autonomy, separatist desires, or even revolution. But the causal variables that Gurr and Harff identify are no less problematic for ethnic groups than for other types of political groups such as secular nationalist groups, Marxist insurgents or any others. The question that still begs an answer is why do individuals choose to mobilize along ethnic or religious lines at all? More importantly, how do individuals come to view themselves as participants in a particular “story”- a story of contention that often induces them to participate in collective action? That is, how does an often loosely and multi-faceted ethnic identity that is shared by many individuals become a basis for a specific story of ethno-religious nationalism?

One answer to this question may be found in the “construction” of a common communal discourse occurs (at least in part) through the development and refinement of

⁷⁸ Ibid.

political speech that is expressed by political entrepreneurs within a given society. A common “story” that helps solidify ethnic identity and the parameters of a given group is clearly one of the necessary elements useful for the process of mobilization and for collective action. Nonetheless, its existence does not necessarily make conflict or violence inevitable.

The common “story” or ethnic narrative that has been discussed here resides in the shared symbols and themes of ethno-religious discourse. Ethno-religious discourse seems to be a unique political strategy in that it delineates between members of the same ethnic or religious group effectively placing some members of the group in on the "outside" and some members on the "inside" or right side of a political matter. Most importantly, ethno-religious discourse is *strategic* and responsive to the political, social and religious environment in which it is found.

Part II

Violence and Transnational Politics

All armed Prophets have been victorious, and all unarmed Prophets have been destroyed.

Machiavelli

In recent year, the literature on violent ethnic conflict has yielded many new findings about the relative importance of a number of explanatory variables. One of the variables that has received a great deal of attention is that of “regime type” and whether the *type* of state in which ethnic groups are found explains whether there will be ethnic conflict. The same question is raised by the discussion of political opportunities in the parallel literature on social movements. Implicit in this literature is the idea that in democratic and open political systems, ethnic conflict and especially violence should be less prevalent. But the type of political system does not always explain outbreaks of ethnic and religious violence, either that which takes place between groups or that which is directed against the state. Democratic states as well as non-democratic states have been the sites for violent ethnic conflict.

Another related variable that is often cited is that of “repression.” Sometimes this includes a measure of political, economic, or cultural discrimination. Gurr and Harff, for example, view these variables as being primary explanations for why ethnic groups begin to mobilize.¹ While repression and discrimination of varying levels is an obvious factor

¹ Gurr and Harff, p. 83.

in most ethnic and religious conflict, it is not clear that repression and discrimination have to be “real” conditions in order for them to be the basis for mobilization. If these were the only reasons that “people rebel”, there would certainly be far more rebellion and yet, as many ethnic conflict theorists have noted, the actual incidence of ethnic violence is rare.²

The following two chapters consider two different issues: 1) *internal* factors that seem to have an impact on group mobilization and violence *within* a given state or political system and 2) *external* factors that are present when a group need not rely entirely on its relationship within a state, but instead on its ability to manage itself in a transnational setting.

Chapter Four therefore, focuses on why some ethno-religious groups have chosen violence. Three of these groups (Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Kahane Chai) have chosen violence while the other three (The Islamic Movement in Israel (IMI), Women in Green, and Zo Artzeinu) have not. The incidence of violence among these groups may be considered within a single “cycle of protest” from 1987-2000.³ Within this period, I measure the number of incidents and type of violence undertaken by each movement. I also examine the importance of other variables such as ideological and

² See Brubaker and Laitin, p. 444.

³ See a discussion of “cycles of protest” in Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and Tarrow, “Mentalities, Political Cultures, and Collective Action Frames: Constructing Meanings through Action,” in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds. *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992.)

institutional flexibility, a range of strategies from violent extralegal opposition to non-violent means of political expression, and whether ethno-religious discourse is strengthened, modified, or even weakened in its transition from local to transnational. Incidences of violence are discussed with reference to other factors such as government incentives, financial resources, and larger structural and political changes (such as an international agreements.)⁴

Chapter Five covers new ground by considering the extent to which these groups are transnational and how effectively their transnational networks seem to function in the overall development of the group. It addresses the structural limitations or lack of political opportunities present for each group that may have affected their ability to mobilize through transnational networks. It also questions whether this lack of political opportunity has actually impeded group efforts to mobilize. Of all the chapters, it remains the most speculative in its conclusions. This is both its strength and its weakness. Although I am certain that transnational networks matter, a complete picture detailing *how* they matter in each and every instance of group mobilization remains a question that can be better resolved by subsequent research.

⁴ I approach these questions using both case-study research and findings of the *Minorities at Risk* -Phase III (MAR III). Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993). Jonathan Fox has also compiled a supplementary dataset to be used with MAR III. He includes variables that measure religious elements of ethnic conflict. His preliminary findings are discussed in Fox, "Towards a dynamic theory of ethno-religious conflict," *Nations and Nationalism*, Volume 5, Number 4(1999).

Finally, the concluding chapter addresses a number of issues that can not yet be resolved with certainty in this research, but that will form the basis for further work on this subject.

CHAPTER FOUR

Choosing Violence

Man is a religious animal. He is the only religious animal. He is the only animal that has a True Religion-several of them. He is the only animal that loves his neighbor as himself and cuts his throat when his theology isn't straight.

Mark Twain

Why do some ethno- religious groups choose violence? This question begs an answer since the number of ethnic conflicts has been steadily increasing since the fall of the Soviet Union and promises to be an enduring concern in the 21st century.¹ Moreover, there is a growing awareness on the part of many governments around the world that ethnic and religious extremism is on the rise and has become a threat to the security of many states. In fact, many of today's extremists are ethnic or religious actors whose political attitudes and goals are heavily shaped by an ethnic and religious worldview.² As Bruce Hoffman has pointed out, while the total number of terrorist incidents has been steadily declining, these incidents have grown increasingly lethal.³

Among the six cases that are included in this present study, only three of them have engaged in violence while the other three have pursued non-violent channels of

¹ Brubaker and Laitin, p.425.

² In Chapter 3, I develop the discussion of this world-view in my treatment of ethno-religious discourse which I view as the vehicle for disseminating this world-view.

³ Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism Trends and Prospects" (Chapter 2) in Lesser et al., *Countering the New Terrorism*, pp. 8-16.

protest. This chapter therefore asks why there is this difference in group strategy? Many ethnic conflict theorists believe that the *type* of state is one of the most significant factors dictating whether ethnic conflict will take place and whether it will take place through violence.⁴ Levels and types of “political opportunities” in a given state are believed to have a direct effect on the behavior of ethnic actors.⁵ This chapter, then, assesses the type and quality of political opportunities available to the Israeli and Palestinian ethno-religious groups discussed in this study. Do political opportunities at the state level explain the difference between those groups that choose violence and those that do not?

Before discussing the individual groups, it is useful to provide a brief overview of the basic concepts in social movement literature and the central assumptions that link this literature to that of ethnic conflict and ethnic mobilization. It is not possible here to provide a comprehensive treatment of either literature, but the following pages selectively focus on the concept of “political opportunities.”

Social scientists have long attempted to explain when, where, and how large scale violence-such as that of revolutions- will take place. They have sought to understand not only the process of revolution, but also smaller incidences of social unrest such as riots, demonstrations, and other manifestations of mass and violent protest. Political science and sociological literature has often overlapped in key areas with respect to the processes of collective action. If social movement theory has been successful in carving out a

⁴ See Sidney Tarrow (1996); pp. 41-63 in McAdam et al.

⁵ Ibid. See also Brubaker and Laitin, pp. 423-452.

conceptual vocabulary for dissecting different processes behind collective action, ethnic conflict theory has generated its conclusions from large-*n* datasets. Whether these studies examine the behavior of union strikers or the eruption and pace of race riots in American cities, there is a common desire expressed in both literatures to dig more deeply into the complicated process of collective action.

At the heart of these two literatures are a few unresolved issues that should be noted. First, there remains within studies of ethnic conflict a strong tendency towards primordialist explanations. While the primordialist explanations have lost ground to constructivism, they nonetheless reemerge in many studies of ethnic conflict that possess a *religious* dimension. Indeed, it is still common to see published articles about violence carried out by self-described *religious* movements who are depicted by scholars as irrational actors confounded and angered by a rational and secular world. This type of approach remains common in the sub-literature on religious fundamentalism and is discussed at length elsewhere in this research.⁶

A second problem that is mainly found in social movement theory is related to whether or not social movements are merely the vehicles for collective action (that is, whether movements direct collective action towards certain ends) or if they actually possess the ability to *cause* collective action? Here it is social movement literature that lacks a satisfactory answer. Moreover, many social movement theorists fail to identify an independent or causal variable. For example, in Della Porta's study of policing practices

⁶ The underlying problems and gaps within the fundamentalism literature are discussed in the introduction.

in Italy and Germany, she views the presence of law enforcement over time as both a cause and effect of collective action.⁷ The problem of causation is one that reoccurs in many studies on social movements and is most often left unresolved. To be fair, there is simply no reason to discard the possibility that a strong reciprocal process is at work in many ethnic conflicts or in collective action. The question of “whether the chicken came before the egg” is of little interest to those who wish to solve the conditions that produce victims of mass violence, political instability, and social upheaval. Indeed, at some point in protracted and bloody ethnic and religious conflicts, the real causal mechanisms become subordinate to the “primordial stories” that individual actors carry with them to the battle.⁸ For those who seek to manage or solve ethnic conflicts, then, it is imperative to understand the primordial narrative of those involved in conflict.

Social movement theory provides a framework for categorizing potential causal variables.⁹ These are political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. Political opportunities are discussed in detail here while the other two concepts are dealt with in Chapters 5 and 3, respectively.

⁷ See chapter three by Donatella della Porta, “Social Movements and the State: Thoughts on the Policing of Protest,” in McAdam et al.(1996).

⁸ Marc Howard Ross, “Creating the conditions for peacemaking: theories of practice in ethnic conflict resolution.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23(6) 2000: p. 1021. Ross discusses the framework for one type of “intervention” for solving ethnic conflict called “community relations theory” which he says does not concern itself with the origin of the conflict between combatants.

⁹ McAdam et al., p. 9.

Political opportunities

Political opportunities are conditions that exist within a given political system. Their existence and type determines the nature of the political environment in which a given social movement functions. The degree to which a given political system affords political opportunities to groups within its boundaries is thought to strongly influence the choices that movements possess. In political systems where political opportunities are few or none, groups are considered to be likely to exhibit more extreme political behavior. In systems where political opportunities are many, these same groups have options that may induce them to seek political gains in ways that are non-violent.

Though there is no consensus on all aspects of what constitutes political opportunities, some theorists have attempted to summarize the main attributes of the concept. Doug McAdam (1996), for example, has argued that the dimensions of political opportunities structures include:

- the relative openness or closure of an institutionalized political system
- the stability or instability of a set of institutionalized elite alignments
- the presence or absence of elite allies
- the state's capacity or propensity for repression.¹⁰

¹⁰ McAdam, p. 27 in McAdam et al (1996). McAdam argues that this category should be included although he acknowledges that other authors including della Porta (1995) do not consider "repression" as a dimension, but rather as a level of receptivity or non-receptivity of the political system. For McAdam's comments on the above, see p. 28 in McAdam et al. I would argue that capacity and propensity of a state to

Each one of these dimensions described by McAdam deserves closer examination. By the “relative openness or closure of an institutionalized political system,” McAdam refers to the ease with which a given movement can form and what types of activities it may pursue once formed. In present-day Syria for example, political opportunities might be afforded to apolitical movements while movements that have specifically political goals would find it difficult, if not impossible, to function.¹¹ In this example, Syria would effectively be a political system that affords few or no political opportunities for a given movement.

The second dimension of the definition presented by McAdam, is “the stability or instability of a set of institutionalized elite alignments.”¹² This dimension is an even more difficult distinction on which to base empirical arguments. McAdam explains this dimension, for example, as the alliance in the American setting between the Democratic Party and labor unions.¹³ This dimension of political opportunities is a useful one especially in societies where these elite alignments can be traced over time. For example,

repress are vastly different and produce different outcomes. For example, the US and other democracies are clearly capable of repression, but do not have a record of choosing repression over other options that would safeguard state security. Those states that show a propensity for repression may indeed be repressive at the outset specifically because they lack the capacity to engage in other forms of dialogue with a movement or because they lack the capacity to repress opposition forces in the long run. For example, the Palestinian Authority may indeed be considered more likely to engage in repressive tactics because of fear that the opposition, if able to grow, would undermine the authority of the government.

¹¹ Unless the goals of the group are consistent with the goals of the state. This has occurred in the cases treated in this research, but I would argue that this is a rare occurrence and that group behavior is not radically altered by short periods of shared ideological parity with a host state.

¹² McAdam in McAdam et al., p. 27.

¹³ Ibid.

the Gush Emunim in Israel has maintained elite alignments through its participation and cultivation of political support amongst the religious and conservative parties in the Knesset.

The third dimension of political opportunities which is described as “the presence or absence of elite allies,” also merits careful consideration. McAdam considers this third dimension distinct from the second. He argues that elite allies have the possibility of granting special entry into the political system to select groups. Nonetheless, the presence of elite allies must also be considered as a function of the timing of protest. The elite allies have a lesser or greater ability to assist a given sector or groups within society. In such cases, elite allies depend heavily on their relationship to elite alliances. Therefore, when the elite alliance such as a formal political party is weakened, so too is the ability of elite allies to lend a hand to certain groups or sectors. The latter two dimensions as described by McAdam, therefore, are not sufficiently distinct as outlined to provide the basis for an empirical test.¹⁴

A more useful measure of whether elite allies affect political opportunities would be achieved if the term itself were specifically defined. Are elite allies only those who are part of a political institution or can they also be part of the overall social structure of a given society? I would argue that elite allies can be party members or judges and

¹⁴ If one were to distinguish between formal elite allies that are part of a political system and informal elite allies such as media personalities, religious figures, then it might be useful to include both categories as providing for political opportunities. For the purpose of this study, however, elite allies are those who maintain some contact or relationship with the formal political system in either Israel or the areas under the Palestinian Authority.

therefore, part of the official political system, but they might also be part of society at large and yet still have an enormous potential to provide political opportunities to a group. For example, media figures, religious leaders, and even influential members of the business community in both Israel and in Palestinian society have, at times, been important in affording access to politics.¹⁵

The fourth and final dimension of political opportunities is described as “the state’s capacity or propensity for repression.” I have chosen to modify this part of the definition to distinguish between *capacity* and *propensity*. Indeed, the capacity of a state to repress political groups is a measure of overall state strength. State strength then may mean total military strength or even the size of a state’s military force. Thus, even if a particular state possesses the *capacity* to repress challenges to its authority, until such a challenge occurs, the real meaning of capacity is unclear.

The propensity of a state to repress challenges is another entirely different matter. First, propensity is a more measurable phenomenon that can be traced over time. Where there is a propensity to repress- that is, where some form of repression has been used and is a matter of public record- I make the assumption that the capacity to repress is also present.¹⁶ The following discussion of the cases in question views propensity for

¹⁵ This is no less true in the US where religious figures such as Pat Robertson have given legitimacy to certain issues that are group-based interests and subsequently find their way into official politics. In some cases, such individuals are called on to participate in government hearings and therefore, can be considered as elites in one sense. If these same individuals are allied with certain groups, even informally, they therefore might be viewed as having the potential to provide for political opportunity.

repression by the state as the main indicator of this dimension of political opportunity. The importance of repression as a causal variable in ethnic conflict is discussed under a separate sub-heading to follow later in this chapter.

Given the enormous scope that is carved out in any discussion of political opportunities, it is then even more important to define what is and what is not a political opportunity within narrow parameters. As noted above, the concept is more useful as a general description of a large category of possible explanatory variables. Indeed, as social movement theorists have pointed out, political opportunities lose their meaning if not clearly identified within each context.¹⁷ Once identified, political opportunities may be a very useful measure for better understanding the political choices and options open to specific social movements within a political system over time or in comparative context.¹⁸ Single or cross-national approaches treat change or variation in a political system as an independent variable.¹⁹

¹⁶ Capacity could also be understood as present only when tested by social unrest, but propensity includes a general sense on the part of a given social movement that the state will act against them under specific conditions.

¹⁷ Gamson and Meyer cite Tarrow on this problem, saying “political opportunity may be discerned along so many directions and in so many ways that it is less of a variable than a cluster of variables.” See William Gamson and David S. Meyer, “Framing Political Opportunity,” in McAdam et al. (1996), p. 275.

¹⁸ McAdam et al. p. 3. Hillel Frisch in his book about the development of the Palestinian state structure addresses some of this literature. See *Palestinian Countdown to Statehood*. The problem that Frisch faces is in the comparative realm when he compares structural developments under Palestinian control to those that took place in Israel in an earlier period. The study of political opportunities and their potential effects on movement development has also gained ground in cross-country comparisons of the same movement. For example, when comparing the political opportunities afforded by the two-party American electoral system and the relatively flexible and proportional system of representation in the German case, McAdam et al. cite the article which argues that the German system was much more open to the environmental movement which resulted ultimately in the formation of the Green Party while the American system

The way in which different social movement theorists have identified political opportunities often leads to acute “selection bias.” This is in large part because political opportunities are measured by virtue of their type and prevalence in cases where violence or violent protest has occurred²⁰ For this reason, I have chosen to include in this analysis groups that have engaged in violence as well as those that have not been associated with any violent conflict.

There are many important findings that suggest that the presence or absence of political opportunities matters. For example, Bessinger (1991) found that the presence of political opportunities does not necessarily decrease episodes of violent protest, but instead tends to encourage non-violent protest.²¹ McAdam et al. (1996) found that movements that lack access and resources- defined as political opportunities- exhibit a greater tendency to resort to violent strategies.²² While it is evident that at least in some cases political opportunities matter, it is not clear *how much* and especially *when* political

prevented the emergence of an institutionalized environmentally oriented representation. McAdam et al., p. 12.

¹⁹ McAdam et al., p. 16. Of course, this need not be the case. It would be equally plausible that the movement, especially if it is a large enough or “deeply” rooted movement, could function as an independent variable, either with regard to political opportunities or with regard to other, less powerful movements. Nonetheless, in this research, the presence or absence of political opportunities, as well as their relative change over time (during a cycle of protest) is considered one of the strongest determinants of movement behavior.

²⁰ Because of this, there is an increased tendency for case-selection bias- that is, to choose to study those movements that are violent or have been violent in the past.

²¹ Beissinger (1991). See also Tarrow in McAdam et al (1996) p. 54.

²² McAdam et al., p. 14.

opportunities matter the most and what other types of variables contribute to the process of collective action.²³

Table 1²⁴ presents different types of political opportunities as summarized by McAdam. I have attached numerical values to each of McAdam's four categories of types of political opportunities. The first three types measure the degree to which groups may participate in a political system either through institutions such as political parties or via elite alliances. Each of the six ethno-religious groups receive a numerical value between 0 and 1 indicating the absence (value of 0) or presence (value of 1) of these types. As might be expected, the Israeli political system has allowed for dissent through official politics- that is, it provides for "institutional openness." The only group that receives a score of zero is Kahane Chai. This is due to Kahane Chai's affiliation with KACH which has been illegal in Israel since 1988. The other three groups that operate within the recognized borders of Israel, including the Islamic Movement in Israel (IMI), are afforded political access through institutions and elite alliances.

[See Table 1- "Types of Political Opportunities"]

²³ Tarrow, for example, notes the conclusions made by Toqueville that the centralized French state prevented the healthy proliferation of social movements and led to the French Revolution while the decentralized American state allowed for a civil society. See Tarrow in McAdam et al., pp. 41-63.

²⁴ None of the numerical values in this table account for change over time.

The two Palestinian Islamist groups based in the West Bank and in Gaza, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, on the other hand, do not hold Israeli citizenship. Therefore, for these groups, the first three types of political opportunities have been virtually non-existent during the cycle of protest identified here between 1987-2000. Since Israel acquired the West Bank and Gaza after the 1967 War, political opportunities as defined in Table 1 were largely absent in the Palestinian areas of the West Bank and Gaza.

During the period following the 1982 eviction of the PLO from Lebanon, Israel sought to limit the influence of the PLO and other expressions of Palestinian nationalism. The most active Palestinian resistance groups had, until the late 1980s, been secular nationalists. Because of its focus on the more secular nationalist opposition within the Palestinian resistance movements, Israel had allowed other groups, like the Islamic organization of the *Mujamma' al-Islami* in Gaza to flourish. In some cases, the Israeli military even encouraged the Islamist competition with the more secular elements of Palestinian resistance movements such as Fatah, PFLP, and DFLP.²⁵ Shortly after the outbreak of the *Intifada*, however, Israel began to place severe restraints on all the Islamic groups, particularly those that pursued militancy against Israel. It is therefore, accurate to assume that overall political opportunities from 1987 onward were limited for most Palestinian movements in the West Bank and Gaza. Therefore, from 1987 to 1993,

²⁵ For a comprehensive background on this period, see Chapters 1 and 2 in Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.)

the areas of the West Bank and Gaza where Palestinian Islamist groups were based were under the tight control of the Israeli military.

Since 1994, however, the Palestinian Authority has severely limited the participation and expression of political groups within the areas under its control and therefore, the absence of political opportunities of any kind persists for the Palestinian Islamist movement as a whole.²⁶ Ghanem (2001) says that the repression of any political opposition to the Palestinian Authority began as soon as the Authority was established. In particular, the main Islamic groups of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad were the Authority's main target.²⁷

The repressive political conditions that affected Islamist groups in Palestinian areas, however, were not the same as those faced by Islamist groups in Israel. Although the *Intifada* certainly acted as a catalyst for some young Israeli Arabs to become more involved in the political unrest that took place in the West Bank and Gaza, Israel did not implement severe measures against its Palestinian citizens at the outset of the uprising.²⁸ In contrast to their West Bank and Gazan counterparts, organizations such as the Islamic

²⁶ As'ad Ghanem, *The Palestinian Regime*.

²⁷ Ghanem notes that the Palestinian Authority has been aware of the popular support for these groups and has, at times, attempted to improve its relations with these groups by releasing detainees, opening up channels for dialogue with group leaders, and seeking to improve the conditions under which prisoners are held in Palestinian prisons. See Ghanem, pp. 125-128.

²⁸ Christopher Bligh argues that the intifada was instrumental in creating a new and stronger Israeli-Arab leadership in Israel and that this new leadership will shape the role that Israeli-Arabs play in any future Palestinian state. See Bligh, "The Intifada and the New Political Role of the Israeli-Arab Leadership," *Middle Eastern Studies* (January 1999.) Palestinian citizens in Israel are often referred to as "Israeli Arabs."

Movement in Israel (IMI) continued to organize, recruit supporters, and publish organizational materials. They also sought political alliances with one of the most prominent Arab political parties in Israel, the Arab Democratic Party.²⁹ Most importantly, IMI retained its legal status as a religious organization under Israeli law. Since 1987, there have been periods in which the Islamic Movement (IMI) has been limited in its political activities by Israel including the closure of its newspapers and other charitable offices.³⁰ These measures are implemented through the use of emergency laws that allow Israel to censor the press and Nonetheless, the Islamic Movement has overall had significantly more political opportunities than Palestinian groups in the West Bank and Gaza.

In a ten-year period measuring “offenses against the security of the state under emergency law,” Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics data shows that there were significantly greater numbers of such offenses during the years 1995 and 2002.

[See Figure 2- “Criminal Offenses Against Israeli Security under Emergency Law, 1992-2002”]

²⁹ In 1996, the Arab Democratic Party won four seats in the Knesset. Arian, *The Second Republic*, p. 138.

³⁰ For an excellent study on the Islamist movements in Israel, see Alisa Rubin Peled, “Towards Autonomy? The Islamist Movement’s Quest for Control of the Islamic Institutions in Israel,” *The Middle East Journal* Summer 2001 (Vol.55, no.3).

Furthermore, during 1995 when political protest in Israel was at a very high level following the implementation of the first phases of the Declaration of Principles in the previous year, the data on “criminal offenses against state security” indicates that protest was extremely elevated throughout the summer months and declined only briefly before rising again in November 1995 when former prime minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated. It is revealing that in December, one month following the death of Rabin, there were *zero* offenses recorded.

[See Figure 3- “Criminal Offenses Against Israeli Security, 1995”]

Playing Legal Politics

One of the most significant examples of such political opportunity is the option to become an official political party. Although IMI has not formally become a political party in Israel, it maintains close ties with members and affiliates of the United Arab List.³¹ The United Arab List has been one of the most popular parties for Palestinian citizens of Israel.

Not surprisingly, political opportunities are available to the Israeli groups and have been qualitatively different from those of the Palestinian Islamist groups. The first and most obvious reason for this difference is that the Israeli groups exist within a

³¹ Arian reports that the legality of some of the Arab parties was challenged in both 1984 and 1988 on the basis that these parties opposed the existence of Israel. The Supreme Court subsequently denied the petitions to outlaw these parties. Arian, *The Second Republic*, p. 138.

sovereign political system that has, with only rare exceptions, allowed for many forms of political dissent. Moreover, it has been relatively easy for Israeli citizens to participate in a formal fashion in the Israeli parliamentary system. For example, it is possible to form a political party in Israel with as few as one hundred signatures.³² Israeli citizens may form new political parties by accepting the following preconditions: First, the party may not oppose the existence of the State of Israel. Second, it may not advocate racism. Third, it may not provide a front for illegal activity. Adherence to these conditions is evaluated by the Registrar of Political Parties and if the proposed party meets the above criteria, it is legalized.³³ In practice, therefore, competing groups may participate in the formal political system at the parliamentary level.

Despite the relative ease of forming a political party in Israel, many groups have nonetheless opted to pursue their political goals through non-party politics. Of the three Jewish Israeli groups examined here, only KACH (which later became Kahane Chai) ever sought formal recognition as a political party. Kach participated in the Israeli political process as a formal political party from 1973 until 1988 when it was banned by the Israeli Knesset because of its overt incitement of violence towards the Arab

³² Asher Arian, *The Second Republic: Politics in Israel* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1998) p. 104.

³³ Ibid.

population.³⁴ In 1984, at its point of greatest electoral strength, Kach received nearly 26,000 votes or approximately 1.5% of the vote.³⁵

The other two Jewish Israeli groups, Zo Artzeinu and Women In Green have not yet sought recognition as formal political parties in Israel. The reasons that groups make this choice to remain outside the political system vary. In some cases, it appears that group leaders view participation in official politics as too restrictive. Many believe they are perhaps better able to influence official politics from outside the formal system. One of the ways in which they have some leverage is to endorse other formal parties or party lists.³⁶

As Quintan Wiktorowicz (2001) argues in his superb and seminal study of Jordanian Islamist movements, “social movements are not irrational outbursts of spontaneous opposition: they are structured through mechanisms of mobilization.”³⁷ Wiktorowicz (2001) compares two different mobilization strategies within the Jordanian Islamist movement. One strategy of mobilization has been to take advantage of formal institutionalization through the state. The other strategy has been to bypass the state and rely on informal networks. He looks at the case of Jordan and asks why some Islamic

³⁴ Tessler, *A History of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*, p. 647.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ A “list” is a group of parties that choose to cooperate to gain representation as a group. Lists, therefore, are groups of parties. See further discussion on how lists influence the electoral process in Arian, pp. 103-140.

³⁷ Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan* (NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), p. 7.

movements there have chosen to become largely institutionalized while others have opted to form informal networks and have preferred to develop outside the reach of the state. This question is especially important in a context where the option to become institutionalized exists. Wiktorowicz argues that since 1989 the liberalization process in Jordan has allowed for greater political participation and thus, provides many movements with increased options.³⁸ He also argues that while Jordan has increased political opportunities for social movements, the state nonetheless still “manages” these social movements through formal institutionalization.³⁹ Thus, rather than be managed, some movements choose informal organization and informal networks over increased political opportunities through the formal system. In this manner, they avoid direct state management. This would perhaps explain the reluctance of groups within Israel to participate as political parties within the system. With the exception of Kahane Chai which is barred from becoming a political party under this name, Women In Green and Zo Artzeinu, as well as the Islamic Movement (IMI) have made the decision to remain extra-parliamentary opposition groups. In the case of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the option to become a political party is neither a viable option nor a meaningful choice since the degree to which the Palestinian Authority has blocked political participation makes party politics irrelevant at this stage. In 1996, during the first ever

³⁸ Ibid, p. 3.

³⁹ Ibid.

Palestinian election, four individuals who had split from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad ran as candidates as part of an organization called the al-Aqsa Regiments.⁴⁰

Becoming a political party, of course, does not assure participation at the parliamentary level. Representation in the Israeli Knesset is achieved by receiving a certain percentage of the total vote. Until 1992, representation could be gained with only 1% of the vote. After 1992, the minimum needed for representation was increased to 1.5%.⁴¹ The relatively small size of the ethno-religious groups in question here has therefore impeded their chances of becoming independent competitors in the parliamentary process. In order to participate in official politics then, these small groups must rely on forging alliances with other established parties whose support base is sufficient enough to achieve the minimum 1-1.5% of the vote. Zo Artzeinu, for example, has sought to form a bloc within the Likud party and has, as such, moved away from its former insistence on its strictly extra-parliamentary status.⁴²

The other reason that may partly explain why some ethno-religious groups remain outside the system is that the religiously salient issues on which they would normally campaign are issues that are already well entrenched within other parties and groups. Especially in Israel, there are several religious parties that, despite their narrow support base, have persisted in seeking small gains and increasing numbers of seats in parliament.

⁴⁰ Ghanem, p. 97.

⁴¹ Arian, p. 104

⁴² See *Manhigut Yehudit's* internet newsletter dated April 12, 2002.

This has been true especially among various sectors of the Orthodox community. Arian (1998) argues that religious parties in Israel are composed of the most observant sectors of Judaism. They tend to fall along a religious spectrum from Orthodox to ultra-ultra-Orthodox.⁴³ Arian notes that the importance of religious parties lies not only in their religious makeup, but that in recent years they are also linked to particular ethnic groups within Israel.⁴⁴ The ethnic and religious parties have tended to come from the Sephardic sectors of Israeli society and most recently, from the new immigrant electorate of Russian immigrants. What this means is that a large proportion of the religious and ethnic voting populace is already politically stratified, thus perhaps leaving less room for other ethnic and religious parties whose political platforms have less to do with religion and ethnicity and more to do with nationalist (albeit, narrowly conceived) platforms such as that of groups within Gush Emunim. On the other hand, the role of religion in public life has increased dramatically in recent years. In a public opinion poll conducted in 1992, only approximately 30% of Israeli Jews reported that religion plays in public life. By 1996, this number had soared to over 50%.⁴⁵ Thus, the fact that more Israeli Jews view religion as an increasing factor in public life in turn creates a difficult choice for those ethno-

⁴³ Arian, p. 127.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Arian, p. 312. Arian does not provide the details on the poll results he cites, but if accurate, the impression that religious observance has become more important in Israel in the last decade is less salient unless it is considered linked to public life.

religious nationalist groups that must seek to build their political appeal on a religiously or ethnically-oriented nationalism.

Since 1977, the Israeli party system has also seen the rise of religious parties linked closely to Gush Emunim circles. One such example is the National Religious Party (NRP) which has made important gains as a main party contender for the Israeli religious right. NRP's strength was established early on in its history as a party because, though its platform was religiously informed, it has always recognized the strategic importance of courting the aims of secular Zionism as a legitimate means to achieving its goals.⁴⁶ Moreover, it has also sought to form alliances with secular parties such as Labor and Mapai.⁴⁷ In recent years however, NRP has not fared as well in Knesset elections. The largest drop in the number of seats occurred between 1977 when it won 12 seats and 1981 when it dropped to half that number.⁴⁸ NRP's popularity was somewhat restored in 1996 when it was able to procure a total of nine seats.⁴⁹ The other parties that have strong links with Gush Emunim include Moledet and Tzomet whose representation in parliament grew steadily from 1981 into the mid-1990s.⁵⁰ What this may mean, at least

⁴⁶ Some of the most religious parties were initially opposed to the existence of the state.

⁴⁷ Arian, p. 128.

⁴⁸ See "Israeli Election Results" in *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, No. 53 (Jerusalem, Israel: Central Bureau of Statistics.)

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid. In 1988, for example, Tehiya gained 3 seats. In 1992, Tsomet won a total of 5 seats. By the 1996 elections, Tsomet had become part of Likud. Arian, p. 208.

for the Israeli groups, is that political opportunities provide abundant points of access to the formal political system.

Even in the absence of full political opportunities, it is important to distinguish change in even the most basic political opportunities afforded by Israel and the Palestinian Authority to Palestinian and Israeli movements over time. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine was free to organize and even was promoted by the Israeli authorities prior to the beginning of the first intifada. With the outbreak of the Intifada and the establishment of a branch of the Brotherhood in the form of Hamas, the existence of political opportunities quickly shrank as Israel sought to limit the growth and strength of the movement. Hamas, therefore, is a prime example of a group that had so few political opportunities that it was compelled to evolve through a more informal system of networks than has its Muslim Brotherhood counterparts in neighboring countries such as Jordan and Egypt.⁵¹

The Significance of Repression

The fourth type of political opportunity included by McAdam is that of repression. In Table 1, repression is coded on a scale of 0 (insignificant) to 2 (severe). Although it is clear that the use of repression by a state will diminish the formal political

⁵¹ The fact that Hamas has been forced to organize through informal networks does not tell us definitively that it would have not chosen this course anyway, even if more political opportunities were afforded it. If Wiktorowicz is correct, it is equally likely that Hamas would have chosen to remain informal as a means of avoiding state control, particularly since it not formed in what may be considered as a formal state system.

opportunities such as access to a political system, it has been argued that some type of political opportunities are of a more informal type remain intact even during periods of repression. Civil society proponents, for example, have noted that even in especially repressive states, the presence of informal politics remains the lynchpin in creating political and social cohesion among different members of society.⁵² One example of this would be Hamas' ability to function smoothly and continue to build its organizational infrastructure even as it has often been blocked from official politics.

While this sort of comparison is valid in many cases, it does not explain the existence of social movements that choose to stay outside the system. In both cases of Gush Emunim and of the Palestinian Islamic movements, the choice to become part of the system was present and in neither case was it accepted by the movement leadership. The question not addressed by political opportunity literature is what function and role these movements have when they remain extra-parliamentary organs in a parliamentary system. Does this "outsider" position afford the movement extra freedom in some areas and yet, constrain them in others? If so, where and why? This question will be dealt with briefly in this chapter, but a careful examination of these questions is not possible within the scope of this research. Do some movements choose violence only because they have little or no access or opportunity in a given political system or are movements also able to

⁵² See Mark Tessler and Marilyn Grobschmidt, "Democracy in the Arab World and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Tessler and Garham, eds. *Democracy, War, and Peace in the Middle East* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995): pp. 135-169.

opt out and bypass specific state-based incentives in a transnational environment? This question is of special relevance to the cases discussed in this research.

A Cycle of Protest: 1987-2000

The period considered here is between the years 1987 and 2000. The reasons for choosing this period as a unique cycle of protest are many: First, while the entire period may be considered one of protest by both Israeli and Palestinian movements, there is extraordinary variation in the speed and content of this protest over this period. For instance, 1990 was the height of the first Palestinian *intifada*. Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), as well as the Islamic Movement had all taken on specific political roles during the early years of the *intifada*. These roles, to a large extent, determined how they developed as movement organizations following the beginning of the end of the *intifada* in 1991. Between 1993-1996, both Hamas and PIJ sought to carve out a loyal constituency amongst Palestinians based on their position towards the Palestinian-Israeli Oslo peace process. The actions pursued by these groups defined how they were viewed by both the Israeli and Palestinian governments, as well as how they have been viewed by their respective populaces.

Moreover, this decade saw the proliferation of political activism along all parts of the political spectrum. Many Israeli peace organizations were founded during this time, as well as anti-peace movements on the Israeli right. The Israeli-Jewish movements were formed in a rapid wave of new movement formation and activities during roughly

the same period. Women in Green, for example, was formed in 1993. Zo Artzeinu was also formed in 1993, while Kahane Chai emerged as a new movement that superseded Meir Kahane's Kach (Thus) in 1992.⁵³ It is worth noting that all six of the ethno-religious groups discussed here were established within a national context and only later grew in their transnational dimensions.

The transfer of institutional power from one group of incumbents to another group of incumbents may encourage or reactivate movements who see potential new allies in the transfer.⁵⁴ This was only partly true of the Israeli/Jewish movements of Women In Green, Kahane Chai, and Zo Artzeinu. Instead of becoming more active during the Netanyahu government which was in office from 1996-1999, these groups were in fact, less vocal. It is possible that these groups perceived that their political agendas, particularly those regarding settlement building, were protected by the presence of a right-wing government. It is significant that these groups did not engage in violent street protests after Netanyahu shook hand with Yasser Arafat, which negated one of the main campaign promises he made before becoming prime minister in Spring 1996.

Periodization within the “cycle of protest”

During this ten-year cycle of protest, there are several distinguishable sub-periods. The most distinctive periods may be broken down into pre- and post-Oslo. Breaking the

⁵³ There also are other Kahanist offshoots such as “New Kach” (www.newkach.org).

⁵⁴ McAdam et al., p. 11.

period of protest in this way is necessary for better assessing how these six cases of ethno-religious movements developed around these seminal events. In two cases, that of the Women in Green and Zo Artzeinu, the Oslo process was the event that prompted the movement leaders to form the organization. In the cases of Hamas, PIJ, Kahane Chai, and the Islamic Movement, pre-Oslo and post-Oslo years revealed distinctive changes in each movement's strategies.

Between 1990-1993 (September) when the Oslo agreement was signed, both the Jewish Israeli movements and Palestinian Islamic movements were forced to take a position on the process being negotiated by their respective governmental representatives. In most cases, these movement organizations were firmly opposed to any peace agreement that would potentially compromise their own narrowly conceived political goals. In the post-Oslo period from 1993-2000, these movements, as integral parts of their two larger social movements (Gush Emunim and Palestinian Islamism) collectively moved towards more radicalized discourse. In the case of the Jewish-Israeli movements, the Oslo process turned the debate within Gush Emunim towards one of contention with what was perceived as a radically leftist government agenda. As noted above, the proliferation of protest organizations in the Jewish populace at this time was significant and though not all of them were actively committed to undermining the peace process, the majority of these movements began to view the actions of their government as non-representative of their aims. In an article about the trends within the Israeli political right, Sprinzak considers another two seminal events in Israeli politics: Rabin's

assassination and the 1996 victory of the Netanyahu government. Sprinzak also argues that Palestinian terrorism was largely responsible for the Likud victory at this time. He presents four reasons for his argument; the most important of these four is that 'it closed the ranks of the Israeli right.'⁵⁵

In the Palestinian cases, the radicalized discourse took the form of suicide bombings and other acts of terrorism. In the years between 1993 and 1999, suicide bombings as a whole were regular even if they went into a brief decline. By the end of the "cycle of protest" from 1987-2000 that is recounted here, a new "cycle of protest" was quickly underway with the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada. Since 2000, the number of suicide bombings per year has skyrocketed from four bombings in 2000 to 36 bombings in 2001 and 28 bombings in 2002.⁵⁶

[See Figure 4- "Suicide Bombings in Israel, 1992-2002"]

Choosing Violence

Studies of ethnic conflict overwhelmingly tend to view conflict as synonymous with large-scale ethnic violence, genocide⁵⁷ or ethnic cleansing. Though studies of ethnic

⁵⁵ Ehud Sprinzak, "The Israeli Right and the Peace Process, 1992-1996," *Davis Occasional Papers, The Leonard Davis Institute*. No. 59, p. 2. Sprinzak breaks the Israeli right into five different types during the 1992-96 period: 1) parliamentarians (in rightist parties such as Tsomet, Likud, Moledet and NRP) 2) pragmatists who are settler leaders of Yesha, 3) extremists, 4) terrorists, and 5) moderates.

⁵⁶ The numbers associated with each year are compiled from various news sources.

conflict often focus on the most egregious forms of violence, Fearon and Laitin (1999) argue that the presence of violent conflict is relatively rare.⁵⁸ This has led them and others to begin to treat violent conflict as a type of conflict rather than degree of conflict⁵⁹ and as a consciously constructed elite strategy within ethnic movements. Indeed, defining the parameters of an ethnic conflict, the actors who are presumed to be part of this conflict, and where and when the conflict began is at the heart of this sub-field. This study adopts Gurr and Harff's definition of a *protracted communal conflict* as being the best descriptive of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.⁶⁰ This is especially true during the period discussed here as a main "cycle of protest."

Studies of ethnic conflict overwhelmingly tend to view conflict as it manifests itself in large-scale ethnic violence, genocide⁶¹ or ethnic cleansing. Though studies of ethnic conflict often focus on the most egregious forms of violence, Fearon and Laitin (1999) argue that the presence of violent conflict is relatively rare.⁶² This has led them

⁵⁷ See Horowitz (2001), *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*.

⁵⁸ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Weak States, Rough Terrain, and Large-Scale Ethnic Violence since 1945," presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia; Cynthia Olzak and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, "Status in the World System and Ethnic Mobilization," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(6) (December 1998); 691-720; See also, Michael Brown et al, eds, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1997).

⁵⁹ Brubaker and Laitin (1998) argued that violence is best understood as a *type* of conflict rather than a *degree* of conflict.

⁶⁰ Gurr and Harff, pp. 87-92.

⁶¹ See Horowitz (2001), *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*.

⁶² James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Weak States, Rough Terrain, and Large-Scale Ethnic Violence since 1945," presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta,

and others to begin to treat violent conflict as a type of conflict rather than degree of conflict⁶³ and as a consciously constructed elite strategy within ethnic movements.

Brubaker and Laitin (1998) view violence as *type* of conflict rather than a *degree*.

Therefore, in these studies, violence emerges as an important strategy *chosen* by ethno-nationalists or ethnic movements rather than the inevitable result of a failure of other strategies or options.

As is true of social movement theory, ethnic conflict literature tends to treat the state as an explanatory variable. Olzak and Tsutsui (1998), for example, adopt a world-systems approach arguing that non-violent ethnic mobilization is more prevalent in states that are part of the “core” in the world system since avenues for non-violent protest are institutionalized.⁶⁴ Conversely, they argue that in the periphery, both non-violent and violent ethnic mobilization is less frequent because of the tendency on the part of a peripheral state to quickly suppress expressions of protest often by repressive means.⁶⁵

While the role of the state remains crucial to understanding even non-state actors, the

Georgia. See also, Michael Brown et al, eds, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1997).

⁶³ Laitin and Brubaker (1998) argued that violence is best understood as a *type* of conflict rather than a *degree* of conflict.

⁶⁴ Cynthia Olzak and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, “Status in the World System and Ethnic Mobilization,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(6) (December 1998); 691-720.

⁶⁵ In my view, the existence of avenues for non-violent protest does not guarantee that these avenues will be utilized by more extreme movements. I would argue that the state itself is a less important factor for determining levels of conflict and may play only a secondary role if it is interested in suppressing a particular movement. In the best of cases, a movement may choose to develop networks in states that do not pay a great deal of attention to their presence, but this does not automatically mean that they will also be able to pursue violence in that particular environment.

presence of growing transnational ties among these ethno-religious groups forces the adoption of new ways of thinking about how and when the state really matters.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Role of Transnational Networks

The State will become nothing more than a simple business office, a sort of central bookkeeping department, devoted to the service of Society.

Mikhail Bakunin

In the last decade and a half, many ethno-religious groups have grown increasingly transnational in their mobilization process and in their organizational capacity. There is also growing evidence that some of these groups have also used specific types of transnational networks to engage in violence and conflict with a state or with ethnic rivals. There are many examples of such groups. They range from the GIA in Algeria to *Hezbollah* in southern Lebanon.¹ Many of the groups that have utilized transnational networks have done so by forming an alliance with a state sponsor such as Iran or Syria.

The US State Department list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (DFTOs) includes over two dozen groups- of these nearly 80% can be characterized as ethno-religious groups.² *Al-Qaeda* is arguably the most lethal of such groups and has demonstrated its sophistication both in its ability to mobilize and in its ability to carry out

¹ Jeffrey Goldberg, "In the Party of God." *The New Yorker*, October 28, 2002. Martin Kramer's early work on Hezbollah's early ideological views is detailed in *Hezbollah's Vision of the West* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute Policy Papers, Number 16 (1989.)

² The State Department reviews this list on a bi-annual basis and adds or removes groups. See Office of the Coordinator for Terrorism, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, 2002.

violent acts against its perceived enemies. Most notably, *al-Qaeda* has been successful in building an elaborate system of transnational networks that enable it to “sell” its ethno-religious discourse to a global audience.

But not all such groups are as successful as *al-Qaeda* in this regard, nor do all groups have equal potential for growth and mobilization. The question that must be raised is whether ethnic and religious actors benefit from building transnational networks and if so, what *types* of networks appear most important in this process? Therefore, the main focus of this chapter is to evaluate what role transnational networks play in the process of group mobilization. I have tried to do this by placing the discussion of transnational networks in the context of social movement theory-in particular, to the literature on “mobilizing structures.” Thus, this chapter discusses the preliminary evidence about how transnational networks seem to function for the different groups included in this study. It is meant to be a beginning of what I hope will be the basis for ongoing research of this subject.

Incorporating the transnational

Just as many nation states have been affected by the forces of rapid globalization, social movements within these states have also been subject to many of the same forces. Some movements have been increasingly able to mobilize outside the formal borders of the “state.” New globalizing technologies such as the internet have transformed the

avenues through which collective action may take place. Tarrow (1995) acknowledges the potential of these rapid societal changes in the following way:

If it was once sufficient to interpret or predict social movements around the shape of the national state, it is less and less possible to do so today. Because of multiple levels and sectors of movement mobilization, their changing shape in different phases of protest cycles, and their increasing transnational links, national regularities in state structure must be seen as no more than the initial grid within which movements emerge and operate. To understand how they make their decisions, we must begin with an account of their specific goals and constituencies, the phase of the cycle in which they emerge, and their connection to transnational repertoires of organization, strategy, and collective action.³

Tarrow's emphasis on how the national is increasingly linked to the transnational is of particular relevance when applied to the organizational capacities of ethno-religious actors. Nonetheless, the mere existence of new avenues of communication does not adequately explain how a group manages to survive in a transnational or global setting where it competes constantly with other groups and other ideologies for political space. Moreover, it is not entirely clear if becoming transnational is a positive step towards the group mobilization or if it impedes group cohesion and development. Indeed, Rucht notes that in many ways, transnational movements may be weaker than national movements located in a single state or political system.⁴

³ Tarrow in McAdam et al., p. 53.

⁴ Dieter Rucht, "The Transnationalization of Social Movements: Trends, Causes, and Problems," in Della Porta, Kriesi, and Rucht, eds. *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999) pp. 206.

It also remains unclear why groups choose to become transnational. There are many potential answers to this question: First, groups may possess little or no access to a national political system and may simply chose the option of becoming transnational because of a lack of other alternatives. Gurr and Harff consider this possibility in their discussion of how levels of state discrimination are linked with the likely outbreak of ethnic conflict.⁵ They argue that there is a relationship between the degree of political and economic discrimination and levels of conflict. But perhaps groups that are denied political opportunities or are discriminated against within a state will choose to conduct their activities from outside the reach of the state? This choice may in turn have important ramifications on whether a group chooses radical or moderate political objectives or whether it will turn to violence over the long and short term.

The second reason that a group may seek to develop transnational networks is that, regardless of the level of political opportunities available, being transnational may be viewed as a means of maximizing its exposure to other ethnic audiences. Group leaders might view being transnational as a means of assuring group survival in an unstable political environment should conditions within a state change to the group's disadvantage. According to Gurr, the lack of security felt by many ethnic and religious groups is a key factor in both the way they view themselves as opponents or victims of a state or another ethnic or religious group.⁶ Such groups may assess the mobilization

⁵ Gurr and Harff, pp. 97-117.

potential and safety of ethnic diasporas and choose the transnational setting based on these rational and strategic considerations.

Third, it is possible that the process of globalization has created a type of competition between groups that is less related to their relative position within a state and more related to how they compete with one another for political power within a given environment. Indeed, it may well be that the development of transnational networks will be the difference between whether a group will manage to survive and develop its organizational capacities inside or outside the boundaries of the formal state.

The Current State of Literature on Transnationalism

The literature on transnationalism and global networks also offers useful insights into this research. Recent research has focused on two areas: domestic structures and international institutionalization.⁷ Domestic structures are viewed as an important indicator of how transnationalism will develop because they form the link between the state and society, thus determining the degree to which transnational actors will be able to penetrate a given political system. International institutions also are believed to play an important role in how norms and values are changed by issue-specific politics that comes

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ In particular, Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed, *Bringing transnational relations back in: non-state actors, domestic structures and international institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). The literature as a whole has enjoyed a recent revival after a relative decline of interest after initial work on the topic in the 1970s. The commonly cited example of early work on the topic is Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).

from the transnational environment. The topics treated in this literature are vastly different and the scope of the literature remains broadly conceived. For example, some studies of transnationalism examine how specific transnational communities shape the internal norms of a country and affect its foreign policy⁸ while others focus on how particular political issues shape political outcomes. The literature on transnationalism, however, tend to be a discussion of what is largely considered the *democratizing* potential of social movement organizations. That is, just as the social movement literature generally tends to view social movements as form of civil society that has the potential to provide checks and balances against the state, the literature on transnational movements is also oriented in this direction. For example, in Keck and Sikkink's study of what they term "transnational advocacy networks" or TANS,⁹ they argue that social movements are constrained by the limits and function of domestic institutions or the state itself, and that the transnational environment may provide greater opportunities for mobilization in multiple institutional and state contexts.¹⁰

⁸ Matthew Evangelista. *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.)

⁹ Margaret E. Keck and Katheryn Sikkink, eds, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998.)

¹⁰ A movement may also *weaken* its cohesiveness and structure by becoming transnational. The move to transnationalism and the creation of transnational networks may scatter crucial resources and make movement mobilization more difficult. Keck and Sikkink caution that the state may limit the political activities of a given social movement and thus, *provide the impetus for becoming transnational*. By contrast, international laws limiting specific groups or types of religious or ethnic-based organizations may also severely limit, rather than promote, the creation and development of transnational movements.

Rucht (1999) describes transnational movements as forms of transnational social movement organizations with common interests or causes. He outlines two types of transnational movements: The first type is made up of those movements that are composed of multiple organizations, each of which is relatively autonomous and equal in stature. He views these as linked horizontally to one another. The second type is made up of national movements, but nonetheless still participate in the transnational arena through an international body. This second type has both horizontal links from one group to another as well as vertical links with the international body that gives it its transnational legitimacy.¹¹ According to a survey of transnational movements conducted in 1993, Rucht reports that transnational movements are largely devoted to a few key areas: These areas are human rights (26.6%), environmental issues (14.3%), and women's rights (9.7%). Just these three issues alone therefore, make up over half (50.6%) of all transnational movement activism.¹²

Regrettably, neither of the two types of transnational movements identified by Rucht applies directly to the cases treated in this study. Nonetheless, the framework for categorization is a useful one. First, the ethno-religious groups included in this study have mainly national objectives. Second, each of the groups has developed transnational

¹¹ Dieter Rucht, "The Transnationalization of Social Movements: Trends, Causes, and Problems," in Della Porta, Kriesi, and Rucht, eds. *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 207-08.

¹² Ibid, p. 211. Interestingly, there is a growing tendency among Islamist groups to portray their objectives in terms of human rights issues. This is especially true of some transnational publications where the subject is raised in the context of religion and Islam's dedication to human rights (*huquq al-insan*). Hamas publications, as well as those of the Islamic Movement in Israel, frequently refer to these themes.

networks over time—that is, during certain periods of each group’s evolution, strategic choices seem to have been made about whether the group would ultimately gain from a greater transnational presence. Although the exact moment that such strategic decision-making takes place is not easily identifiable, it is nonetheless important for understanding group objectives in this regard. Finally, none of the groups discussed in this research have expressed their national or transnational objectives through affiliation with an international body or organization.¹³ By contrast, they have articulated and pursued their individual interests and respective agendas through their own ethnic and religious diasporas. In this way, ethno-religious groups as they are conceived of here do not possess the same mobilization potential as do those that are commonly the subject of much of the transnationalism literature. The only possible exception to this is perhaps in the most general and universalist formulations of group ethno-religious discourse.¹⁴ Though the transnationalism literature has been criticized for its inability to merge theory to empirical findings, it remains one of the most interesting and innovative areas of research and will likely form the basis for a much-needed change in what has been a largely state-centric discipline.

¹³ Some of these groups make frequent references to international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). To my knowledge, however, none have pursued formal relations or participation in any INGOs.

¹⁴ Rucht, for instance, discusses international environmental movements, human rights movements, etc. The cases in this research remain narrow and explicitly territorial and except for certain universalist aspects of their ethno-religious discourse, do not possess the potential for creating a sufficiently flexible collective action frame outside their respective communities.

Transnational Networks as Mobilizing Structures

Social movement theory, by contrast, provides a preliminary context for discussing transnational networks as they apply to this research. In social movement literature, “mobilizing structures” are viewed as the “collective vehicles, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action.”¹⁵ These mobilizing structures may be of two types: *formal* or *informal*.¹⁶ Formal structures, such as churches, unions or professional associations allow a movement to pursue its goals through an already existing institutional framework. Movements that utilize informal structures may instead conduct group meetings in private homes or on street corners. Of course, it becomes immediately obvious that the distinction between *formal* and *informal* is at best problematic. The mere existence of a meeting place for individuals does little to explain how that meeting place becomes the site of protest or dissent in the process of collective action. Moreover, it provides little in the way of information about why the movement chose to utilize this particular type of structure. It also reveals little useful information about how a movement’s activities or organizational capacity might be altered in the absence of a particular mobilizing structure. Finally, formal structures in one cultural setting may be viewed as informal structures in another cultural context. Therefore, just

¹⁵ McAdam et al., p. 3.

¹⁶ McCarthy in McAdam et al., p. 145. McCarthy also distinguishes between movement and non-movement structures. For the time being, I do not find it useful to adopt or distinguish between movement and non-movement structures for the simple reason that they may be *both* at different points in time. For example, a church might be considered a non-movement structure on Sunday morning, but on Monday morning be host to an organizational meeting of some social movement organization.

as political opportunities do not on their own account for the whole process of collective action, neither do mobilizing structures.

If formal and informal mobilizing structures are defined within strict parameters, the concept might yet be useful in identifying some observable causal variables in the process of collective action and mobilization. It would be therefore unwise to dismiss discussions of mobilizing structures as a whole. Some Islamic groups, for example, have been known to organize and mobilize support within the formal structure of a mosque. Other groups organize outside the mosque seeking to undermine the ossified institutions of *'ulama* who in many Muslim communities have lost legitimacy as authority figures for the *Umma* or Muslim Community. In other cases, both mosques and other less formal settings such as private homes and street rallies and funerals fulfill the basic requisites of the mobilizing structure concept. These sites of mobilization are in and of themselves keys to understanding the movement dynamic. The choice of a group to use a mosque, for example, reveals something about the degree to which the mosque is considered as separate from the government's reach. That is, in some states, the degree to which religious institutions have been co-opted by a government makes them less likely sites for social movement mobilization. At times, a mosque is itself an arm of the state and therefore, has no role in the process of mobilization.¹⁷ In other cases, mosques have been the main centers of such mobilization and therefore, can be considered formal

¹⁷ Tight governmental control of mosques and religious institutions is one of the most common ways that regimes in the Middle East have sought to control Islamist groups. In the absence of severe political repression of these groups, the alternate sources of "mobilizing structures" have been private homes, street corners, as well as religious holidays and funerals.

mobilizing structures. For example, in Israel, the Islamic Movement (IMI) has frequently used specific mosques to disseminate a political message. This is equally true in Gaza and the West Bank where religious institutions have formed the core “structures” around which Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have mobilized. By contrast, however, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan as well as the same group in Syria, have not used formal religious institutions as sites of mobilization.¹⁸

In this analysis, I view transnational networks as being fundamentally informal. This is because they are supplemental to the group’s main place of mobilization within a given homeland and, at least among these six groups, do not function independently without the homeland organizational structure. Other groups, such as *al-Qaeda*, might possess the flexibility to compartmentalize and function as separate units, but the groups discussed here rely on the central “framing” issues of territorial and ethnic exclusivism embodied by the homeland and therefore, do not possess as flexible a collective action frame as other more universalist Islamic or other religious movements that seek worldwide unity. These six groups have mainly national political objectives, despite the overtly global or even apocalyptic content of their ethno-religious discourse.

¹⁸ In Syria (as well as in Iraq) religious institutions are heavily controlled by the government. In Jordan, while less invasive monitoring has been the norm since 1989, the religious institutions have not been the primary site of mobilization. For extensive detail on Jordanian Islamist mobilization, see Wiktorowicz (2001).

McCarthy (1996) argues that the strength and utility of mobilizing structures indeed depends heavily on the process of “framing.”¹⁹ That is, a fundraising office is useless to the movement without a sufficiently attractive “advertising campaign” that will induce individuals to contribute money to the movement. This would seem to be more valid for those structures that are considered *informal* since a socially constructed meaning that tells potential adherents something about how the institution is viewed by the group must be present. For example, the *Refah* party in Turkey was successful in turning previously unrelated social meeting places, restaurants, and even private businesses into mobilizing structures that then became intimately associated with the party and party ideology.²⁰ By the same token, re-framing often takes place when a given movement is able to change the accepted societal meaning of a given social structure.

The transnational networks that have been developed by the six groups discussed here have grown in both quantity and in type since each group was established. Some elaboration of what constitutes network and the function different types of networks seem to have on the overall strength of a group is warranted.

[See Appendix A- “Transnational Networks by Group”]

¹⁹ McCarthy in McAdam et al., p. 149.

²⁰ Hakan Yavuz, “Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey,” *Comparative Politics* 30 (1) 1997.

In Appendix A (“Transnational Networks by Group”) types of networks are shown in the following categories: 1) whether the group maintains its own website, 2) sources of print and electronic media, and 3) whether the group is involved in transnational fundraising, and 4) a list of offices for public fundraising, media distribution offices, and religious training academies. All six groups are engaged in some level of transnational fundraising, whether it is fundraising through its offices or through mail campaigns or through contributions to religious training centers. It is important to note that, at least at first glance, there does not seem to be a visible difference in the numbers and types of print and electronic media sources among these six groups.

From its inception as a group, for example, Women in Green (WIG) was skilled at developing transnational networks that allowed it to broadcast its political objectives to an outside audience. In 1993, the group began publishing on its internet site. Since this time, the group has most often disseminated information and mobilized rallies and fundraising activities via the internet. In recent years, it has also sought a mainstream presence in other Gush Emunim media outlets such as Arutz-7.²¹

Women In Green does not publish its own newspaper and therefore, must rely on its internet site for all group-related information and communication. The webpage of the group targets many different parts of the worldwide Jewish community. It does so by publishing in several languages other than English and Hebrew including Russian.

²¹ Arutz-7 is the main news organ of the Israeli settlement movement and is heavily geared towards reporting news that is relevant to settlement communities, many of which are Gush Emunim supporters.

As was noted in Chapter Four, however, Women in Green has not been associated with any violence, but has on occasion, been laudatory of vigilante acts on the part of other groups such as Kahane Chai.

Like Women in Green, Zo Artzeinu has relied heavily on the group website as a main outlet for its political platform. The website publishes an online version of its print publication, *L'Chathilah* (From the Outset.) The website also provides other internet links to Moshe Feiglin's frequent political commentary as well as occasional editorials and articles written by those who share Feiglin's views in the larger movement of Gush Emunim. Unlike Women in Green, Zo Artzeinu has engaged in illegal protest activities since its establishment in the early 1990s. Feiglin, for example, was tried and convicted for sedition and incitement against the State of Israel in 1995.²² In the period leading up to his trial, Feiglin sought financial assistance from American supporters to run a full page advertisement protesting his treatment by Israeli authorities. The advertisement was designed by the well known marketing firm Mozeson and Malinowski which pictured a photo of a jail cell viewed from outside. The caption at the top of the advertisement read as follows: "Zo Artzeinu leaders Shmuel Sackett and Moshe Feiglin fought to save your home. Should this be their new home?" The bottom portion of the advertisement asked

²² *The State of Israel vs. Moshe Feiglin and Shmuel Sackett*. (Transcript- in Hebrew) Shalom Courthouse in Jerusalem (1995). Subsequent court cases were heard in 1996 and 1997 when Feiglin and Sackett sued the State of Israel and various judges and prosecuting lawyers from the previous cases.

for donations to the “Zo Artzeinu Legal Fund” and listed one of Zo Artzeinu’s fundraising offices in New Jersey as its mailing address.²³

Among the three groups that have chosen to engage in violence, there are a few important similarities. The first major difference seems to be in the group’s ability to maintain a balance between publications that are distributed in the homeland and publications that are directed at outside audiences. For example, PIJ has published two main Arabic language newspapers for over a decade that provide news about the group for the local Palestinian community. These two publications, *al-Mujahid* and *al-Istiqlal* have a similar format that is characterized by its focus on the biographical profiles of martyrs, religious commentary, and daily updates pertaining to political and military actions by the Israeli government.²⁴ Although *al-Mujahid* is published in Beirut, it is not a publication that is intended for a Lebanese audience, though it likely is a popular source for Palestinians who reside on Lebanese territory in refugee camps in such places such as Ain al-Hilwa in southern Lebanon.²⁵

Hamas is perhaps the most well documented on the issue of transnational fundraising. Their fundraising offices are found in the US, Canada, and Great Britain and to a lesser extent in Arab countries like Yemen, Syria, and Jordan.²⁶ Hamas offices in

²³ This advertisement was pictured on the Mozeson and Malinowski webpage, www.mozmal.com.

²⁴ The former even has a section with children’s games and word puzzles.

²⁵ Ain al-Hilwa, a large Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon, has recently been the base of operations for a new Palestinian Islamist group called *Asbat al-Ansar*.

western nations have been more likely to seek funds from individual citizens of these countries and run advertisements in local newspapers and publications. Most often, the advertisements appeal to the public to support charity organizations in Palestine and do not state their official affiliation with Hamas or any of the military wings that have been linked to violence.

But the main question that still remains unanswered is whether the development of transnational networks allows groups such as those mentioned above to more easily pursue their political objectives even when those political objectives involve the use of violence. The evidence to support an answer to this question is not yet conclusive, but it appears that the development of some types of transnational networks allows the group greater mobility and flexibility in the face of constraints that may be imposed within the borders of the homeland. Transnational networks such as those presented in the table in Appendix A, therefore, might have been particularly useful during periods of greater “policing” by the state.

If a given group feels that its political options are limited by state intervention during certain times (such as after a political assassination or during a peace negotiation), there is a possibility that it may extend its political activities through the use of

²⁶ “Hamas fundraisers active in Canada according to FBI report.” *Insight on the News*, September 16, 2002. In Arab countries such as Yemen and Syria, the practice of soliciting funds from the citizenry as a charitable organization outside of recognizable religious institutions is less of an established tradition. Furthermore, the per capita income of citizens of these countries makes them an unlikely target of large scale advertising. Of course, this does not preclude large donations from wealthy individuals to these groups, but the evidence of such donations is only alleged and not disclosed by any source to my knowledge.

transnational networks. Indeed, Zo Artzeinu, for example, immediately called on its donors and supporters after a decision made by the Israeli court to ban Moshe Feiglin from participation in the recent 2003 Israeli parliamentary elections.²⁷

Transnational networks undoubtedly play a role in how ethno-religious groups mobilize and pursue their political objectives, but the data on how this happens is not yet conclusive. It seems unlikely that any group will forego the development of at least some types of transnational networks and that these will probably have an overall positive effect on a group's organization and potential for mobilization. The initial evidence would suggest that transnational networks of all types appear to have *more* importance for those groups that have engaged in violence already, but that these networks are not the primary impetus for engaging in violence. These networks seem to provide these groups with the tools to *continue* to engage in violence even in the presence of constraints within the transnational setting such as anti-terrorism legislation. Hamas, for example, has engaged in more violent attacks in the last two years than in the entire period prior to 2000.²⁸ If transnational networks matter, then Hamas is evidence that being transnational is a beneficial choice for furthering group objectives.

²⁷ "Moshe Feiglin's Response to the Supreme Court Ruling," *Manhigut Yehudit*, May 19, 2003.

²⁸ See Appendix E: Graph 4.4: "Suicide Bombings in Israel, 1993-2002" and Appendix F: Graph 6.1-Violent Incidents by Group, 1987-2002."

CONCLUSION

“The absence of war is not peace.”

President John F. Kennedy

This study has aimed at dissecting the multi-disciplinary literature on fundamentalism and ethnic conflict. In particular, it seeks to better explain the frequently debated question about whether the motives and strategies of religious and ethnic actors are the same as those of other political actors. Differently stated, does religious fundamentalism operate on the same assumptions? One answer to this question is that ethno-religious nationalism, as I have termed it, is indeed different in its language and its world-view, but its goals are mainly the same; that is, the pursuit of political power, legitimacy, and the furthering of specific ideological objectives.

Although ethno-religious discourse exhibits what can be called an unmistakable primordialism, it would be a mistake to underestimate the presence of pragmatic and rational politics within “fundamentalism.” Ethno-religious nationalists learn from their successes and from their mistakes. It is important if we wish to understand political actors such as *al-Qaeda* and others that we not attribute their actions to the presence of irrational religious belief.¹

¹ An interesting, if not wholly convincing attempt to explain *al-Qaeda* in these terms is made by Michael Doran in his article, “The pragmatic fanaticism of *al-Qaeda*: an anatomy of extremism in Middle Eastern politics.” *Political Science Quarterly* 117(2) Summer 2002.

Donald Horowitz has made a similar argument pertaining to racial explanations of South African politics. He argues that the presence of a clear and obvious racial variable in most treatments of South Africa has led to a heavy dependence on this single explanation and a lack of theoretical sophistication with respect to other important variables such as class. He writes,

There is a conflict in South Africa that has something to do with race. That is about as far as agreement runs among many of the participants and interpreters of the conflict. Beyond that, there is disagreement over the extent to which the conflict is really about race, as opposed to being about oppression merely in the guise of race, or about nationalism among groups demarcated by race, or contending claims to the same land.²

The second question that has grown central to the discussion of ethnic conflict and fundamentalism is whether or not ethnic and religious nationalism will be transformed through a process of transnationalization? The most obvious extension of this question is whether or not groups such as *al-Qaeda* have an unlimited transnational potential for growth, either in human terms or in terms of their financial resources. This research has addressed this question directly by examining the potential of different types of transnational networks. While it is premature to assert the claim that transnational networks are explanations in and of themselves, it appears that the presence of complex systems of transnational networks provide individual groups with increased potential for mobilization and organization.

² Donald Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); p. 1.

The previous five chapters then, are a modest step towards a better understanding of the nexus between political *speech* and political *action* among ethnic and religious nationalists. In Chapters One and Two, two social movements (Gush Emunim and the Palestinian Islamist Movement) are discussed in terms of their ideological, political and historical evolution within the Israeli and Palestinian populaces. These social movements are made up of dozens of competing groups who, in some respects, share similar political and religious visions. Six of these individual groups were singled out for further examination within this context.

In Chapter Three, the subject of ethno-religious discourse was developed as the key to understanding how ethno-religious nationalists *engage* in politics. I argued that ethno-religious discourse is a specific type of political narrative that, if carefully interpreted, reveals group strategy and objectives and is flexible and responsive to political change. Moreover, I believe that although core elements of ethno-religious discourse remain static, the “embedded frames” that identify individual group narratives are dynamic and have the potential to drive political debate within these movements. I have explored the possibility that there are other ways of defining ethnic conflict that does not necessarily include the presence of physical incidents of violence. Ethno-religious discourse, in my estimation, is a unique *type* of conflict that has the potential to function independently in a purely discursive realm.

Chapter Four sought a better answer to the question of why some ethno-religious groups engage in violence while others do not? It examined each group’s access to

political opportunities and behavior in response to various levels of repression and control by the state. While both lack of opportunities and experience with repression are obviously impediments to group mobilization, neither fully explains why some groups choose violence.

Finally, Chapter Five carried forward the discussion of *internal* or state-based options available to a group and instead, offered some preliminary observations about the potential effects that various types of transnational networks seem to have on group mobilization, organization and especially, on whether the group chooses to engage in violence. In many ways, this fifth chapter has extended itself to the limits of the theoretical and academic literature on transnationalism that is available at this time and therefore, will be more broadly developed in future research. The conclusions made are also often tentative due to a deficit of consistent and concrete information about how each group engages in fundraising and other organizational activities. This is exacerbated by the fact that the groups that have engaged in violence are mainly clandestine and secretive. Nonetheless, I believe the chapter offers a few useful insights that deserve attention.

Effects of Transnational Networks on ethno-religious discourse

First, with regard to Hypothesis (1), several of the six ethno-religious groups examined in this study seem to engage in strategic reframing of their political speech when it is directed at co-ethnics and co-religionists outside the “homeland.” This is not

to say that a group's main political objectives have undergone reevaluation, but that the group has made a conscious effort to tailor political speech in a way that resonates with each respective audience.

This is evident in some of the transnational internet publications that are linked to Hamas. On the main webpage of the Palestinian Information Centre (PIC),³ for example, the reader may choose to read about the organization in several different languages. If one chooses to read the site's information in English, there is one set of choices and in Arabic, Urdu, and Russian, other choices. Notably, the Arabic version of the website provides a direct link to the official Hamas website and to the original Hamas *bayanat* (leaflets) in Arabic. The English language link on this website does not offer this option.⁴

A second important finding that emerges from my examination of nearly ten years of homeland and transnational publications disseminated by each of these groups is that the content of ethno-religious discourse itself seems to undergo a change from the national to the transnational audience. That is, the ethnic and religious dimensions of the discourse remains intact, but specific references to "time and place" diminish in many transnational publications. Gone are direct references to daily events, specific group leaders, and local organizational meetings and items of interest. In their place are "issue-poor" and diluted collective action frames. There appears to be a slight difference on this

³ See Chapter Five and accompanying appendix for a list of other transnational networks for each group.

⁴ The English-language part of the website did, at one time, include a hypertext link to Hamas' official website. Because of periodic difficulty in accessing these sites, it is not clear exactly when the link was removed, but it seems to have been after September 11, 2001.

point between the transnational publications of groups that have engaged in violence and those that have not. In the case of those groups that have *not* engaged in violence, there is a notable absence of any credible solution to the problems they portray in their ethno-religious discourse.

The reasons for this dilution of the ethno-religious discourse are not entirely clear nor can they be asserted with confidence in the absence of a more comprehensive comparison with other cases. However, because the change appears more clearly among those groups that have engaged in violence, there is at least partial evidence that these groups are also responding strategically to the political environment in which they find themselves. If groups indeed reframe their political speech according to their audience, this fact would underline the central role of strategy in group mobilization even as the narrative of ethno-religious discourse grows ever more mythical and apocalyptic. It seems probable that “successful” ethno-religious groups are those groups that develop a clear sense of the kinds of news that is likely to be of interest to co-ethnics in the “homeland” as well as what will appeal to their respective ethnic diasporas. In a fundraising letter sent out by Kahane Net⁵, for example, the author requests that readers:

empower us with the necessary resources to succeed in changing the face of Israel and saving Israel, before it is too late...Please help us. Every \$2000 helps us publish another 500 books.⁶

⁵ To my knowledge, Kahane Net is an effort by Kahane Chai to evade the ban on its fundraising activities in the US as part of the US Designated List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (DFTOs). See further information on how Kahane Chai has evaded US restrictions in “US Fails to Halt Cash Flow to Israeli Extremist Groups,” *The Jerusalem Report*, December 14, 1995, p. 8.

The same organization is credited with the most vicious and xenophobic forms of political expression in Israel.⁷ Therefore, the ethno-religious discourses that appear to be most effective as *strategies* include the following components: 1) a strong and well-defined group identity, 2) an explicit or implicit “Enemy Other” 3) explicit or implicit references to the “Enemy Within,” and most importantly, 4) a prescribed solution or course of action to the problem that afflicts the ethnic or religious group in question.

Effects of Transnational Networks on Organizational Capacity and Violence

It appears that simply having transnational networks may have an overall positive effect on a group’s organization and potential for mobilization. But the preliminary evidence would suggest that transnational networks appear to have *more* importance for those groups that have engaged in violence. These networks seem to provide these groups with the tools to *continue* to engage in violence even in the presence of constraints within the transnational setting such as anti-terrorism legislation. This assertion is partially supported by the fact that both the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas were able to carry out dramatically more attacks during the years 2001 and 2002. This is startling given the fact that both in the homeland and in the transnational setting, there

⁶ Excerpted from a “Kahane Net” solicitation sent by Dr. Guszofsky (Dated תשנ"ה)

⁷ For information on some especially virulent expressions, see “Four held in Rabin-SS poster case,” *The Jerusalem Post*, November 26, 1995: pg. 1.

was more surveillance, policing, and anti-terrorism legislation aimed at these groups in particular.⁸

[See Figure 5- “Violent Incidents by Group, 1987-2002”]

There is not sufficient evidence at this time, however, to argue that transnational networks in and of themselves have the potential to induce a group towards engaging in violence. Nonetheless, the most “successful groups” in this regard maintain a diversity of types of networks and are decentralized in their organizational structure. That is, they are able to carry out their political objectives and survive and grow in a competitive political arena, as well as maintain an extensive array of both formal and informal networks. For example, Hamas has maintained a local presence in many communities in several countries, as well as a strong presence on the internet. Other groups, such as Women In Green and Zo Artzeinu have been less able to do so.

Group size, especially the size of the group’s leadership core also seems to have a direct impact on its potential organizational capacities. For example, Women In Green and Zo Artzeinu have been highly centralized under one or two charismatic leaders. This has created a top-down leadership that remains in control of almost all group activities even as the group develops its resources in the transnational setting. This centralization

⁸ It may also have been the result of strategic planning that was done prior to this period by these groups, or more likely, an infusion of funds from a donor state like Iran or Syria, but I do not think these factors explain all of the increase in the capacities of these two groups to implement their missions.

under one leader seems to be an impediment to groups that wish to survive, especially those that seek to augment themselves through various transnational networks. Notably, during the period when Zo Artzeinu's leaders, Moshe Feiglin and Shmuel Sackett were serving prison time in Israel, the activities and fundraising capabilities of the group were put on hold.⁹ Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, by contrast, have been forced to decentralize their leadership partly as a means of protection, but the likely outcome of this decentralization is that their organizational structure (both national and transnational) is therefore more flexible in the face of changing circumstances.

Finally, regardless of how extensive the transnational networks among these cases, the violence they have pursued is nonetheless directed at targets within the "homeland." That is to say, the exportability of group infrastructure and discourse has not resulted in an export of violence. In this way, these groups stand apart from other types of ethno-religious groups like *al-Qaeda*. Indeed, most ethno-religious groups are nationalist in their focus. This may eventually change, but at this time, fundamentalism stays close to home in most cases.

Future Implications

The future implications of ethno-religious nationalism in a transnational world are many. Two points merit brief mention here: First, will transnational networks reduce the

⁹ Moshe Feiglin attested to this problem at a Zo Artzeinu rally held in protest of Camp David II at the Lion's Gate in the Old City of Jerusalem. *Taped interview with Moshe Feiglin*, July 13, 2000.

motivation of an ethno-religious group to seek compromise or participation within the homeland? Second, will transnational networks remain *cheap* political options or will their cost increase as the international emphasis on terrorism and ethnic activism grows?

The choice of ethno-religious groups to stay outside the system and instead, become transnational, is not fully explained by a lack of political opportunities nor by the presence of repression. Therefore, it does not seem likely that the mere presence of transnational networks will be the basis for a decision about whether to seek compromise or participation in the future. Among groups within Gush Emunim and the Palestinian Islamic Movement, the choice of individual groups to become part of the system was present at different times and was, for the most part, rejected even before some of these groups had a significant transnational presence. The question that remains unanswered is what strategic gains are made by groups when they remain extra-parliamentary organizations in a parliamentary system. Does this “outsider” position afford the movement extra freedom in some areas and yet, constrain them in others? If so, do these freedoms expand even further in the transnational realm?

If ethno-religious groups opt to extend their organizational capacities beyond homeland, there must be both a political and economic cost to being transnational. Politically, a group may face a potential loss of centralization in its attempt to maintain transnational networks. This is especially true of certain types of transnational networks that require a staff, operational funds, or offices and is less true of networks that are mainly technological mouthpieces for group propaganda. Another political cost that is

incurred by a group that develops itself through transnational networks is that it is subject to the limitations imposed by the states or mediums in which it is found. Newsletters can be banned or restricted and internet sites can be sabotaged by other groups or interrupted by state controls. The degree to which this has been the case for most of the groups in this study is low, but may become increasingly relevant as the United States and other Western powers limit the dissemination of speech through such networks as part of state efforts to limit extremism and terrorism.

If a group has both a strong local infrastructure as well as significant transnational networks, it appears that there is a greater likelihood that the group will succeed in making itself less vulnerable to the state. This process may yield different results for the group. The mere presence of even basic transnational networks, particularly for groups that are based in weak states, provides this opportunity.¹⁰ The type of activity such groups choose to pursue may include acts of militancy and violence directed from the outside in. On the other hand, if a group wishes to simultaneously build a support base in its own homeland environment, it also may benefit from maintaining transnational networks so long as its focus remains local and does not create cleavages between different locations that would threaten to undermine group cohesiveness. Transnational networks, therefore, are a cheap option and appear to assist groups in many ways. In

¹⁰ Sislin and Pearson argue that the states that are most prone to violence by ethnic and communal contenders are those that are semi-democratic or transitional democracies, while democratic and autocratic states encounter fewer episodes of violence. They call this the “inverted U-relationship” between state type and violence. See Sislin and Pearson, *Arms and Ethnic Conflict* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001): pp. 8-9.

some cases, transnational networks do have the potential to hurt groups, but because of the relatively low level of cooperation between states, it is still somewhat uncommon to see coordinated efforts to repress the same group across multiple countries.¹¹

By carefully examining whether there is a link between what ethno-religious nationalist movements say, types of transnational networks, and the presence or absence of violence over time, much can be learned about the variables that shape the process of ethnic and religious mobilization. In general, this research seeks to contribute to empirical, as well as qualitative knowledge about the organizational dynamics of specific ethno-religious groups in the Middle East.

Finally, this research has placed heavy emphasis on the salience of ethno-religious nationalism, both at the level of discourse and at the level of political behavior. I have connected it to the various debates about fundamentalism and ethnic conflict. Indeed, how these questions are answered will determine whether scholars or policymakers will have the ability to address the political challenges presented by ethno-religious nationalists who maintain that they engage in conflict and violence on direct “orders from God.”

¹¹ *It remains to be seen whether counter-terrorism efforts as part of the “War on Terror” will result in effective measures and limits against groups that have transnational networks in multiple states. Thus far, the results are not convincing.*

FIGURE 1

Master and Embedded Frames in Ethno-Religious Discourse

The ideas and symbols in a master frame change very slowly and can afford to change in this way because they are very general and not as highly relevant to the daily pace of political events. For example, in Gush Emunim discourse, the idea of “transfer” is very ambiguous is expressed in different ways by different groups.

Embedded frames, by contrast, must bear the burden of reframing the meaning of a given idea so that it is linked to the objectives and narrative of a specific group. This gives the idea dynamism within the master frame without threatening its general symbolic utility for the entire movement. Sometimes, the reframing of a particular idea does change the overall master frame, but the embedded frames can afford to change more quickly and be more reactive to specific events.




TABLE 1: TYPES OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES

| GROUP | TYPES OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES ¹ | | | |
|----------------------------|---|--|--------------|-------------------------|
| | INSTITUTIONAL OPENNESS/CLOSURE ² | elite/institutional alliances ³ | elite allies | repression ⁴ |
| <i>Hamas</i> | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 (severe) |
| <i>PIJ</i> | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 (severe) |
| <i>Zo Artzeinu</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1(moderate) |
| Women In Green | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 (insignificant) |
| <i>Kahane Chai</i> | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1(moderate) |
| The Islamic Movement (IMI) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1(moderate) |

¹ These categories of political opportunities are adopted and modified from McAdam (1996). The numerical values presented are my own.


² Measured as a dummy variable, 0 is an illegal movement while 1 is a legal movement.

³ Measured as having a political party or group that seeks to secure movement interests in the formal political process. For this reason, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) as well as Kahane Chai, have a value of zero. The Islamic Movement in Israel is ranked as a zero as well, but if considered as two movements (Northern and Southern) the latter may be ranked as "1" because of its affiliations with the United Arab List.

⁴ Repression is measured as government actions to limit group political participation (in addition to preventing it from barring it from legal participation), arresting or imprisoning its members, or assassinating and deporting members.

FIGURE 2


Criminal Offenses Against Israeli Security Under Emergency Law, 1992-2002



Source: Israeli Bureau of Statistics, Online Machine Readable File.

FIGURE 3


Criminal Offenses Against Israeli Security, 1995



Source: Israeli Bureau of Statistics, Online Machine Readable File.


Note: Former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated in November 1995.

FIGURE 4- Suicide Bombings in Israel, 1992-2002



Note: Suicide bombings were not employed before 1993. The numbers above reflect the actions of all groups who engaged in this type of militancy. The data is gleaned from various newspaper reports.

FIGURE 5- Violent Incidents by Group, 1987-2002



Source: "Terror Attack Database," The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya, Israel

APPENDIX A: Transnational Networks By Group

| Group | OFFICIAL GROUP WEBSITE | PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA** | Transnational Fundraising | PUBLIC FUNDRAISING MEDIA DISTRIBUTION OFFICES RELIGIOUS TRAINING ACADEMIES |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|--|
| Hamas | yes | <input type="checkbox"/> <i>al-Watan</i> (newspaper) <input type="checkbox"/> <i>Filastin al-Muslima</i> (magazine) <input type="checkbox"/> Palestine Information Centre (website) | yes | <input type="checkbox"/> The Islamic Association for Palestine (Chicago) <input type="checkbox"/> The Holyland Foundation (Chicago) <input type="checkbox"/> The Palestinian Information Centre (London) |
| Palestinian Islamic Jihad | yes | <input type="checkbox"/> <i>al-Istiqlal</i> (Gaza) <input type="checkbox"/> <i>al-Mujahid</i> (Beirut) <input type="checkbox"/> alqudsway.com (Illinois, New Jersey) | yes | <input type="checkbox"/> unknown since 1996 |
| Kahane Chai | yes | <input type="checkbox"/> The Way of the Torah (newsletter) <input type="checkbox"/> The Judean Voice (magazine) | yes | <input type="checkbox"/> American Friends of Yeshiva Rav Meir (Brooklyn) <input type="checkbox"/> <i>Ha-Tikva</i> Religious Training Center (Brooklyn) |
| Zo Artzeinu | yes | <input type="checkbox"/> <i>L'Chathilah</i> (newsletter) <input type="checkbox"/> editorials via Arutz-7 <input type="checkbox"/> The Jewish Press (Brooklyn) | yes | <input type="checkbox"/> American Friends of Zo Artzeinu |
| Women in Green | yes | <input type="checkbox"/> Women In Green website <input type="checkbox"/> editorials via Arutz-7 <input type="checkbox"/> editorials in main and right-wing press | yes | <input type="checkbox"/> Women for Israel's tomorrow (Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Toronto) |
| The Islamic Movement | no | <input type="checkbox"/> <i>Sawt al-Haq wa al-Hurriyah</i> (The Voice of Truth and Freedom) <input type="checkbox"/> <i>al-Mithaq</i> (The Covenant) | yes | <input type="checkbox"/> unknown |

** All publications other than those noted are official group newspapers (daily or weekly circulation.)

APPENDIX B

Content Analysis Of Ethno-Religious Discourse The Hamas Charter (*Mithaq* Hamas)- 1988

| | Preface | Intro | One | Two | Three | Four | Five | Postscript |
|------------------------------------|---------|--------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|--|
| No. of articles | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 12 | 11 | 2 | 1 |
| No. of Qur'anic quotes | 1 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 10 | 12 | 2 | 1 |
| No. of Hadith quotes | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| No. of uncited quotes ⁱ | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| No. of others quotes | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Chapter Title | ---- | <i>al-Muqadima</i> | <i>al-Ta'rif bil-Haraka</i> | <i>al-Ahdaf</i> | <i>al-Estrategiyah wa al-Wasa'il</i> | <i>Mawaqifuna</i> | <i>Shahadat al-Tarikh</i> | <i>Haraka al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya Junud</i> |

| | No. of Quotations | Percentage of total | Sources |
|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|
| QUR'AN | 34 | 66.66 | |
| al-Baqara | 4 of 34 | 7.8 | Verses: 120,130, 251,256 |
| al-'Imran | 4 of 34 | 7.8 | Verses: 12,102,110-112,118 |
| al-Ma'ida | 3 of 34 | 5.9 | Verses: 48,64,64 |
| Other surahs | 23 of 34 | 67.6 | ---- |
| HADITH | 7 | 13.7 | |
| Cited | 5 of 7 | 9.8 | ----- |
| Uncited | 2 of 7 | 3.9 | ----- |
| INDIVIDUALS | 3 | 6.0 | |
| Hasan al-Banna | 1 of 3 | 2.0 | unknown |
| Muhammad Iqbal | 1 of 3 | 2.0 | unknown |
| Amjad al-Zahawee | 1 of 3 | 2.0 | unknown |
| OTHERS | 7 | 13.7 | unknown |
| TOTALS | 51 | 100 | |

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